Attachment 18222 Details for Bug 13688 – Patch for 4.19 backported from master

[patch] Patch for 4.19 backported from master

bug13688-v419.patch (text/plain), 52.32 KB, created by Ralph Böhme on 2024-01-09 09:59:26 UTC

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Creator: Ralph Böhme

Created: 2024-01-09 09:59:26 UTC

Size: 52.32 KB

patch

obsolete

>From 91da8d9ee7226b3f8029160176402c7ef3a79ef8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 19:40:21 +0100
>Subject: [PATCH 01/13] selftest: remove error_inject from shadow_write share
>
>Frankly, I can't remember why I added this as part of bug 13688. The
>goal of the corresponding test is to verify a write on a read-only
>file handle fails. As the file is opened O_RDONLY, the write will fail
>anyway and there's no need to inject the error.
>
>To make things worse, having the error injected meant we didn't notice
>when the underlying logic of forcing the open to be done with O_RDONLY
>was done as O_RDWR, resulting in the write on the handle to succeed.
>
>This happened when we introduced reopen_from_fsp(): the initial
>pathref open of a path with a twrp value was correctly detected and
>handled by shadow_copy2_openat(). However, when converting the pathref
>open to a real one via reopen_from_fsp(), shadow_copy2_openat() only
>sees the magic /proc/fd path and has no way of inferring that this was
>originating from a prevous version open with a twrp value.
>
>Tl;dr: we can just remove this error injection, it is not needed, the
>correct fix is to implement this in the SMB layer which is done in the
>subsequent commits.
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
>
>Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
>(cherry picked from commit 78119edba013583555069271bb61134c12c2c135)
>---
> selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.blackbox.shadow_copy_torture | 1 +
> selftest/target/Samba3.pm                                | 4 +---
> 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.blackbox.shadow_copy_torture
>
>diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.blackbox.shadow_copy_torture b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.blackbox.shadow_copy_torture
>new file mode 100644
>index 000000000000..16537e58aeb7
>--- /dev/null
>+++ b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.blackbox.shadow_copy_torture
>@@ -0,0 +1 @@
>+^samba3.blackbox.shadow_copy_torture.writing to shadow copy of a file$fileserver$
>diff --git a/selftest/target/Samba3.pm b/selftest/target/Samba3.pm
>index 44ac4a5901aa..b9990928f4b2 100755
>--- a/selftest/target/Samba3.pm
>+++ b/selftest/target/Samba3.pm
>@@ -3437,9 +3437,7 @@ sub provision($$)
> [shadow_write]
> 	path = $shadow_tstdir
> 	comment = previous versions snapshots under mount point
>-	vfs objects = shadow_copy2 streams_xattr error_inject
>-	aio write size = 0
>-	error_inject:pwrite = EBADF
>+	vfs objects = shadow_copy2 streams_xattr
> 	shadow:mountpoint = $shadow_tstdir
> 	shadow:fixinodes = yes
> 	smbd async dosmode = yes
>-- 
>2.43.0
>
>
>From 70bad6ff46f8c6f39c87116f5316dcb26fb93ca7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 10:40:39 +0100
>Subject: [PATCH 02/13] s4/libcli/raw: implemement
> RAW_SFILEINFO_LINK_INFORMATION
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
>
>Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
>(cherry picked from commit c62484bc2c60ebac42635793d94cb8e62629acbf)
>---
> source4/libcli/raw/rawsetfileinfo.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/source4/libcli/raw/rawsetfileinfo.c b/source4/libcli/raw/rawsetfileinfo.c
>index fec99d30b957..0ef509405091 100644
>--- a/source4/libcli/raw/rawsetfileinfo.c
>+++ b/source4/libcli/raw/rawsetfileinfo.c
>@@ -119,6 +119,20 @@ bool smb_raw_setfileinfo_passthru(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
> 				    parms->full_ea_information.in.eas.eas, 4);
> 		return true;
> 
>+	case RAW_SFILEINFO_LINK_INFORMATION:
>+		NEED_BLOB(20);
>+		memset(blob->data, 0, blob->length);
>+
>+		PUSH_LE_U8(blob->data, 0, parms->link_information.in.overwrite);
>+		PUSH_LE_U64(blob->data, 8, parms->link_information.in.root_fid);
>+
>+		len = smbcli_blob_append_string(
>+			NULL, mem_ctx, blob,
>+			parms->link_information.in.new_name,
>+			STR_UNICODE | STR_TERMINATE);
>+		PUSH_LE_U32(blob->data, 16, len - 2);
>+		return true;
>+
> 		/* Unhandled levels */
> 	case RAW_SFILEINFO_PIPE_INFORMATION:
> 	case RAW_SFILEINFO_VALID_DATA_INFORMATION:
>-- 
>2.43.0
>
>
>From 82ec2a46aa6a3a0d8b8f642557a6ac38c36d6770 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 19:55:23 +0100
>Subject: [PATCH 03/13] smbtorture: expand smb2.twrp.write test
>
>Test more modifying operations are blocked and access masks are correct.
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
>
>Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
>(cherry picked from commit 537eedfe2a79fba2e1f062f14ba7a0c5f8f70a88)
>---
> source4/torture/smb2/create.c | 245 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 242 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/source4/torture/smb2/create.c b/source4/torture/smb2/create.c
>index bee5d8961a30..b0cbbe144b46 100644
>--- a/source4/torture/smb2/create.c
>+++ b/source4/torture/smb2/create.c
>@@ -1753,6 +1753,18 @@ static bool test_twrp_write(struct torture_context *tctx, struct smb2_tree *tree
> 	uint64_t nttime;
> 	const char *file = NULL;
> 	const char *snapshot = NULL;
>+	uint32_t expected_access;
>+	union smb_fileinfo getinfo;
>+	union smb_setfileinfo setinfo;
>+	struct security_descriptor *sd = NULL, *sd_orig = NULL;
>+	const char *owner_sid = NULL;
>+	struct create_disps_tests {
>+		const char *file;
>+		uint32_t create_disposition;
>+		uint32_t create_options;
>+		NTSTATUS expected_status;
>+	};
>+	struct create_disps_tests *cd_test = NULL;
> 
> 	file = torture_setting_string(tctx, "twrp_file", NULL);
> 	if (file == NULL) {
>@@ -1794,11 +1806,102 @@ static bool test_twrp_write(struct torture_context *tctx, struct smb2_tree *tree
> 					"smb2_create\n");
> 	smb2_util_close(tree, io.out.file.handle);
> 
>-	ret = io.out.maximal_access & (SEC_FILE_READ_DATA | SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA);
>-	torture_assert_goto(tctx, ret, ret, done, "Bad access\n");
>+	expected_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_ALL &
>+				~(SEC_FILE_EXECUTE | SEC_DIR_DELETE_CHILD);
>+
>+	torture_assert_int_equal_goto(tctx,
>+				      io.out.maximal_access & expected_access,
>+				      expected_access,
>+				      ret, done, "Bad access\n");
>+
>+	{
>+		/*
>+		 * Test create dispositions
>+		 */
>+		struct create_disps_tests cd_tests[] = {
>+			{
>+				.file = file,
>+				.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN,
>+				.expected_status = NT_STATUS_OK,
>+			},
>+			{
>+				.file = file,
>+				.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF,
>+				.expected_status = NT_STATUS_OK,
>+			},
>+			{
>+				.file = file,
>+				.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OVERWRITE,
>+				.expected_status = NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED,
>+			},
>+			{
>+				.file = file,
>+				.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OVERWRITE_IF,
>+				.expected_status = NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED,
>+			},
>+			{
>+				.file = file,
>+				.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_SUPERSEDE,
>+				.expected_status = NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED,
>+			},
>+			{
>+				.file = "newfile",
>+				.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF,
>+				.expected_status = NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED,
>+			},
>+			{
>+				.file = "newfile",
>+				.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OVERWRITE_IF,
>+				.expected_status = NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED,
>+			},
>+			{
>+				.file = "newfile",
>+				.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE,
>+				.expected_status = NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED,
>+			},
>+			{
>+				.file = "newfile",
>+				.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_SUPERSEDE,
>+				.expected_status = NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED,
>+			},
>+			{
>+				.file = "newdir",
>+				.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF,
>+				.create_options = NTCREATEX_OPTIONS_DIRECTORY,
>+				.expected_status = NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED,
>+			},
>+			{
>+				.file = "newdir",
>+				.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_CREATE,
>+				.create_options = NTCREATEX_OPTIONS_DIRECTORY,
>+				.expected_status = NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED,
>+			},
>+			{
>+				.file = NULL,
>+			},
>+		};
>+
>+		for (cd_test = &cd_tests[0]; cd_test->file != NULL; cd_test++) {
>+			io = (struct smb2_create) {
>+				.in.fname = cd_test->file,
>+				.in.create_disposition = cd_test->create_disposition,
>+				.in.create_options = cd_test->create_options,
>+
>+				.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_READ_DATA,
>+				.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
>+				.in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK,
>+				.in.timewarp = nttime,
>+			};
>+
>+			status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &io);
>+			torture_assert_ntstatus_equal_goto(
>+				tctx, status, cd_test->expected_status, ret, done,
>+				"Bad status\n");
>+		}
>+	}
> 
> 	io = (struct smb2_create) {
>-		.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_READ_DATA|SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA,
>+		.in.desired_access = expected_access,
> 		.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
> 		.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN,
> 		.in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK,
>@@ -1816,9 +1919,145 @@ static bool test_twrp_write(struct torture_context *tctx, struct smb2_tree *tree
> 					   NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED,
> 					   ret, done, "smb2_create\n");
> 
>+	/*
>+	 * Verify access mask
>+	 */
>+
>+	ZERO_STRUCT(getinfo);
>+	getinfo.generic.level = RAW_FILEINFO_ACCESS_INFORMATION;
>+	getinfo.generic.in.file.handle = h1;
>+
>+	status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tree, &getinfo);
>+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
>+					"smb2_getinfo_file\n");
>+
>+	torture_assert_int_equal_goto(
>+		tctx,
>+		getinfo.access_information.out.access_flags,
>+		expected_access,
>+		ret, done,
>+		"Bad access mask\n");
>+
>+	/*
>+	 * Check we can't set various things
>+	 */
>+
>+	ZERO_STRUCT(getinfo);
>+	getinfo.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
>+	getinfo.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = h1;
>+	getinfo.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
>+
>+	status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &getinfo);
>+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
>+					"smb2_getinfo_file\n");
>+
>+	sd_orig = getinfo.query_secdesc.out.sd;
>+	owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid);
>+
>+	sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
>+					     0, NULL, NULL,
>+					     owner_sid,
>+					     SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
>+					     SEC_FILE_WRITE_DATA,
>+					     0,
>+					     NULL);
>+
>+	/* Try to set ACL */
>+
>+	ZERO_STRUCT(setinfo);
>+	setinfo.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
>+	setinfo.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = h1;
>+	setinfo.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
>+	setinfo.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
>+
>+	status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &setinfo);
>+	torture_assert_ntstatus_equal_goto(
>+		tctx,
>+		status,
>+		NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED,
>+		ret, done,
>+		"smb2_setinfo_file\n");
>+
>+	/* Try to delete */
>+
>+	ZERO_STRUCT(setinfo);
>+	setinfo.generic.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION;
>+	setinfo.disposition_info.in.delete_on_close = 1;
>+	setinfo.generic.in.file.handle = h1;
>+
>+	status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &setinfo);
>+	torture_assert_ntstatus_equal_goto(
>+		tctx,
>+		status,
>+		NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED,
>+		ret, done,
>+		"smb2_setinfo_file\n");
>+
>+	ZERO_STRUCT(setinfo);
>+	setinfo.basic_info.in.attrib = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_HIDDEN;
>+	setinfo.generic.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_BASIC_INFORMATION;
>+	setinfo.generic.in.file.handle = h1;
>+
>+	status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &setinfo);
>+	torture_assert_ntstatus_equal_goto(
>+		tctx,
>+		status,
>+		NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED,
>+		ret, done,
>+		"smb2_setinfo_file\n");
>+
>+	/* Try to truncate */
>+
>+	ZERO_STRUCT(setinfo);
>+	setinfo.generic.level = SMB_SFILEINFO_END_OF_FILE_INFORMATION;
>+	setinfo.generic.in.file.handle = h1;
>+	setinfo.end_of_file_info.in.size = 0x100000;
>+
>+	status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &setinfo);
>+	torture_assert_ntstatus_equal_goto(
>+		tctx,
>+		status,
>+		NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED,
>+		ret, done,
>+		"smb2_setinfo_file\n");
>+
>+	/* Try to set a hardlink */
>+
>+	ZERO_STRUCT(setinfo);
>+	setinfo.generic.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_LINK_INFORMATION;
>+	setinfo.generic.in.file.handle = h1;
>+	setinfo.link_information.in.new_name = "hardlink";
>+
>+	status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &setinfo);
>+	torture_assert_ntstatus_equal_goto(
>+		tctx,
>+		status,
>+		NT_STATUS_NOT_SAME_DEVICE,
>+		ret, done,
>+		"smb2_setinfo_file\n");
>+
>+	/* Try to rename */
>+
>+	ZERO_STRUCT(setinfo);
>+	setinfo.rename_information.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_RENAME_INFORMATION;
>+	setinfo.rename_information.in.file.handle = h1;
>+	setinfo.rename_information.in.new_name = "renamed";
>+
>+	status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &setinfo);
>+	torture_assert_ntstatus_equal_goto(
>+		tctx,
>+		status,
>+		NT_STATUS_NOT_SAME_DEVICE,
>+		ret, done,
>+		"smb2_setinfo_file\n");
>+
> 	smb2_util_close(tree, h1);
>+	ZERO_STRUCT(h1);
> 
> done:
>+	if (!smb2_util_handle_empty(h1)) {
>+		smb2_util_close(tree, h1);
>+	}
> 	return ret;
> }
> 
>-- 
>2.43.0
>
>
>From 858a7606457f1929d888ea42f25059fcc9d61237 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2023 13:06:55 +0100
>Subject: [PATCH 04/13] smbd: return the correct error in can_rename()
>
>This is what Windows returns for this case.
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
>
>Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
>(cherry picked from commit 276c5bd851ab6ab818a49d9c47f6b96de8024778)
>---
> source3/smbd/smb2_reply.c | 5 +++++
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_reply.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_reply.c
>index dfcd05d2cae1..a7c63c0df58e 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_reply.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_reply.c
>@@ -1140,6 +1140,11 @@ ssize_t sendfile_short_send(struct smbXsrv_connection *xconn,
> static NTSTATUS can_rename(connection_struct *conn, files_struct *fsp,
> 			uint16_t dirtype)
> {
>+	if (fsp->fsp_name->twrp != 0) {
>+		/* Get the error right, this is what Windows returns. */
>+		return NT_STATUS_NOT_SAME_DEVICE;
>+	}
>+
> 	if (!CAN_WRITE(conn)) {
> 		return NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED;
> 	}
>-- 
>2.43.0
>
>
>From 7f4d7e3247963b2d56c7f6118a0a0617b8c7233b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 16:27:42 +0100
>Subject: [PATCH 05/13] smbd: set fsp_flags.is_fsa to true on printer file
> handles
>
>Printer file handles went through SMB_VFS_CREATE_FILE() and are network
>callable, so it makes sense to set this on them.
>
>This ensures that check_access_fsp() doesn't take the codepath calling
>smbd_check_access_rights_fsp(), but just checks the request rights from
>fsp->access_mask.
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
>
>Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
>(cherry picked from commit 76c8fe16bff36a29fa326355256b50737d04bd85)
>---
> source3/printing/printspoolss.c | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>
>diff --git a/source3/printing/printspoolss.c b/source3/printing/printspoolss.c
>index 31117a4b7438..94404f7682ab 100644
>--- a/source3/printing/printspoolss.c
>+++ b/source3/printing/printspoolss.c
>@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ NTSTATUS print_spool_open(files_struct *fsp,
> 	fsp->sent_oplock_break = NO_BREAK_SENT;
> 	fsp->fsp_flags.is_directory = false;
> 	fsp->fsp_flags.delete_on_close = false;
>+	fsp->fsp_flags.is_fsa = true;
> 
> 	fsp->print_file = pf;
> 
>-- 
>2.43.0
>
>
>From 14357f42922a09b274fe561b9f778bf191372aab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 10:58:09 +0100
>Subject: [PATCH 06/13] smbd: rename check_access_fsp() to
> check_any_access_fsp()
>
>The semantics of the access check in check_access_fsp() itself is to
>allow access if *at least* one or more rights of the rights in
>access_mask are allowed. The name check_any_access_fsp() better
>reflects this.
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
>
>Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
>(cherry picked from commit 96b577c380fa914eb1ffa95849c82bdb88aa1ec6)
>---
> source3/smbd/proto.h              |  4 ++--
> source3/smbd/smb2_ioctl_filesys.c |  6 +++---
> source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c        | 15 ++++++++++-----
> 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/proto.h b/source3/smbd/proto.h
>index 78e1b48be09b..277b9660e9bd 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/proto.h
>+++ b/source3/smbd/proto.h
>@@ -1108,8 +1108,8 @@ NTSTATUS smb_set_file_disposition_info(connection_struct *conn,
> 				       files_struct *fsp,
> 				       struct smb_filename *smb_fname);
> NTSTATUS refuse_symlink_fsp(const struct files_struct *fsp);
>-NTSTATUS check_access_fsp(struct files_struct *fsp,
>-			  uint32_t access_mask);
>+NTSTATUS check_any_access_fsp(struct files_struct *fsp,
>+			      uint32_t access_mask);
> uint64_t smb_roundup(connection_struct *conn, uint64_t val);
> bool samba_private_attr_name(const char *unix_ea_name);
> NTSTATUS get_ea_value_fsp(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_ioctl_filesys.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_ioctl_filesys.c
>index 36429b8fd352..6cc53d4828ed 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_ioctl_filesys.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_ioctl_filesys.c
>@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static NTSTATUS fsctl_set_cmprn(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
> 	}
> 
> 	/* WRITE_DATA permission is required, WRITE_ATTRIBUTES is not */
>-	status = check_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_DATA);
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_DATA);
> 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> 		return status;
> 	}
>@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static NTSTATUS fsctl_zero_data(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
> 	}
> 
> 	/* WRITE_DATA permission is required */
>-	status = check_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_DATA);
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_DATA);
> 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> 		return status;
> 	}
>@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ static NTSTATUS fsctl_qar(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
> 	}
> 
> 	/* READ_DATA permission is required */
>-	status = check_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_READ_DATA);
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_READ_DATA);
> 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> 		return status;
> 	}
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c
>index 3eb4a2de8790..3a08eab9d912 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c
>@@ -72,8 +72,13 @@ NTSTATUS refuse_symlink_fsp(const files_struct *fsp)
> 	return NT_STATUS_OK;
> }
> 
>-NTSTATUS check_access_fsp(struct files_struct *fsp,
>-			  uint32_t access_mask)
>+/**
>+ * Check that one or more of the rights in access_mask are
>+ * allowed. Iow, access_mask can contain more then one right and
>+ * it is sufficient having only one of those granted to pass.
>+ **/
>+NTSTATUS check_any_access_fsp(struct files_struct *fsp,
>+			      uint32_t access_mask)
> {
> 	if (!fsp->fsp_flags.is_fsa) {
> 		return smbd_check_access_rights_fsp(fsp->conn->cwd_fsp,
>@@ -677,7 +682,7 @@ NTSTATUS set_ea(connection_struct *conn, files_struct *fsp,
> 		return status;
> 	}
> 
>-	status = check_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_EA);
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_EA);
> 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> 		return status;
> 	}
>@@ -4803,7 +4808,7 @@ static NTSTATUS smb_set_file_basic_info(connection_struct *conn,
> 		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_HANDLE;
> 	}
> 
>-	status = check_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES);
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES);
> 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> 		return status;
> 	}
>@@ -4874,7 +4879,7 @@ static NTSTATUS smb_set_info_standard(connection_struct *conn,
> 	DEBUG(10,("smb_set_info_standard: file %s\n",
> 		smb_fname_str_dbg(smb_fname)));
> 
>-	status = check_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES);
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES);
> 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> 		return status;
> 	}
>-- 
>2.43.0
>
>
>From d0db5da41132b24e7de222bcfe241786e71a1085 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 10:58:09 +0100
>Subject: [PATCH 07/13] smbd: fix check_any_access_fsp() for non-fsa fsps
>
>smbd_check_access_rights_fsp() requires *all* rights in access_mask to
>be granted by the underlying ACL, but the semantics of this function
>is supposed to grant access if any one of the rights in
>access_requested is allowed.
>
>Fix this by looping over the requested access mask. If
>smbd_check_access_rights_fsp() returns sucess, mask will be non-null
>and when assigned to access_granted, the subsequent check will pass,
>fail otherwise.
>
>I'm not doing an early exit on purpose because a subsequent commit
>adds additional security checks that are done in the subsequent code
>path common for fsa and non-fsa fsps.
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
>
>Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
>(cherry picked from commit bf497819e61131cfa6469971596af3aa9bd4bb49)
>---
> source3/smbd/proto.h       |  2 +-
> source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/proto.h b/source3/smbd/proto.h
>index 277b9660e9bd..6e54e11486fc 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/proto.h
>+++ b/source3/smbd/proto.h
>@@ -1109,7 +1109,7 @@ NTSTATUS smb_set_file_disposition_info(connection_struct *conn,
> 				       struct smb_filename *smb_fname);
> NTSTATUS refuse_symlink_fsp(const struct files_struct *fsp);
> NTSTATUS check_any_access_fsp(struct files_struct *fsp,
>-			      uint32_t access_mask);
>+			      uint32_t access_requested);
> uint64_t smb_roundup(connection_struct *conn, uint64_t val);
> bool samba_private_attr_name(const char *unix_ea_name);
> NTSTATUS get_ea_value_fsp(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c
>index 3a08eab9d912..fa3ffc546fcc 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c
>@@ -73,20 +73,40 @@ NTSTATUS refuse_symlink_fsp(const files_struct *fsp)
> }
> 
> /**
>- * Check that one or more of the rights in access_mask are
>- * allowed. Iow, access_mask can contain more then one right and
>+ * Check that one or more of the rights in access mask are
>+ * allowed. Iow, access_requested can contain more then one right and
>  * it is sufficient having only one of those granted to pass.
>  **/
> NTSTATUS check_any_access_fsp(struct files_struct *fsp,
>-			      uint32_t access_mask)
>+			      uint32_t access_requested)
> {
>-	if (!fsp->fsp_flags.is_fsa) {
>-		return smbd_check_access_rights_fsp(fsp->conn->cwd_fsp,
>-						    fsp,
>-						    false,
>-						    access_mask);
>+	uint32_t access_granted = 0;
>+	NTSTATUS status;
>+
>+	if (fsp->fsp_flags.is_fsa) {
>+		access_granted = fsp->access_mask;
>+	} else {
>+		uint32_t mask = 1;
>+
>+		while (mask != 0) {
>+			if (!(mask & access_requested)) {
>+				mask <<= 1;
>+				continue;
>+			}
>+
>+			status = smbd_check_access_rights_fsp(
>+							fsp->conn->cwd_fsp,
>+							fsp,
>+							false,
>+							mask);
>+			if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+				break;
>+			}
>+			mask <<= 1;
>+		}
>+		access_granted = mask;
> 	}
>-	if (!(fsp->access_mask & access_mask)) {
>+	if ((access_granted & access_requested) == 0) {
> 		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
> 	}
> 	return NT_STATUS_OK;
>-- 
>2.43.0
>
>
>From cd70545ed2a40bab564879cb42a94a469390176d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 11:19:38 +0100
>Subject: [PATCH 08/13] smbd: return correct error when trying to create a
> hardlink to a VSS file
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
>
>Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
>(cherry picked from commit a0ae45be770a13373c148a689b9761f14c4f942c)
>---
> source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c | 5 +++++
> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c
>index fa3ffc546fcc..2a90629ce61f 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c
>@@ -3788,6 +3788,11 @@ NTSTATUS hardlink_internals(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
> 		goto out;
> 	}
> 
>+	if (smb_fname_old->twrp != 0) {
>+		status = NT_STATUS_NOT_SAME_DEVICE;
>+		goto out;
>+	}
>+
> 	status = parent_pathref(talloc_tos(),
> 				conn->cwd_fsp,
> 				smb_fname_old,
>-- 
>2.43.0
>
>
>From 435fa115e61bbc563b33441c3e43f5c37822ce92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 18:03:22 +0100
>Subject: [PATCH 09/13] smbd: set fsp->fsp_flags.can_write to false for access
> to previous-versions
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
>
>Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
>(cherry picked from commit ee3035218df4cfd68b6aab6825c78f2b85234c6c)
>---
> source3/smbd/files.c | 3 +++
> source3/smbd/open.c  | 3 +++
> 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/files.c b/source3/smbd/files.c
>index b8640fd66770..02cfc4248222 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/files.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/files.c
>@@ -2148,6 +2148,9 @@ NTSTATUS dup_file_fsp(
> 	to->fsp_flags.can_write =
> 		CAN_WRITE(from->conn) &&
> 		((access_mask & (FILE_WRITE_DATA | FILE_APPEND_DATA)) != 0);
>+	if (from->fsp_name->twrp != 0) {
>+		to->fsp_flags.can_write = false;
>+	}
> 	to->fsp_flags.modified = from->fsp_flags.modified;
> 	to->fsp_flags.is_directory = from->fsp_flags.is_directory;
> 	to->fsp_flags.aio_write_behind = from->fsp_flags.aio_write_behind;
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/open.c b/source3/smbd/open.c
>index 3581c4b91731..8b08c9ad5dcc 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/open.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/open.c
>@@ -1678,6 +1678,9 @@ static NTSTATUS open_file(struct smb_request *req,
> 	fsp->fsp_flags.can_write =
> 		CAN_WRITE(conn) &&
> 		((access_mask & (FILE_WRITE_DATA | FILE_APPEND_DATA)) != 0);
>+	if (fsp->fsp_name->twrp != 0) {
>+		fsp->fsp_flags.can_write = false;
>+	}
> 	fsp->print_file = NULL;
> 	fsp->fsp_flags.modified = false;
> 	fsp->sent_oplock_break = NO_BREAK_SENT;
>-- 
>2.43.0
>
>
>From ddf579f146afebaded0609e64b553ecf96a767c0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 18:32:25 +0100
>Subject: [PATCH 10/13] smbd: replace CHECK_WRITE() macro with calls to
> check_any_access_fsp()
>
>The additional check if fd underlying fd is valid and not -1 should not be done
>at this place. I actually would prefer an write to fail with EBADF if this
>happens, as it's likely easier to debug why this happened. These days we should
>always have a valid fd.
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
>
>Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
>(cherry picked from commit 995a31c8d4c1789c16bae6b8196f2565d4b1dfdb)
>---
> source3/include/smb_macros.h    |  5 -----
> source3/modules/offload_token.c |  7 +++++--
> source3/smbd/smb1_reply.c       | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++------------
> source3/smbd/smb2_flush.c       |  3 ++-
> source3/smbd/smb2_write.c       |  6 ++++--
> 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/source3/include/smb_macros.h b/source3/include/smb_macros.h
>index 42ff9ffb0d45..1851709774a4 100644
>--- a/source3/include/smb_macros.h
>+++ b/source3/include/smb_macros.h
>@@ -74,11 +74,6 @@
> 	 (fsp_get_io_fd(fsp) != -1) && \
> 	 (((fsp)->fsp_flags.can_read)))
> 
>-#define CHECK_WRITE(fsp) \
>-	((fsp)->fsp_flags.can_write && \
>-	(!(fsp)->fsp_flags.is_pathref) && \
>-	 (fsp_get_io_fd(fsp) != -1))
>-
> #define ERROR_WAS_LOCK_DENIED(status) (NT_STATUS_EQUAL((status), NT_STATUS_LOCK_NOT_GRANTED) || \
> 				NT_STATUS_EQUAL((status), NT_STATUS_FILE_LOCK_CONFLICT) )
> 
>diff --git a/source3/modules/offload_token.c b/source3/modules/offload_token.c
>index 901991daf28d..3b71a0028fb7 100644
>--- a/source3/modules/offload_token.c
>+++ b/source3/modules/offload_token.c
>@@ -259,6 +259,8 @@ NTSTATUS vfs_offload_token_check_handles(uint32_t fsctl,
> 					 files_struct *src_fsp,
> 					 files_struct *dst_fsp)
> {
>+	NTSTATUS status;
>+
> 	if (src_fsp->vuid != dst_fsp->vuid) {
> 		DBG_INFO("copy chunk handles not in the same session.\n");
> 		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
>@@ -317,10 +319,11 @@ NTSTATUS vfs_offload_token_check_handles(uint32_t fsctl,
> 	 *
> 	 * A non writable dst handle also doesn't make sense for other fsctls.
> 	 */
>-	if (!CHECK_WRITE(dst_fsp)) {
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(dst_fsp, FILE_WRITE_DATA|FILE_APPEND_DATA);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> 		DBG_INFO("dest handle not writable (%s).\n",
> 			smb_fname_str_dbg(dst_fsp->fsp_name));
>-		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
>+		return status;
> 	}
> 	/*
> 	 * - The Open.GrantedAccess of the destination file does not include
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb1_reply.c b/source3/smbd/smb1_reply.c
>index 63ff98fb22b0..92cc7bf7dd11 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/smb1_reply.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/smb1_reply.c
>@@ -3926,8 +3926,9 @@ void reply_writebraw(struct smb_request *req)
> 		return;
> 	}
> 
>-	if (!CHECK_WRITE(fsp)) {
>-		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_DATA|FILE_APPEND_DATA);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+		reply_nterror(req, status);
> 		error_to_writebrawerr(req);
> 		END_PROFILE(SMBwritebraw);
> 		return;
>@@ -4157,8 +4158,9 @@ void reply_writeunlock(struct smb_request *req)
> 		return;
> 	}
> 
>-	if (!CHECK_WRITE(fsp)) {
>-		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_DATA|FILE_APPEND_DATA);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+		reply_nterror(req, status);
> 		END_PROFILE(SMBwriteunlock);
> 		return;
> 	}
>@@ -4292,8 +4294,9 @@ void reply_write(struct smb_request *req)
> 		return;
> 	}
> 
>-	if (!CHECK_WRITE(fsp)) {
>-		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_DATA|FILE_APPEND_DATA);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+		reply_nterror(req, status);
> 		END_PROFILE(SMBwrite);
> 		return;
> 	}
>@@ -4571,8 +4574,9 @@ void reply_write_and_X(struct smb_request *req)
> 		goto out;
> 	}
> 
>-	if (!CHECK_WRITE(fsp)) {
>-		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_DATA|FILE_APPEND_DATA);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+		reply_nterror(req, status);
> 		goto out;
> 	}
> 
>@@ -5283,6 +5287,7 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
> 	struct timespec mtime;
> 	files_struct *fsp;
> 	struct lock_struct lock;
>+	NTSTATUS status;
> 
> 	START_PROFILE(SMBwriteclose);
> 
>@@ -5298,8 +5303,9 @@ void reply_writeclose(struct smb_request *req)
> 		END_PROFILE(SMBwriteclose);
> 		return;
> 	}
>-	if (!CHECK_WRITE(fsp)) {
>-		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_DATA|FILE_APPEND_DATA);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+		reply_nterror(req, status);
> 		END_PROFILE(SMBwriteclose);
> 		return;
> 	}
>@@ -6086,6 +6092,7 @@ void reply_printwrite(struct smb_request *req)
> 	int numtowrite;
> 	const char *data;
> 	files_struct *fsp;
>+	NTSTATUS status;
> 
> 	START_PROFILE(SMBsplwr);
> 
>@@ -6108,8 +6115,9 @@ void reply_printwrite(struct smb_request *req)
> 		return;
> 	}
> 
>-	if (!CHECK_WRITE(fsp)) {
>-		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_DATA|FILE_APPEND_DATA);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+		reply_nterror(req, status);
> 		END_PROFILE(SMBsplwr);
> 		return;
> 	}
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_flush.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_flush.c
>index 2d3e63196976..3fec7908a462 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_flush.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_flush.c
>@@ -150,7 +150,8 @@ static struct tevent_req *smbd_smb2_flush_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
> 		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
> 	}
> 
>-	if (!CHECK_WRITE(fsp)) {
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_DATA|FILE_APPEND_DATA);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> 		bool allow_dir_flush = false;
> 		uint32_t flush_access = FILE_ADD_FILE | FILE_ADD_SUBDIRECTORY;
> 
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_write.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_write.c
>index a7af20173a17..2675997b0fdc 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_write.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_write.c
>@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
> #include "../libcli/smb/smb_common.h"
> #include "../lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h"
> #include "rpc_server/srv_pipe_hnd.h"
>+#include "libcli/security/security.h"
> 
> #undef DBGC_CLASS
> #define DBGC_CLASS DBGC_SMB2
>@@ -339,8 +340,9 @@ static struct tevent_req *smbd_smb2_write_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
> 		return req;
> 	}
> 
>-	if (!CHECK_WRITE(fsp)) {
>-		tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_DATA|FILE_APPEND_DATA);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+		tevent_req_nterror(req, status);
> 		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
> 	}
> 
>-- 
>2.43.0
>
>
>From 827133363d5a9c3a097abcf0670e7b7246d0692b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 18:01:57 +0100
>Subject: [PATCH 11/13] smbd: use check_any_access_fsp() for all access checks
>
>Replaces the direct access to fsp->access_mask with a call to
>check_any_access_fsp() which allows doing additional checks if needed.
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
>
>Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
>(cherry picked from commit 02ed99343d19fd0845531ad99a46b1dd5b8a7a4f)
>---
> source3/modules/vfs_acl_common.c    |  7 +++--
> source3/modules/vfs_nfs4acl_xattr.c |  7 +++--
> source3/smbd/dir.c                  |  5 ++--
> source3/smbd/dosmode.c              | 20 +++++++------
> source3/smbd/file_access.c          | 10 ++++---
> source3/smbd/notify.c               |  5 ++--
> source3/smbd/smb1_reply.c           |  5 ++--
> source3/smbd/smb2_flush.c           |  4 ++-
> source3/smbd/smb2_getinfo.c         |  8 ++---
> source3/smbd/smb2_nttrans.c         | 45 +++++++++++++++++------------
> source3/smbd/smb2_reply.c           | 10 ++++---
> source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c          | 10 ++++---
> 12 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/source3/modules/vfs_acl_common.c b/source3/modules/vfs_acl_common.c
>index 341806b09a40..8f611c485aef 100644
>--- a/source3/modules/vfs_acl_common.c
>+++ b/source3/modules/vfs_acl_common.c
>@@ -738,10 +738,13 @@ static NTSTATUS set_underlying_acl(vfs_handle_struct *handle, files_struct *fsp,
> 	/* We got access denied here. If we're already root,
> 	   or we didn't need to do a chown, or the fsp isn't
> 	   open with WRITE_OWNER access, just return. */
>-	if (get_current_uid(handle->conn) == 0 || !chown_needed ||
>-	    !(fsp->access_mask & SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER)) {
>+	if (get_current_uid(handle->conn) == 0 || !chown_needed) {
> 		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
> 	}
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+		return status;
>+	}
> 
> 	/*
> 	 * Only allow take-ownership, not give-ownership. That's the way Windows
>diff --git a/source3/modules/vfs_nfs4acl_xattr.c b/source3/modules/vfs_nfs4acl_xattr.c
>index cecafcf50b8d..1fd3519ca020 100644
>--- a/source3/modules/vfs_nfs4acl_xattr.c
>+++ b/source3/modules/vfs_nfs4acl_xattr.c
>@@ -368,11 +368,14 @@ static NTSTATUS nfs4acl_xattr_fset_nt_acl(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
> 	}
> 
> 	if (get_current_uid(handle->conn) == 0 ||
>-	    chown_needed == false ||
>-	    !(fsp->access_mask & SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER))
>+	    chown_needed == false)
> 	{
> 		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
> 	}
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+		return status;
>+	}
> 
> 	/*
> 	 * Only allow take-ownership, not give-ownership. That's the way Windows
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/dir.c b/source3/smbd/dir.c
>index 59fbe5485013..6cdbec19a54f 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/dir.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/dir.c
>@@ -218,11 +218,12 @@ NTSTATUS dptr_create(connection_struct *conn,
> 		return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
> 	}
> 
>-	if (!(fsp->access_mask & SEC_DIR_LIST)) {
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, SEC_DIR_LIST);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> 		DBG_INFO("dptr_create: directory %s "
> 			"not open for LIST access\n",
> 			fsp_str_dbg(fsp));
>-		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
>+		return status;
> 	}
> 	status = OpenDir_fsp(NULL, conn, fsp, wcard, attr, &dir_hnd);
> 	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/dosmode.c b/source3/smbd/dosmode.c
>index 18d2322cf0e7..5402180cf268 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/dosmode.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/dosmode.c
>@@ -1068,15 +1068,17 @@ NTSTATUS file_set_sparse(connection_struct *conn,
> 	 * Windows Server 2008 & 2012 permit FSCTL_SET_SPARSE if any of the
> 	 * following access flags are granted.
> 	 */
>-	if ((fsp->access_mask & (FILE_WRITE_DATA
>-				| FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES
>-				| SEC_FILE_APPEND_DATA)) == 0) {
>-		DEBUG(9,("file_set_sparse: fname[%s] set[%u] "
>-			"access_mask[0x%08X] - access denied\n",
>-			smb_fname_str_dbg(fsp->fsp_name),
>-			sparse,
>-			fsp->access_mask));
>-		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp,
>+				  FILE_WRITE_DATA
>+				  | FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES
>+				  | SEC_FILE_APPEND_DATA);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+		DBG_DEBUG("fname[%s] set[%u] "
>+			  "access_mask[0x%08X] - access denied\n",
>+			  smb_fname_str_dbg(fsp->fsp_name),
>+			  sparse,
>+			  fsp->access_mask);
>+		return status;
> 	}
> 
> 	if (fsp->fsp_flags.is_directory) {
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/file_access.c b/source3/smbd/file_access.c
>index 476aead590dc..7c4c7156d245 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/file_access.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/file_access.c
>@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ bool directory_has_default_acl_fsp(struct files_struct *fsp)
> 
> NTSTATUS can_set_delete_on_close(files_struct *fsp, uint32_t dosmode)
> {
>+	NTSTATUS status;
> 	/*
> 	 * Only allow delete on close for writable files.
> 	 */
>@@ -219,11 +220,12 @@ NTSTATUS can_set_delete_on_close(files_struct *fsp, uint32_t dosmode)
> 	 * intent.
> 	 */
> 
>-	if (!(fsp->access_mask & DELETE_ACCESS)) {
>-		DEBUG(10,("can_set_delete_on_close: file %s delete on "
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, DELETE_ACCESS);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+		DBG_DEBUG("file %s delete on "
> 			  "close flag set but delete access denied.\n",
>-			  fsp_str_dbg(fsp)));
>-		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
>+			  fsp_str_dbg(fsp));
>+		return status;
> 	}
> 
> 	/* Don't allow delete on close for non-empty directories. */
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/notify.c b/source3/smbd/notify.c
>index 399d7800249c..156fbf700c3e 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/notify.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/notify.c
>@@ -295,8 +295,9 @@ NTSTATUS change_notify_create(struct files_struct *fsp,
> 	 * Setting a changenotify needs READ/LIST access
> 	 * on the directory handle.
> 	 */
>-	if (!(fsp->access_mask & SEC_DIR_LIST)) {
>-		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, SEC_DIR_LIST);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+		return status;
> 	}
> 
> 	if (fsp->notify != NULL) {
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb1_reply.c b/source3/smbd/smb1_reply.c
>index 92cc7bf7dd11..9fbfc39c69fc 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/smb1_reply.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/smb1_reply.c
>@@ -6965,8 +6965,9 @@ void reply_setattrE(struct smb_request *req)
> 		goto out;
> 	}
> 
>-	if (!(fsp->access_mask & FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES)) {
>-		reply_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+		reply_nterror(req, status);
> 		goto out;
> 	}
> 
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_flush.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_flush.c
>index 3fec7908a462..35f545ae3bde 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_flush.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_flush.c
>@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ static struct tevent_req *smbd_smb2_flush_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
> 	struct smb_request *smbreq;
> 	bool is_compound = false;
> 	bool is_last_in_compound = false;
>+	NTSTATUS status;
> 
> 	req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state,
> 				struct smbd_smb2_flush_state);
>@@ -167,7 +168,8 @@ static struct tevent_req *smbd_smb2_flush_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
> 		 * they can be flushed.
> 		 */
> 
>-		if ((fsp->access_mask & flush_access) != 0) {
>+		status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, flush_access);
>+		if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> 			allow_dir_flush = true;
> 		}
> 
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_getinfo.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_getinfo.c
>index 51283eb174e7..d3067a53ab94 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_getinfo.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_getinfo.c
>@@ -315,15 +315,15 @@ static struct tevent_req *smbd_smb2_getinfo_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
> 		case FSCC_FILE_ALL_INFORMATION:
> 		case FSCC_FILE_NETWORK_OPEN_INFORMATION:
> 		case FSCC_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_TAG_INFORMATION:
>-			if (!(fsp->access_mask & SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE)) {
>-				tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
>+			status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, SEC_FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTE);
>+			if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
> 				return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
> 			}
> 			break;
> 
> 		case FSCC_FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION:
>-			if (!(fsp->access_mask & SEC_FILE_READ_EA)) {
>-				tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED);
>+			status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, SEC_FILE_READ_EA);
>+			if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) {
> 				return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
> 			}
> 			break;
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_nttrans.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_nttrans.c
>index 1312d9bfc363..c58cfadcf925 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_nttrans.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_nttrans.c
>@@ -114,20 +114,23 @@ NTSTATUS set_sd(files_struct *fsp, struct security_descriptor *psd,
> 
> 	/* Ensure we have the rights to do this. */
> 	if (security_info_sent & SECINFO_OWNER) {
>-		if (!(fsp->access_mask & SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER)) {
>-			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
>+		status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER);
>+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+			return status;
> 		}
> 	}
> 
> 	if (security_info_sent & SECINFO_GROUP) {
>-		if (!(fsp->access_mask & SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER)) {
>-			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
>+		status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER);
>+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+			return status;
> 		}
> 	}
> 
> 	if (security_info_sent & SECINFO_DACL) {
>-		if (!(fsp->access_mask & SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC)) {
>-			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
>+		status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC);
>+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+			return status;
> 		}
> 		/* Convert all the generic bits. */
> 		if (psd->dacl) {
>@@ -136,15 +139,17 @@ NTSTATUS set_sd(files_struct *fsp, struct security_descriptor *psd,
> 	}
> 
> 	if (security_info_sent & SECINFO_SACL) {
>-		if (!(fsp->access_mask & SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY)) {
>-			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
>+		status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY);
>+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+			return status;
> 		}
> 		/*
> 		 * Setting a SACL also requires WRITE_DAC.
> 		 * See the smbtorture3 SMB2-SACL test.
> 		 */
>-		if (!(fsp->access_mask & SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC)) {
>-			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
>+		status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC);
>+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+			return status;
> 		}
> 		/* Convert all the generic bits. */
> 		if (psd->sacl) {
>@@ -407,16 +412,20 @@ static NTSTATUS smbd_fetch_security_desc(connection_struct *conn,
> 	 * Get the permissions to return.
> 	 */
> 
>-	if ((security_info_wanted & SECINFO_SACL) &&
>-			!(fsp->access_mask & SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY)) {
>-		DEBUG(10, ("Access to SACL denied.\n"));
>-		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
>+	if (security_info_wanted & SECINFO_SACL) {
>+		status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, SEC_FLAG_SYSTEM_SECURITY);
>+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+			DBG_DEBUG("Access to SACL denied.\n");
>+			return status;
>+		}
> 	}
> 
>-	if ((security_info_wanted & (SECINFO_DACL|SECINFO_OWNER|SECINFO_GROUP)) &&
>-			!(fsp->access_mask & SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL)) {
>-		DEBUG(10, ("Access to DACL, OWNER, or GROUP denied.\n"));
>-		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
>+	if (security_info_wanted & (SECINFO_DACL|SECINFO_OWNER|SECINFO_GROUP)) {
>+		status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL);
>+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+			DBG_DEBUG("Access to DACL, OWNER, or GROUP denied.\n");
>+			return status;
>+		}
> 	}
> 
> 	status = refuse_symlink_fsp(fsp);
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_reply.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_reply.c
>index a7c63c0df58e..4d92e83c57ae 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_reply.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_reply.c
>@@ -1140,6 +1140,8 @@ ssize_t sendfile_short_send(struct smbXsrv_connection *xconn,
> static NTSTATUS can_rename(connection_struct *conn, files_struct *fsp,
> 			uint16_t dirtype)
> {
>+	NTSTATUS status;
>+
> 	if (fsp->fsp_name->twrp != 0) {
> 		/* Get the error right, this is what Windows returns. */
> 		return NT_STATUS_NOT_SAME_DEVICE;
>@@ -1183,11 +1185,11 @@ static NTSTATUS can_rename(connection_struct *conn, files_struct *fsp,
> 		return NT_STATUS_OK;
> 	}
> 
>-	if (fsp->access_mask & (DELETE_ACCESS|FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES)) {
>-		return NT_STATUS_OK;
>+	status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, DELETE_ACCESS | FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES);
>+	if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+		return status;
> 	}
>-
>-	return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
>+	return NT_STATUS_OK;
> }
> 
> /****************************************************************************
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c
>index 2a90629ce61f..d39f5880efab 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c
>@@ -4051,8 +4051,9 @@ NTSTATUS smb_set_file_size(connection_struct *conn,
> 	    fsp_get_io_fd(fsp) != -1)
> 	{
> 		/* Handle based call. */
>-		if (!(fsp->access_mask & FILE_WRITE_DATA)) {
>-			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
>+		status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_DATA);
>+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+			return status;
> 		}
> 
> 		if (vfs_set_filelen(fsp, size) == -1) {
>@@ -4962,8 +4963,9 @@ static NTSTATUS smb_set_file_allocation_info(connection_struct *conn,
> 	    fsp_get_io_fd(fsp) != -1)
> 	{
> 		/* Open file handle. */
>-		if (!(fsp->access_mask & FILE_WRITE_DATA)) {
>-			return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
>+		status = check_any_access_fsp(fsp, FILE_WRITE_DATA);
>+		if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>+			return status;
> 		}
> 
> 		/* Only change if needed. */
>-- 
>2.43.0
>
>
>From 6bf571c8b088ce7e79b9e1fe2541394119a953b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 15:09:59 +0100
>Subject: [PATCH 12/13] smbd: check for previous versions in
> check_any_access_fsp()
>
>Now that check_any_access_fsp() is broadly used consistently to
>restrict access for all modifying operations, we can add a check for
>previous versions to check_any_access_fsp() and it gets enforced
>consistently.
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
>
>Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
>(cherry picked from commit fd4e41144a819b4403340e4a28664ac586722b41)
>---
> .../samba3.blackbox.shadow_copy_torture       |  1 -
> source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c                    | 22 +++++++++++++++++--
> 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> delete mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.blackbox.shadow_copy_torture
>
>diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.blackbox.shadow_copy_torture b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.blackbox.shadow_copy_torture
>deleted file mode 100644
>index 16537e58aeb7..000000000000
>--- a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.blackbox.shadow_copy_torture
>+++ /dev/null
>@@ -1 +0,0 @@
>-^samba3.blackbox.shadow_copy_torture.writing to shadow copy of a file$fileserver$
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c
>index d39f5880efab..7fb7f45505ca 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_trans2.c
>@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ NTSTATUS refuse_symlink_fsp(const files_struct *fsp)
> NTSTATUS check_any_access_fsp(struct files_struct *fsp,
> 			      uint32_t access_requested)
> {
>+	const uint32_t ro_access = SEC_RIGHTS_FILE_READ | SEC_FILE_EXECUTE;
>+	uint32_t ro_access_granted = 0;
> 	uint32_t access_granted = 0;
> 	NTSTATUS status;
> 
>@@ -100,15 +102,31 @@ NTSTATUS check_any_access_fsp(struct files_struct *fsp,
> 							false,
> 							mask);
> 			if (NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
>-				break;
>+				access_granted |= mask;
>+				if (fsp->fsp_name->twrp == 0) {
>+					/*
>+					 * We can only optimize
>+					 * the non-snapshot case
>+					 */
>+					break;
>+				}
> 			}
> 			mask <<= 1;
> 		}
>-		access_granted = mask;
> 	}
> 	if ((access_granted & access_requested) == 0) {
> 		return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
> 	}
>+
>+	if (fsp->fsp_name->twrp == 0) {
>+		return NT_STATUS_OK;
>+	}
>+
>+	ro_access_granted = access_granted & ro_access;
>+	if ((ro_access_granted & access_requested) == 0) {
>+		return NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED;
>+	}
>+
> 	return NT_STATUS_OK;
> }
> 
>-- 
>2.43.0
>
>
>From 8eb867c91ec655f443988671de906fc4821c271d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 11:59:36 +0100
>Subject: [PATCH 13/13] smbd: move access override for previous versions to the
> SMB layer
>MIME-Version: 1.0
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
>
>Doing the previous version access checks and semantics at the SMB
>layer means we can simplify the shadow_copy2 and remove the kludge.
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13688
>
>Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
>
>Autobuild-User(master): Ralph BÃ¶hme <slow@samba.org>
>Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jan  8 16:58:26 UTC 2024 on atb-devel-224
>
>(backported from commit f14a7065690b00e3c6af2c1f0b0aec51c1e0b372)
>[slow@samba.org: vfs_shadow_copy2.c: no TALLOC_FREE() in context]
>[slow@samba.org: open.c: assign result from calculate_open_access_flags()]
>---
> source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c | 30 ++++------------------
> source3/smbd/open.c                | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c b/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c
>index 8471d81c153e..df9b2cefcfe2 100644
>--- a/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c
>+++ b/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c
>@@ -1556,7 +1556,6 @@ static int shadow_copy2_openat(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
> 	struct smb_filename *smb_fname = NULL;
> 	time_t timestamp = 0;
> 	char *stripped = NULL;
>-	bool is_converted = false;
> 	int saved_errno = 0;
> 	int ret;
> 	bool ok;
>@@ -1573,26 +1572,15 @@ static int shadow_copy2_openat(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
> 		return -1;
> 	}
> 
>-	ok = shadow_copy2_strip_snapshot_converted(talloc_tos(),
>-						   handle,
>-						   smb_fname,
>-						   &timestamp,
>-						   &stripped,
>-						   &is_converted);
>+	ok = shadow_copy2_strip_snapshot(talloc_tos(),
>+					 handle,
>+					 smb_fname,
>+					 &timestamp,
>+					 &stripped);
> 	if (!ok) {
> 		return -1;
> 	}
> 	if (timestamp == 0) {
>-		if (is_converted) {
>-			/*
>-			 * Just pave over the user requested mode and use
>-			 * O_RDONLY. Later attempts by the client to write on
>-			 * the handle will fail in the pwrite() syscall with
>-			 * EINVAL which we carefully map to EROFS. In sum, this
>-			 * matches Windows behaviour.
>-			 */
>-			how.flags &= ~(O_WRONLY | O_RDWR | O_CREAT);
>-		}
> 		return SMB_VFS_NEXT_OPENAT(handle,
> 					   dirfsp,
> 					   smb_fname_in,
>@@ -1613,14 +1601,6 @@ static int shadow_copy2_openat(vfs_handle_struct *handle,
> 	}
> 	TALLOC_FREE(stripped);
> 
>-	/*
>-	 * Just pave over the user requested mode and use O_RDONLY. Later
>-	 * attempts by the client to write on the handle will fail in the
>-	 * pwrite() syscall with EINVAL which we carefully map to EROFS. In sum,
>-	 * this matches Windows behaviour.
>-	 */
>-	how.flags &= ~(O_WRONLY | O_RDWR | O_CREAT);
>-
> 	ret = SMB_VFS_NEXT_OPENAT(handle,
> 				  dirfsp,
> 				  smb_fname,
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/open.c b/source3/smbd/open.c
>index 8b08c9ad5dcc..a7759c349e40 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/open.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/open.c
>@@ -3672,7 +3672,8 @@ static int disposition_to_open_flags(uint32_t create_disposition)
> }
> 
> static int calculate_open_access_flags(uint32_t access_mask,
>-				       uint32_t private_flags)
>+				       uint32_t private_flags,
>+				       NTTIME twrp)
> {
> 	bool need_write, need_read;
> 
>@@ -3681,6 +3682,15 @@ static int calculate_open_access_flags(uint32_t access_mask,
> 	 * mean the same thing under DOS and Unix.
> 	 */
> 
>+	if (twrp != 0) {
>+		/*
>+		 * Pave over the user requested mode and force O_RDONLY for the
>+		 * file handle. Windows allows opening a VSS file with O_RDWR,
>+		 * even though actual writes on the handle will fail.
>+		 */
>+		return O_RDONLY;
>+	}
>+
> 	need_write = (access_mask & (FILE_WRITE_DATA | FILE_APPEND_DATA));
> 	if (!need_write) {
> 		return O_RDONLY;
>@@ -3811,6 +3821,7 @@ static NTSTATUS open_file_ntcreate(connection_struct *conn,
> 	bool posix_open = False;
> 	bool new_file_created = False;
> 	bool first_open_attempt = true;
>+	bool is_twrp = (smb_fname_atname->twrp != 0);
> 	NTSTATUS fsp_open = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED;
> 	mode_t new_unx_mode = (mode_t)0;
> 	mode_t unx_mode = (mode_t)0;
>@@ -3968,6 +3979,9 @@ static NTSTATUS open_file_ntcreate(connection_struct *conn,
> 					 smb_fname_str_dbg(smb_fname) ));
> 				return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND;
> 			}
>+			if (is_twrp) {
>+				return NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED;
>+			}
> 			break;
> 
> 		case FILE_CREATE:
>@@ -3983,11 +3997,24 @@ static NTSTATUS open_file_ntcreate(connection_struct *conn,
> 				}
> 				return NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_COLLISION;
> 			}
>+			if (is_twrp) {
>+				return NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED;
>+			}
> 			break;
> 
> 		case FILE_SUPERSEDE:
> 		case FILE_OVERWRITE_IF:
>+			if (is_twrp) {
>+				return NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED;
>+			}
>+			break;
> 		case FILE_OPEN_IF:
>+			if (is_twrp) {
>+				if (!file_existed) {
>+					return NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED;
>+				}
>+				create_disposition = FILE_OPEN;
>+			}
> 			break;
> 		default:
> 			return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
>@@ -4060,7 +4087,9 @@ static NTSTATUS open_file_ntcreate(connection_struct *conn,
> 	 * mean the same thing under DOS and Unix.
> 	 */
> 
>-	flags = calculate_open_access_flags(access_mask, private_flags);
>+	flags = calculate_open_access_flags(access_mask,
>+					    private_flags,
>+					    smb_fname->twrp);
> 
> 	/*
> 	 * Currently we only look at FILE_WRITE_THROUGH for create options.
>@@ -4788,6 +4817,10 @@ static NTSTATUS open_directory(connection_struct *conn,
> 				return status;
> 			}
> 
>+			if (smb_fname_atname->twrp != 0) {
>+				return NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED;
>+			}
>+
> 			status = mkdir_internal(conn,
> 						parent_dir_fname,
> 						smb_fname_atname,
>@@ -4816,6 +4849,9 @@ static NTSTATUS open_directory(connection_struct *conn,
> 				status = NT_STATUS_OK;
> 				info = FILE_WAS_OPENED;
> 			} else {
>+				if (smb_fname_atname->twrp != 0) {
>+					return NT_STATUS_MEDIA_WRITE_PROTECTED;
>+				}
> 				status = mkdir_internal(conn,
> 							parent_dir_fname,
> 							smb_fname_atname,
>-- 
>2.43.0
>

Flags:

metze: review+

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Attachments on bug 13688: 14671 | 14713 | 14722 | 18222 | 18223