The Samba-Bugzilla – Attachment 18906 Details for
Bug 16034
CVE-2026-4408 [SECURITY] Remote Code Execution in SAMR
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Initial advisory, CVE number pending
16034.txt (text/plain), 2.66 KB, created by
Volker Lendecke
on 2026-03-18 12:51:28 UTC
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Description:
Initial advisory, CVE number pending
Filename:
MIME Type:
Creator:
Volker Lendecke
Created:
2026-03-18 12:51:28 UTC
Size:
2.66 KB
patch
obsolete
>=========================================================== >== Subject: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution >== in Samba DCE/RPC SAMR server >== >== CVE ID#: >== >== Versions: All versions >== >== Summary: Samba file servers with samba-dcerpcd >== started as a system service are vulnerable >== to a remote code execution >=========================================================== > >=========== >Description >=========== > >Samba file servers offer the SamValidatePasswordChange and >SamValidatePasswordReset RPC services on the SAMR DCE/RPC service when >running over NCACN_IP_TCP. Both services pass a username and password >to the "check password script" that can be configured in smb.conf. > >If the "check password script" is configured with the "%u" >substitution character, the client-controlled username is passed to >the "check password script" without escaping shell meta-characters, >leading to a remote command execution vulnerability. > >This is a non-standard configuration in several ways: > >It affects Samba file servers and classic (non-AD) domain controllers >that have the "check password script" configured with the "%u" >substitution character. Active Directory Domain Controllers are not >affected, they do not expand the username via the "%u" substitution >character. > >Standard Samba file servers and classic domain controllers are also >only affected if the samba-dcerpcd service is started as a system >service, which can only happen if "rpc start on demand helpers" is set >to the non-default setting "no". In the default configuration for >DCE/RPC, smbd starts the samba-dcerpcd in a way that makes the >vulnerable code inaccessible. > >================== >Patch Availability >================== > >Patches addressing this issue have been posted to: > > https://www.samba.org/samba/security/ > >Additionally, Samba $VERSIONS have been issued >as security releases to correct the defect. Samba administrators are >advised to upgrade to these releases or apply the patch as soon >as possible. > >================== >CVSSv3 calculation >================== > >CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H 9.9 > >========== >Workaround >========== > >Start samba-dcerpc on demand, i.e. leave "rpc start on demand helpers" >at its default setting "yes". > >Change your "check password script" to not rely on the username passed >via "%u" but instead retrieve the username from the >SAMBA_CPS_ACCOUNT_NAME environment variable, remove "%u" from the >"check password script" setting. > >======= >Credits >======= > >Originally reported by Ron Ben Yizhak with SafeBreach > >========================================================== >== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility. >== The Samba Team >========================================================== >
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