Attachment 5799 Details for Bug 6411 – Avoid substition of patterns in substituted part of the chat string

[patch] Avoid substition of patterns in substituted part of the chat string

samba-bug-6411-chgpasswd-avoid-replace-in-oldpasswd.patch (text/plain), 2.39 KB, created by Roel van Meer on 2010-06-17 05:16:23 UTC

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Creator: Roel van Meer

Created: 2010-06-17 05:16:23 UTC

Size: 2.39 KB

patch

obsolete

>diff -ruN samba-3.5.3.a/source3/smbd/chgpasswd.c samba-3.5.3.b/source3/smbd/chgpasswd.c
>--- samba-3.5.3.a/source3/smbd/chgpasswd.c	2010-06-16 16:38:29.000000000 +0200
>+++ samba-3.5.3.b/source3/smbd/chgpasswd.c	2010-06-17 10:45:16.000000000 +0200
>@@ -240,6 +240,59 @@
> 	return (True);
> }
> 
>+static char *expand_pass_patterns(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, const char *patstr,
>+			const char *oldpass, const char *newpass)
>+{
>+	int i;
>+	ssize_t chat_len, op_len, np_len, pat_len, insert_len, ld;
>+	char *s,*p,*chatstr;
>+	const char *insert;
>+
>+	chat_len = (ssize_t)strlen(patstr);
>+	op_len = (ssize_t)strlen(oldpass);
>+	np_len = (ssize_t)strlen(newpass);
>+	pat_len = 2;
>+
>+	chatstr = talloc_strdup(ctx, patstr);
>+	if (chatstr == NULL) {
>+		DEBUG(0, ("expand_pass_patterns: talloc_strdup failed\n"));
>+		return NULL;
>+	}
>+
>+	for (i = chat_len-1; i>=0; i--) {
>+		p = chatstr+i;
>+		/* All patterns start with '%' */
>+		if (*p != '%') {
>+			continue;
>+		}
>+		if (p == (s = strstr_m(p, "%n"))) {
>+			ld = np_len - pat_len;
>+			insert = newpass;
>+			insert_len = np_len;
>+		} else if (p == (s = strstr_m(p, "%o"))) {
>+			ld = op_len - pat_len;
>+			insert = oldpass;
>+			insert_len = op_len;
>+		} else {
>+			continue;
>+		}
>+
>+		if (ld > 0) {
>+			chatstr = TALLOC_REALLOC(ctx, chatstr, chat_len + ld + 1);
>+			if (!chatstr) {
>+				DEBUG(0, ("expand_pass_patterns: out "
>+					"of memory!\n"));
>+				return (NULL);
>+			}
>+		}
>+		if (insert_len != 2) {
>+			memmove(p+insert_len,p+2,strlen(p+2)+1);
>+		}
>+		memcpy(p, insert, insert_len);
>+	}
>+	return (chatstr);
>+}
>+
> static int expect(int master, const char *issue, const char *expected,
> 			const char *oldpass, const char *newpass)
> {
>@@ -253,25 +306,7 @@
> 	 * We know we're safe allowing "unsafe" characters here
>  	 * as we know there are no embedded control characters.
>  	 */
>-	newissue = talloc_string_sub2(talloc_tos(),
>-					issue,
>-					"%o",
>-					oldpass,
>-					false,	/* remove_unsafe_characters */
>-					false,  /* replace_once */
>-					true);  /* allow_trailing_dollar */
>-	if (!newissue) {
>-		DEBUG(1,("expect: talloc fail\n"));
>-		return false;
>-	}
>-
>-	newissue = talloc_string_sub2(talloc_tos(),
>-					newissue,
>-					"%n",
>-					newpass,
>-					false,	/* remove_unsafe_characters */
>-					false,  /* replace_once */
>-					true);  /* allow_trailing_dollar */
>+	newissue = expand_pass_patterns(talloc_tos(), issue, oldpass, newpass);
> 	if (!newissue) {
> 		DEBUG(1,("expect: talloc fail\n"));
> 		return false;

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