The Samba-Bugzilla – Attachment 7018 Details for
Bug 8541
readlink() on Linux clients fails if the symlink target is outside of the share
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[patch]
Raw patch for 3.6.1
look1 (text/plain), 5.27 KB, created by
Jeremy Allison
on 2011-10-21 21:16:25 UTC
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Description:
Raw patch for 3.6.1
Filename:
MIME Type:
Creator:
Jeremy Allison
Created:
2011-10-21 21:16:25 UTC
Size:
5.27 KB
patch
obsolete
>diff --git a/source3/include/smb.h b/source3/include/smb.h >index 3a64af7..549ebb2 100644 >--- a/source3/include/smb.h >+++ b/source3/include/smb.h >@@ -1714,6 +1714,7 @@ struct smb_file_time { > #define UCF_ALWAYS_ALLOW_WCARD_LCOMP 0x00000002 > #define UCF_COND_ALLOW_WCARD_LCOMP 0x00000004 > #define UCF_POSIX_PATHNAMES 0x00000008 >+#define UCF_UNIX_NAME_LOOKUP 0x00000010 > > /* > * smb_filename >diff --git a/source3/smbd/filename.c b/source3/smbd/filename.c >index 25301e6..691a779 100644 >--- a/source3/smbd/filename.c >+++ b/source3/smbd/filename.c >@@ -977,26 +977,39 @@ NTSTATUS unix_convert(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, > } > > /**************************************************************************** >- Check a filename - possibly calling check_reduced_name. >- This is called by every routine before it allows an operation on a filename. >- It does any final confirmation necessary to ensure that the filename is >- a valid one for the user to access. >+ Ensure a path is not vetod. > ****************************************************************************/ > >-NTSTATUS check_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *name) >+NTSTATUS check_veto_path(connection_struct *conn, const char *name) > { > if (IS_VETO_PATH(conn, name)) { > /* Is it not dot or dot dot. */ >- if (!((name[0] == '.') && (!name[1] || >- (name[1] == '.' && !name[2])))) { >- DEBUG(5,("check_name: file path name %s vetoed\n", >+ if (!(ISDOT(name) || ISDOTDOT(name))) { >+ DEBUG(5,("check_veto_path: file path name %s vetoed\n", > name)); > return map_nt_error_from_unix(ENOENT); > } > } >+ return NT_STATUS_OK; >+} >+ >+/**************************************************************************** >+ Check a filename - possibly calling check_reduced_name. >+ This is called by every routine before it allows an operation on a filename. >+ It does any final confirmation necessary to ensure that the filename is >+ a valid one for the user to access. >+****************************************************************************/ >+ >+NTSTATUS check_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *name) >+{ >+ NTSTATUS status = check_veto_path(conn, name); >+ >+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >+ return status; >+ } > > if (!lp_widelinks(SNUM(conn)) || !lp_symlinks(SNUM(conn))) { >- NTSTATUS status = check_reduced_name(conn,name); >+ status = check_reduced_name(conn,name); > if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { > DEBUG(5,("check_name: name %s failed with %s\n",name, > nt_errstr(status))); >@@ -1314,6 +1327,12 @@ NTSTATUS filename_convert(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, > return status; > } > >+ if ((ucf_flags & UCF_UNIX_NAME_LOOKUP) && >+ VALID_STAT((*pp_smb_fname)->st) && >+ S_ISLNK((*pp_smb_fname)->st.st_ex_mode)) { >+ return check_veto_path(conn, (*pp_smb_fname)->base_name); >+ } >+ > status = check_name(conn, (*pp_smb_fname)->base_name); > if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { > DEBUG(3,("filename_convert: check_name failed " >diff --git a/source3/smbd/proto.h b/source3/smbd/proto.h >index c455ffe..1e5d891 100644 >--- a/source3/smbd/proto.h >+++ b/source3/smbd/proto.h >@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ NTSTATUS unix_convert(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, > const char *orig_path, > struct smb_filename **smb_fname, > uint32_t ucf_flags); >+NTSTATUS check_veto_path(connection_struct *conn, const char *name); > NTSTATUS check_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *name); > int get_real_filename(connection_struct *conn, const char *path, > const char *name, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, >diff --git a/source3/smbd/trans2.c b/source3/smbd/trans2.c >index 0931fff..284635d 100644 >--- a/source3/smbd/trans2.c >+++ b/source3/smbd/trans2.c >@@ -2271,6 +2271,7 @@ static void call_trans2findfirst(connection_struct *conn, > TALLOC_CTX *ctx = talloc_tos(); > struct dptr_struct *dirptr = NULL; > struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = req->sconn; >+ uint32_t ucf_flags = (UCF_SAVE_LCOMP | UCF_ALWAYS_ALLOW_WCARD_LCOMP); > > if (total_params < 13) { > reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); >@@ -2314,6 +2315,7 @@ close_if_end = %d requires_resume_key = %d level = 0x%x, max_data_bytes = %d\n", > reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_LEVEL); > goto out; > } >+ ucf_flags |= UCF_UNIX_NAME_LOOKUP; > break; > default: > reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_LEVEL); >@@ -5103,6 +5105,7 @@ static void call_trans2qfilepathinfo(connection_struct *conn, > } else { > uint32_t name_hash; > char *fname = NULL; >+ uint32_t ucf_flags = 0; > > /* qpathinfo */ > if (total_params < 7) { >@@ -5114,9 +5117,16 @@ static void call_trans2qfilepathinfo(connection_struct *conn, > > DEBUG(3,("call_trans2qfilepathinfo: TRANSACT2_QPATHINFO: level = %d\n", info_level)); > >- if (INFO_LEVEL_IS_UNIX(info_level) && !lp_unix_extensions()) { >- reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_LEVEL); >- return; >+ if (INFO_LEVEL_IS_UNIX(info_level)) { >+ if (!lp_unix_extensions()) { >+ reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_LEVEL); >+ return; >+ } >+ if (info_level == SMB_QUERY_FILE_UNIX_BASIC || >+ info_level == SMB_QUERY_FILE_UNIX_INFO2 || >+ info_level == SMB_QUERY_FILE_UNIX_LINK) { >+ ucf_flags |= UCF_UNIX_NAME_LOOKUP; >+ } > } > > srvstr_get_path(req, params, req->flags2, &fname, ¶ms[6], >@@ -5131,7 +5141,7 @@ static void call_trans2qfilepathinfo(connection_struct *conn, > conn, > req->flags2 & FLAGS2_DFS_PATHNAMES, > fname, >- 0, >+ ucf_flags, > NULL, > &smb_fname); > if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
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