Attachment 17940 Details for Bug 15072 – Patch for 4.17

[patch] Patch for 4.17

CVE-2022-2127-winbindd-crash-lm_resp_len-4.17-01.patch (text/plain), 3.97 KB, created by Ralph Böhme on 2023-06-23 14:13:10 UTC

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Creator: Ralph Böhme

Created: 2023-06-23 14:13:10 UTC

Size: 3.97 KB

patch

obsolete

>From bc0ea8b34bb5252d0fcdd146430be65fd869313b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
>Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 10:55:23 +0200
>Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2022-2127: winbindd: Fix WINBINDD_PAM_AUTH_CRAP
> length checks
>
>With WBFLAG_BIG_NTLMV2_BLOB being set plus lm_resp_len too large you
>can crash winbind. We don't independently check lm_resp_len
>sufficiently.
>
>Discovered via Coverity ID 1504444 Out-of-bounds access
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15072
>
>Signed-off-by: Volker Lendecke <vl@samba.org>
>---
> source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c | 31 +++++++++++++++--------
> 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c b/source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c
>index 6120522ce3cf..e6a32c7ed79c 100644
>--- a/source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c
>+++ b/source3/winbindd/winbindd_pam_auth_crap.c
>@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ struct tevent_req *winbindd_pam_auth_crap_send(
> 	DATA_BLOB chal = data_blob_null;
> 	struct wbint_SidArray *require_membership_of_sid = NULL;
> 	NTSTATUS status;
>+	bool lmlength_ok = false;
>+	bool ntlength_ok = false;
>+	bool pwlength_ok = false;
> 
> 	req = tevent_req_create(mem_ctx, &state,
> 				struct winbindd_pam_auth_crap_state);
>@@ -115,16 +118,24 @@ struct tevent_req *winbindd_pam_auth_crap_send(
> 		fstrcpy(request->data.auth_crap.workstation, lp_netbios_name());
> 	}
> 
>-	if (request->data.auth_crap.lm_resp_len > sizeof(request->data.auth_crap.lm_resp)
>-		|| request->data.auth_crap.nt_resp_len > sizeof(request->data.auth_crap.nt_resp)) {
>-		if (!(request->flags & WBFLAG_BIG_NTLMV2_BLOB) ||
>-		     request->extra_len != request->data.auth_crap.nt_resp_len) {
>-			DBG_ERR("Invalid password length %u/%u\n",
>-				request->data.auth_crap.lm_resp_len,
>-				request->data.auth_crap.nt_resp_len);
>-			tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
>-			return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
>-		}
>+	lmlength_ok = (request->data.auth_crap.lm_resp_len <=
>+		       sizeof(request->data.auth_crap.lm_resp));
>+
>+	ntlength_ok = (request->data.auth_crap.nt_resp_len <=
>+		       sizeof(request->data.auth_crap.nt_resp));
>+
>+	ntlength_ok |=
>+		((request->flags & WBFLAG_BIG_NTLMV2_BLOB) &&
>+		 (request->extra_len == request->data.auth_crap.nt_resp_len));
>+
>+	pwlength_ok = lmlength_ok && ntlength_ok;
>+
>+	if (!pwlength_ok) {
>+		DBG_ERR("Invalid password length %u/%u\n",
>+			request->data.auth_crap.lm_resp_len,
>+			request->data.auth_crap.nt_resp_len);
>+		tevent_req_nterror(req, NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER);
>+		return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
> 	}
> 
> 	state->domain = talloc_strdup(state, request->data.auth_crap.domain);
>-- 
>2.40.0
>
>
>From dd6cd1ea26306115fea42bb457b11c25ef751c4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2023 12:28:47 +0200
>Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2022-2127: ntlm_auth: cap lanmen response length
> value
>
>We already copy at most sizeof(request.data.auth_crap.lm_resp) bytes to the
>lm_resp buffer, but we don't cap the length indicator.
>
>BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15072
>
>Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
>---
> source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c | 8 ++++++--
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c b/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c
>index 1306951c2a8d..62319ccd5b9d 100644
>--- a/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c
>+++ b/source3/utils/ntlm_auth.c
>@@ -576,10 +576,14 @@ NTSTATUS contact_winbind_auth_crap(const char *username,
> 	memcpy(request.data.auth_crap.chal, challenge->data, MIN(challenge->length, 8));
> 
> 	if (lm_response && lm_response->length) {
>+		size_t capped_lm_response_len = MIN(
>+			lm_response->length,
>+			sizeof(request.data.auth_crap.lm_resp));
>+
> 		memcpy(request.data.auth_crap.lm_resp,
> 		       lm_response->data,
>-		       MIN(lm_response->length, sizeof(request.data.auth_crap.lm_resp)));
>-		request.data.auth_crap.lm_resp_len = lm_response->length;
>+		       capped_lm_response_len);
>+		request.data.auth_crap.lm_resp_len = capped_lm_response_len;
> 	}
> 
> 	if (nt_response && nt_response->length) {
>-- 
>2.40.0
>

Flags:

vl: review+
slow: ci-passed+

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