Attachment 18131 Details for Bug 15439 – Patch for 4.18

[patch] Patch for 4.18

CVE-2023-4091-v4.18.patch (text/plain), 7.57 KB, created by Ralph Böhme on 2023-09-28 17:27:50 UTC

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Creator: Ralph Böhme

Created: 2023-09-28 17:27:50 UTC

Size: 7.57 KB

patch

obsolete

>From a4a3868fda277ddf0f174b77a859c33e4c339538 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 12:30:00 +0200
>Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2023-4091: smbtorture: test overwrite dispositions on
> read-only file
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15439
>
>Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>---
> selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls |   1 +
> source4/torture/smb2/acls.c           | 143 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 144 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls
>
>diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls
>new file mode 100644
>index 000000000000..18df260c0e50
>--- /dev/null
>+++ b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls
>@@ -0,0 +1 @@
>+^samba3.smb2.acls.OVERWRITE_READ_ONLY_FILE
>diff --git a/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c b/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c
>index a27d4e079e67..5a892d004ea8 100644
>--- a/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c
>+++ b/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c
>@@ -2989,6 +2989,148 @@ static bool test_mxac_not_granted(struct torture_context *tctx,
> 	return ret;
> }
> 
>+static bool test_overwrite_read_only_file(struct torture_context *tctx,
>+					  struct smb2_tree *tree)
>+{
>+	NTSTATUS status;
>+	struct smb2_create c;
>+	const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\test_overwrite_read_only_file.txt";
>+	struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}};
>+	union smb_fileinfo q;
>+	union smb_setfileinfo set;
>+	struct security_descriptor *sd = NULL, *sd_orig = NULL;
>+	const char *owner_sid = NULL;
>+	int i;
>+	bool ret = true;
>+
>+	struct tcase {
>+		int disposition;
>+		const char *disposition_string;
>+		NTSTATUS expected_status;
>+	} tcases[] = {
>+#define TCASE(d, s) {				\
>+		.disposition = d,		\
>+		.disposition_string = #d,	\
>+		.expected_status = s,		\
>+	}
>+		TCASE(NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN, NT_STATUS_OK),
>+		TCASE(NTCREATEX_DISP_SUPERSEDE, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED),
>+		TCASE(NTCREATEX_DISP_OVERWRITE, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED),
>+		TCASE(NTCREATEX_DISP_OVERWRITE_IF, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED),
>+	};
>+#undef TCASE
>+
>+	ret = smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR);
>+	torture_assert_goto(tctx, ret, ret, done, "smb2_util_setup_dir not ok");
>+
>+	c = (struct smb2_create) {
>+		.in.desired_access = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL |
>+			SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC |
>+			SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER,
>+		.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
>+		.in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_READ |
>+			NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE,
>+		.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF,
>+		.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS,
>+		.in.fname = fname,
>+	};
>+
>+	status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &c);
>+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
>+					"smb2_create failed\n");
>+	handle = c.out.file.handle;
>+
>+	torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n");
>+
>+	ZERO_STRUCT(q);
>+	q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
>+	q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
>+	q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
>+
>+	status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
>+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
>+					"smb2_getinfo_file failed\n");
>+	sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd;
>+
>+	owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid);
>+
>+	sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
>+					0, NULL, NULL,
>+					owner_sid,
>+					SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
>+					SEC_FILE_READ_DATA,
>+					0,
>+					NULL);
>+
>+	ZERO_STRUCT(set);
>+	set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
>+	set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
>+	set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
>+	set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
>+
>+	status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
>+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
>+					"smb2_setinfo_file failed\n");
>+
>+	smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
>+	ZERO_STRUCT(handle);
>+
>+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tcases); i++) {
>+		torture_comment(tctx, "Verify open with %s dispostion\n",
>+				tcases[i].disposition_string);
>+
>+		c = (struct smb2_create) {
>+			.in.create_disposition = tcases[i].disposition,
>+			.in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_READ_DATA,
>+			.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
>+			.in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK,
>+			.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS,
>+			.in.fname = fname,
>+		};
>+
>+		status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &c);
>+		smb2_util_close(tree, c.out.file.handle);
>+		torture_assert_ntstatus_equal_goto(
>+			tctx, status, tcases[i].expected_status, ret, done,
>+			"smb2_create failed\n");
>+	};
>+
>+	torture_comment(tctx, "put back original sd\n");
>+
>+	c = (struct smb2_create) {
>+		.in.desired_access = SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC,
>+		.in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
>+		.in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK,
>+		.in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF,
>+		.in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS,
>+		.in.fname = fname,
>+	};
>+
>+	status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &c);
>+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
>+					"smb2_create failed\n");
>+	handle = c.out.file.handle;
>+
>+	ZERO_STRUCT(set);
>+	set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
>+	set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
>+	set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
>+	set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig;
>+
>+	status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
>+	torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
>+					"smb2_setinfo_file failed\n");
>+
>+	smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
>+	ZERO_STRUCT(handle);
>+
>+done:
>+	smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
>+	smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname);
>+	smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR);
>+	return ret;
>+}
>+
> /*
>    basic testing of SMB2 ACLs
> */
>@@ -3017,6 +3159,7 @@ struct torture_suite *torture_smb2_acls_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx)
> 			test_deny1);
> 	torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "MXAC-NOT-GRANTED",
> 			test_mxac_not_granted);
>+	torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "OVERWRITE_READ_ONLY_FILE", test_overwrite_read_only_file);
> 
> 	suite->description = talloc_strdup(suite, "SMB2-ACLS tests");
> 
>-- 
>2.41.0
>
>
>From 5b5e2b1714e4a242b1cea44deff1f380620872c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 13:04:36 +0200
>Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2023-4091: smbd: use open_access_mask for access
> check in open_file()
>
>If the client requested FILE_OVERWRITE[_IF], we're implicitly adding
>FILE_WRITE_DATA to the open_access_mask in open_file_ntcreate(), but for the
>access check we're using access_mask which doesn't contain the additional
>right, which means we can end up truncating a file for which the user has
>only read-only access via an SD.
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15439
>
>Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>---
> selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls | 1 -
> source3/smbd/open.c                   | 4 ++--
> 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> delete mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls
>
>diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls
>deleted file mode 100644
>index 18df260c0e50..000000000000
>--- a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls
>+++ /dev/null
>@@ -1 +0,0 @@
>-^samba3.smb2.acls.OVERWRITE_READ_ONLY_FILE
>diff --git a/source3/smbd/open.c b/source3/smbd/open.c
>index 94f50becb247..0c9ddfe7c948 100644
>--- a/source3/smbd/open.c
>+++ b/source3/smbd/open.c
>@@ -1442,7 +1442,7 @@ static NTSTATUS open_file(struct smb_request *req,
> 						dirfsp,
> 						fsp,
> 						false,
>-						access_mask);
>+						open_access_mask);
> 
> 				if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
> 					DBG_DEBUG("smbd_check_access_rights_fsp"
>@@ -1633,7 +1633,7 @@ static NTSTATUS open_file(struct smb_request *req,
> 			status = smbd_check_access_rights_fsp(dirfsp,
> 							      fsp,
> 							      false,
>-							      access_mask);
>+							      open_access_mask);
> 
> 			if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND) &&
> 			    posix_open &&
>-- 
>2.41.0
>

Flags:

jra: review+
metze: review+
slow: ci-passed+

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