Attachment 17627 Details for Bug 15203 – Just the CVE patches for Heimdal 7.7.1

[patch] Just the CVE patches for Heimdal 7.7.1

Heimdal-7-7-1-patches-minimal.patch (text/plain), 85.32 KB, created by nico on 2022-11-04 15:13:27 UTC

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Creator: nico

Created: 2022-11-04 15:13:27 UTC

Size: 85.32 KB

patch

obsolete

>From e916e1747abaf7ac2d7bfd5ca1a8987c01aef1f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@secure-endpoints.com>
>Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2021 09:21:36 -0500
>Subject: [PATCH 01/17] Address GCC Bug 95189 memcmp wrongly stripped like
> strcmp
>
>As documented in Russell O'Connor's blog, Heimdal when compiled with
>some versions of gcc 9 and 10 would generate incorrect behaviors from
>_gssapi_verify_mic_arcfour(), _gssapi_unwrap_arcfour(),
>_gssapi_unwrap_iov_arcfour() and _gssapi_unwrap_iov_arcfour().
>
>As a result of the bug, code of the form
>
>   if (memcmp(a, "\x00\x00\x00\x00"))
>
>and
>
>   cmp = memcmp(a, "\x00\x00\x00\x00")
>
>will be compiled as if it were written as
>
>   if (strcmp(a, "\x00\x00\x00\x00"))
>
>and
>
>   cmp = strcmp(a, "\x00\x00\x00\x00")
>
>but not
>
>   if (memcmp(a, "\x00\x00\x00\x00") != 0)
>
>and
>
>   cmp = (memcmp(a, "\x00\x00\x00\x00") != 0)
>
>Bad code is generated whenever one of the parameters to memcmp()
>is a constant with at least one NUL in the first four octets and
>the return value is used immediated without a boolean comparison.
>
>The gcc bug 95189 has since been fixed.
>
>This change applies a defensive programming technique to avoid
>the broken code generation.
>
>(cherry picked from commit 02200d55eaf01a3a21d52eccfa7eea02f9e8df72)
>
>Change-Id: I1db2a561735317cb6cac66a0ec9caf5443e65e03
>Link: https://r6.ca/blog/20200929T023701Z.html
>Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=95189
>Reported-by: Buck Huppmann (buckh@pobox.com) <buckh@pobox.com>
>---
> lib/gssapi/krb5/arcfour.c | 6 +++---
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/krb5/arcfour.c b/lib/gssapi/krb5/arcfour.c
>index d88ec4cdd..cde8a0ac6 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/krb5/arcfour.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/krb5/arcfour.c
>@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ _gssapi_verify_mic_arcfour(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
>     if (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL)
> 	cmp = memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4);
>     else
>-	cmp = memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4);
>+	cmp = (memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4) != 0);
> 
>     memset_s(SND_SEQ, sizeof(SND_SEQ), 0, sizeof(SND_SEQ));
>     if (cmp != 0) {
>@@ -658,7 +658,7 @@ OM_uint32 _gssapi_unwrap_arcfour(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
>     if (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL)
> 	cmp = memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4);
>     else
>-	cmp = memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4);
>+	cmp = (memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4) != 0);
> 
>     if (cmp != 0) {
> 	*minor_status = 0;
>@@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ _gssapi_unwrap_iov_arcfour(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
>     if (ctx->more_flags & LOCAL) {
> 	cmp = memcmp(&snd_seq[4], "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4);
>     } else {
>-	cmp = memcmp(&snd_seq[4], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4);
>+	cmp = (memcmp(&snd_seq[4], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4) != 0);
>     }
>     if (cmp != 0) {
> 	*minor_status = 0;
>-- 
>2.32.0
>
>
>From f82cd2e4df74e95e61c5b9df5d2cb4b72b6586b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Nicolas Williams <nico@twosigma.com>
>Date: Sat, 27 Mar 2021 22:44:57 -0500
>Subject: [PATCH 02/17] Fix compiler warnings and build issues
>
>---
> admin/change.c                       |   1 -
> appl/gssmask/gssmask.c               |   2 +
> appl/otp/otp.c                       |  12 ++-
> kadmin/ext.c                         |   2 +-
> kadmin/kadmind.c                     |   4 +
> kadmin/mod.c                         |  13 ++-
> kadmin/stash.c                       |   5 +-
> kcm/config.c                         |   2 +
> kcm/protocol.c                       |   2 +-
> kdc/digest.c                         |   4 +
> kdc/hpropd.c                         |   5 +-
> kdc/kdc-replay.c                     |   2 +
> kdc/kstash.c                         |   2 +
> kdc/pkinit.c                         |   2 -
> kuser/kdestroy.c                     |   2 +
> kuser/kgetcred.c                     |   3 +
> kuser/kswitch.c                      |   5 +-
> lib/asn1/der_copy.c                  |   8 +-
> lib/base/bsearch.c                   |  24 +++---
> lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c |   1 +
> lib/gssapi/krb5/arcfour.c            |   7 +-
> lib/gssapi/mech/gss_display_status.c |   3 +-
> lib/gssapi/mech/gss_import_name.c    |   2 +-
> lib/gssapi/mech/gss_mech_switch.c    |   2 +
> lib/gssapi/mech/gss_pname_to_uid.c   |   4 +
> lib/gssapi/mech/mech_locl.h          |   1 +
> lib/gssapi/ntlm/init_sec_context.c   |   2 +
> lib/hcrypto/Makefile.am              |   2 +-
> lib/hcrypto/bn.c                     |   5 +-
> lib/hcrypto/test_cipher.c            |   6 +-
> lib/hdb/hdb-mitdb.c                  |   6 +-
> lib/hx509/hxtool.c                   |   1 +
> lib/hx509/ks_file.c                  |   8 +-
> lib/hx509/name.c                     |  11 ++-
> lib/hx509/softp11.c                  |   6 +-
> lib/ipc/client.c                     |   4 +-
> lib/kadm5/get_s.c                    |   2 +-
> lib/kadm5/init_c.c                   |   2 +-
> lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c            |   7 +-
> lib/kadm5/set_keys.c                 |   2 +
> lib/kafs/afskrb5.c                   |   2 -
> lib/kafs/rxkad_kdf.c                 |   1 +
> lib/krb5/acl.c                       |   2 +-
> lib/krb5/addr_families.c             |   2 +-
> lib/krb5/context.c                   |   2 +-
> lib/krb5/deprecated.c                |  10 +--
> lib/krb5/enomem.c                    |   2 +-
> lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c             |  10 +--
> lib/krb5/keytab.c                    |  37 +++++----
> lib/krb5/krb5.h                      | 114 +++++++++++++++------------
> lib/krb5/krb5_ccapi.h                |   2 +-
> lib/krb5/krbhst.c                    |   6 ++
> lib/krb5/plugin.c                    |   2 +-
> lib/krb5/rd_req.c                    |   9 +--
> lib/krb5/test_store.c                |   2 +-
> lib/krb5/transited.c                 |   5 +-
> lib/roken/getaddrinfo.c              |   6 +-
> lib/roken/getxxyyy.c                 |   2 +-
> lib/sl/sl.c                          |   2 +
> lib/sqlite/Makefile.am               |   2 +
> lib/wind/idn-lookup.c                |   6 +-
> tests/gss/check-context.in           |   6 +-
> 62 files changed, 258 insertions(+), 158 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/admin/change.c b/admin/change.c
>index c390441f2..1ddbded6b 100644
>--- a/admin/change.c
>+++ b/admin/change.c
>@@ -217,7 +217,6 @@ kt_change (struct change_options *opt, int argc, char **argv)
>     krb5_kt_end_seq_get(context, keytab, &cursor);
> 
>     if (ret == KRB5_KT_END) {
>-	ret = 0;
> 	for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
> 	    if (verbose_flag) {
> 		char *client_name;
>diff --git a/appl/gssmask/gssmask.c b/appl/gssmask/gssmask.c
>index 35c548979..b61db3d37 100644
>--- a/appl/gssmask/gssmask.c
>+++ b/appl/gssmask/gssmask.c
>@@ -951,7 +951,9 @@ HandleOP(WrapExt)
>     memcpy(p, iov[4].buffer.value, iov[4].buffer.length);
>     p += iov[4].buffer.length;
>     memcpy(p, iov[5].buffer.value, iov[5].buffer.length);
>+#ifndef __clang_analyzer__
>     p += iov[5].buffer.length;
>+#endif
> 
>     gss_release_iov_buffer(NULL, iov, iov_len);
> 
>diff --git a/appl/otp/otp.c b/appl/otp/otp.c
>index 516669f1d..3ac75d03b 100644
>--- a/appl/otp/otp.c
>+++ b/appl/otp/otp.c
>@@ -118,16 +118,22 @@ verify_user_otp(char *username)
> {
>     OtpContext ctx;
>     char passwd[OTP_MAX_PASSPHRASE + 1];
>-    char prompt[128], ss[256];
>+    char ss[256];
>+    char *prompt = NULL;
> 
>     if (otp_challenge (&ctx, username, ss, sizeof(ss)) != 0) {
> 	warnx("no otp challenge found for %s", username);
> 	return 1;
>     }
> 
>-    snprintf (prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%s's %s Password: ", username, ss);
>-    if(UI_UTIL_read_pw_string(passwd, sizeof(passwd)-1, prompt, 0))
>+    if (asprintf(&prompt, "%s's %s Password: ", username, ss) == -1 ||
>+        prompt == NULL)
>+        return 1;
>+    if(UI_UTIL_read_pw_string(passwd, sizeof(passwd)-1, prompt, 0)) {
>+        free(prompt);
> 	return 1;
>+    }
>+    free(prompt);
>     return otp_verify_user (&ctx, passwd);
> }
> 
>diff --git a/kadmin/ext.c b/kadmin/ext.c
>index 32e3a12f6..e0443b3cf 100644
>--- a/kadmin/ext.c
>+++ b/kadmin/ext.c
>@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ do_ext_keytab(krb5_principal principal, void *data)
>     }
>     free(unparsed);
>     free(keys);
>-    return 0;
>+    return ret;
> }
> 
> int
>diff --git a/kadmin/kadmind.c b/kadmin/kadmind.c
>index 12abaa598..cdb93150f 100644
>--- a/kadmin/kadmind.c
>+++ b/kadmin/kadmind.c
>@@ -130,7 +130,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
> 	errx (1, "krb5_init_context failed: %d", ret);
> 
>     argc -= optidx;
>+#ifndef __clang_analyzer__
>     argv += optidx;
>+#endif
>+    if (argc != 0)
>+        usage(1);
> 
>     if (config_file == NULL) {
> 	int aret;
>diff --git a/kadmin/mod.c b/kadmin/mod.c
>index 4a88a85a4..ba435a517 100644
>--- a/kadmin/mod.c
>+++ b/kadmin/mod.c
>@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static void
> add_aliases(krb5_context contextp, kadm5_principal_ent_rec *princ,
> 	    struct getarg_strings *strings)
> {
>-    krb5_error_code ret;
>+    krb5_error_code ret = 0;
>     HDB_extension ext;
>     krb5_data buf;
>     krb5_principal p;
>@@ -127,9 +127,16 @@ add_aliases(krb5_context contextp, kadm5_principal_ent_rec *princ,
> 		   sizeof(ext.data.u.aliases.aliases.val[0]));
> 	ext.data.u.aliases.aliases.len = strings->num_strings;
> 
>-	for (i = 0; i < strings->num_strings; i++) {
>+	for (i = 0; ret == 0 && i < strings->num_strings; i++) {
> 	    ret = krb5_parse_name(contextp, strings->strings[i], &p);
>-	    ret = copy_Principal(p, &ext.data.u.aliases.aliases.val[i]);
>+            if (ret)
>+                krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "Could not parse alias %s",
>+                         strings->strings[i]);
>+            if (ret == 0)
>+                ret = copy_Principal(p, &ext.data.u.aliases.aliases.val[i]);
>+            if (ret)
>+                krb5_err(contextp, 1, ret, "Could not copy parsed alias %s",
>+                         strings->strings[i]);
> 	    krb5_free_principal(contextp, p);
> 	}
>     }
>diff --git a/kadmin/stash.c b/kadmin/stash.c
>index 1eb56b36f..c301f2c5f 100644
>--- a/kadmin/stash.c
>+++ b/kadmin/stash.c
>@@ -105,7 +105,10 @@ stash(struct stash_options *opt, int argc, char **argv)
> 	    }
> 	}
> 	ret = krb5_string_to_key_salt(context, enctype, buf, salt, &key);
>-	ret = hdb_add_master_key(context, &key, &mkey);
>+        if (ret == 0)
>+            ret = hdb_add_master_key(context, &key, &mkey);
>+        if (ret)
>+            krb5_warn(context, errno, "setting master key");
> 	krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key);
>     }
> 
>diff --git a/kcm/config.c b/kcm/config.c
>index 42f896f3f..6ec9f3416 100644
>--- a/kcm/config.c
>+++ b/kcm/config.c
>@@ -336,7 +336,9 @@ kcm_configure(int argc, char **argv)
>     }
> 
>     argc -= optidx;
>+#ifndef __clang_analyzer__
>     argv += optidx;
>+#endif
> 
>     if (argc != 0)
> 	usage(1);
>diff --git a/kcm/protocol.c b/kcm/protocol.c
>index c36bbe9c6..0b5e6189b 100644
>--- a/kcm/protocol.c
>+++ b/kcm/protocol.c
>@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ kcm_op_get_principal(krb5_context context,
>     free(name);
>     kcm_release_ccache(context, ccache);
> 
>-    return 0;
>+    return ret;
> }
> 
> /*
>diff --git a/kdc/digest.c b/kdc/digest.c
>index 295189c66..0af87400d 100644
>--- a/kdc/digest.c
>+++ b/kdc/digest.c
>@@ -1466,6 +1466,10 @@ _kdc_do_digest(krb5_context context,
>     ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context, crypto, KRB5_KU_DIGEST_ENCRYPT,
> 				     buf.data, buf.length, 0,
> 				     &rep.innerRep);
>+    if (ret) {
>+        krb5_prepend_error_message(context, ret, "Failed to encrypt digest: ");
>+        goto out;
>+    }
> 
>     ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(DigestREP, reply->data, reply->length, &rep, &size, ret);
>     if (ret) {
>diff --git a/kdc/hpropd.c b/kdc/hpropd.c
>index a931d7f68..08c516f74 100644
>--- a/kdc/hpropd.c
>+++ b/kdc/hpropd.c
>@@ -107,7 +107,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
>     }
> 
>     argc -= optidx;
>+#ifndef __clang_analyzer__
>     argv += optidx;
>+#endif
> 
>     if (argc != 0)
> 	usage(1);
>@@ -125,6 +127,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
> 	krb5_ticket *ticket;
> 	char *server;
> 
>+        memset(&ss, 0, sizeof(ss));
> 	sock = STDIN_FILENO;
> #ifdef SUPPORT_INETD
> 	if (inetd_flag == -1) {
>@@ -145,7 +148,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
> 	if (getpeername(sock, sa, &sin_len) < 0)
> 	    krb5_err(context, 1, errno, "getpeername");
> 
>-	if (inet_ntop(ss.ss_family,
>+	if (inet_ntop(sa->sa_family,
> 		      socket_get_address (sa),
> 		      addr_name,
> 		      sizeof(addr_name)) == NULL)
>diff --git a/kdc/kdc-replay.c b/kdc/kdc-replay.c
>index af4e55c35..29190f783 100644
>--- a/kdc/kdc-replay.c
>+++ b/kdc/kdc-replay.c
>@@ -184,6 +184,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
> 	    unsigned int tag2;
> 	    ret = der_get_tag (r.data, r.length,
> 			       &cl, &ty, &tag2, NULL);
>+            if (ret)
>+                krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "Could not decode replay data");
> 	    if (MAKE_TAG(cl, ty, 0) != clty)
> 		krb5_errx(context, 1, "class|type mismatch: %d != %d",
> 			  (int)MAKE_TAG(cl, ty, 0), (int)clty);
>diff --git a/kdc/kstash.c b/kdc/kstash.c
>index 54d662838..bcfcbeb16 100644
>--- a/kdc/kstash.c
>+++ b/kdc/kstash.c
>@@ -130,6 +130,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
> 	    krb5_string_to_key_salt(context, enctype, buf, salt, &key);
> 	}
> 	ret = hdb_add_master_key(context, &key, &mkey);
>+        if (ret)
>+            krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "hdb_add_master_key");
> 
> 	krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &key);
> 
>diff --git a/kdc/pkinit.c b/kdc/pkinit.c
>index 4060c0ba6..a90feb7c8 100644
>--- a/kdc/pkinit.c
>+++ b/kdc/pkinit.c
>@@ -241,8 +241,6 @@ generate_dh_keyblock(krb5_context context,
> 	    memmove(dh_gen_key + size, dh_gen_key, dh_gen_keylen);
> 	    memset(dh_gen_key, 0, size);
> 	}
>-
>-	ret = 0;
>     } else if (client_params->keyex == USE_ECDH) {
> 	if (client_params->u.ecdh.public_key == NULL) {
> 	    ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
>diff --git a/kuser/kdestroy.c b/kuser/kdestroy.c
>index 1823bf56c..feabe55fd 100644
>--- a/kuser/kdestroy.c
>+++ b/kuser/kdestroy.c
>@@ -90,7 +90,9 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
>     }
> 
>     argc -= optidx;
>+#ifndef __clang_analyzer__
>     argv += optidx;
>+#endif
> 
>     if (argc != 0)
> 	usage (1);
>diff --git a/kuser/kgetcred.c b/kuser/kgetcred.c
>index 92eb77099..4982f8a79 100644
>--- a/kuser/kgetcred.c
>+++ b/kuser/kgetcred.c
>@@ -283,6 +283,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
> 
> 	    ret = krb5_sname_to_principal(context, hname, sname,
> 					   KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server2);
>+            if (ret)
>+                krb5_err(context, 1, ret, "krb5_sname_to_principal %s %s",
>+                         sname, hname);
>             sname = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, server2, 0);
>             hname = krb5_principal_get_comp_string(context, server2, 1);
> 
>diff --git a/kuser/kswitch.c b/kuser/kswitch.c
>index d897a8e74..3bb3b700d 100644
>--- a/kuser/kswitch.c
>+++ b/kuser/kswitch.c
>@@ -86,16 +86,17 @@ kswitch(struct kswitch_options *opt, int argc, char **argv)
> 	    krb5_err(heimtools_context, 1, ret, "krb5_cc_cache_get_first");
> 
> 	while (krb5_cc_cache_next(heimtools_context, cursor, &id) == 0) {
>-	    krb5_principal p;
>+	    krb5_principal p = NULL;
> 	    char num[10];
> 
> 	    ret = krb5_cc_get_principal(heimtools_context, id, &p);
>+            if (ret == 0)
>+                ret = krb5_unparse_name(heimtools_context, p, &name);
> 	    if (ret) {
>                 krb5_cc_close(heimtools_context, id);
> 		continue;
>             }
> 
>-	    ret = krb5_unparse_name(heimtools_context, p, &name);
> 	    krb5_free_principal(heimtools_context, p);
> 
> 	    snprintf(num, sizeof(num), "%d", (int)(len + 1));
>diff --git a/lib/asn1/der_copy.c b/lib/asn1/der_copy.c
>index 87f1a0d5a..4faf87014 100644
>--- a/lib/asn1/der_copy.c
>+++ b/lib/asn1/der_copy.c
>@@ -149,8 +149,12 @@ int
> der_copy_octet_string (const heim_octet_string *from, heim_octet_string *to)
> {
>     to->length = from->length;
>-    to->data   = malloc(to->length);
>-    if(to->length != 0 && to->data == NULL)
>+    if (from->data == NULL) {
>+        to->data = NULL;
>+        return 0;
>+    }
>+    to->data = malloc(to->length);
>+    if (to->length != 0 && to->data == NULL)
> 	return ENOMEM;
>     memcpy(to->data, from->data, to->length);
>     return 0;
>diff --git a/lib/base/bsearch.c b/lib/base/bsearch.c
>index 278962172..268cc018d 100644
>--- a/lib/base/bsearch.c
>+++ b/lib/base/bsearch.c
>@@ -275,11 +275,12 @@ bsearch_common(const char *buf, size_t sz, const char *key,
> 	    ret = 0;
> 	    if (val_len && value) {
> 		/* Avoid strndup() so we don't need libroken here yet */
>-		*value = malloc(val_len + 1);
>-		if (!*value)
>-		    ret = errno;
>-		(void) memcpy(*value, &buf[val_start], val_len);
>-		(*value)[val_len] = '\0';
>+		if ((*value = malloc(val_len + 1))) {
>+                    (void) memcpy(*value, &buf[val_start], val_len);
>+                    (*value)[val_len] = '\0';
>+                } else {
>+                    ret = errno;
>+                }
> 	    }
> 	    break;
> 	}
>@@ -708,6 +709,10 @@ _bsearch_file(bsearch_file_handle bfh, const char *key,
> 
>     if (reads)
> 	*reads = 0;
>+    if (value)
>+	*value = NULL;
>+    if (loops)
>+	*loops = 0;
> 
>     /* If whole file is in memory then search that and we're done */
>     if (bfh->file_sz == bfh->cache_sz)
>@@ -715,11 +720,6 @@ _bsearch_file(bsearch_file_handle bfh, const char *key,
> 
>     /* Else block-wise binary search */
> 
>-    if (value)
>-	*value = NULL;
>-    if (loops)
>-	*loops = 0;
>-
>     l = 0;
>     r = (bfh->file_sz / bfh->page_sz) + 1;
>     for (level = 0, page = r >> 1; page >= l && page < r ; level++) {
>@@ -851,7 +851,7 @@ stdb_copy_value(void *db, heim_string_t table, heim_data_t key,
> {
>     bsearch_file_handle bfh = db;
>     const char *k;
>-    char *v;
>+    char *v = NULL;
>     heim_data_t value;
>     int ret;
> 
>@@ -869,6 +869,8 @@ stdb_copy_value(void *db, heim_string_t table, heim_data_t key,
>     else
> 	k = (const char *)heim_data_get_ptr(key);
>     ret = _bsearch_file(bfh, k, &v, NULL, NULL, NULL);
>+    if (ret == 0 && v == NULL)
>+        ret = -1; /* Quiet lint */
>     if (ret != 0) {
> 	if (ret > 0 && error)
> 	    *error = heim_error_create(ret, "%s", strerror(ret));
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c b/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
>index d4680e9e8..e35cc10e5 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/krb5/accept_sec_context.c
>@@ -443,6 +443,7 @@ gsskrb5_acceptor_start(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
> 	     * lets only send the error token on clock skew, that
> 	     * limit when send error token for non-MUTUAL.
> 	     */
>+            free_Authenticator(ctx->auth_context->authenticator);
> 	    return send_error_token(minor_status, context, kret,
> 				    server, &indata, output_token);
> 	} else if (kret) {
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/krb5/arcfour.c b/lib/gssapi/krb5/arcfour.c
>index cde8a0ac6..e6d1f2403 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/krb5/arcfour.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/krb5/arcfour.c
>@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ arcfour_mic_cksum_iov(krb5_context context,
> 	memcpy(ptr + ofs,
> 	       padding->buffer.value,
> 	       padding->buffer.length);
>-	ofs += padding->buffer.length;
>+	/* ofs += padding->buffer.length; */
>     }
> 
>     ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, key, 0, &crypto);
>@@ -880,6 +880,11 @@ _gssapi_wrap_iov_length_arcfour(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> 	}
>     }
> 
>+    if (header == NULL) {
>+        *minor_status = EINVAL;
>+        return GSS_S_FAILURE;
>+    }
>+
>     major_status = _gk_verify_buffers(minor_status, ctx, header, padding, trailer);
>     if (major_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
> 	    return major_status;
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/mech/gss_display_status.c b/lib/gssapi/mech/gss_display_status.c
>index a79ef350d..848e8a320 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/mech/gss_display_status.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/mech/gss_display_status.c
>@@ -91,8 +91,7 @@ routine_error(OM_uint32 v)
> 	"Incorrect channel bindings were supplied",
> 	"An invalid status code was supplied",
> 	"A token had an invalid MIC",
>-	"No credentials were supplied, "
>-	"or the credentials were unavailable or inaccessible.",
>+	"No credentials were supplied, or the credentials were unavailable or inaccessible.",
> 	"No context has been established",
> 	"A token was invalid",
> 	"A credential was invalid",
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/mech/gss_import_name.c b/lib/gssapi/mech/gss_import_name.c
>index 4c1d940d9..fab57597c 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/mech/gss_import_name.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/mech/gss_import_name.c
>@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ _gss_import_export_name(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> 	len -= t;
> 
> 	t = (p[0] << 24) | (p[1] << 16) | (p[2] << 8) | p[3];
>-	p += 4;
>+	/* p += 4; */
> 	len -= 4;
> 
> 	if (!composite && len != t)
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/mech/gss_mech_switch.c b/lib/gssapi/mech/gss_mech_switch.c
>index 58b187eda..4d7f298d1 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/mech/gss_mech_switch.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/mech/gss_mech_switch.c
>@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ _gss_string_to_oid(const char* s, gss_OID oid)
> 				}
> 			}
> 		}
>+                if (byte_count == 0)
>+                    return EINVAL;
> 		if (!res) {
> 			res = malloc(byte_count);
> 			if (!res)
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/mech/gss_pname_to_uid.c b/lib/gssapi/mech/gss_pname_to_uid.c
>index 315f0e0d8..9223a918b 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/mech/gss_pname_to_uid.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/mech/gss_pname_to_uid.c
>@@ -158,6 +158,10 @@ gss_pname_to_uid(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
>     major = gss_localname(minor_status, pname, mech_type, &localname);
>     if (GSS_ERROR(major))
>         return major;
>+    if (localname.length == 0) {
>+        *minor_status = KRB5_NO_LOCALNAME;
>+        return GSS_S_FAILURE;
>+    }
> 
>     szLocalname = malloc(localname.length + 1);
>     if (szLocalname == NULL) {
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/mech/mech_locl.h b/lib/gssapi/mech/mech_locl.h
>index 6c23ac525..0f4d8e51b 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/mech/mech_locl.h
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/mech/mech_locl.h
>@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
> 
> #include <roken.h>
> 
>+#include <krb5.h>
> #include <gssapi.h>
> #include <gssapi_mech.h>
> #include <gssapi_krb5.h>
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/ntlm/init_sec_context.c b/lib/gssapi/ntlm/init_sec_context.c
>index f3198d8a2..cf72ae8f7 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/ntlm/init_sec_context.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/ntlm/init_sec_context.c
>@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ from_file(const char *fn, const char *target_domain,
> 	d = strtok_r(buf, ":", &str);
>         free(*domainp);
> 	*domainp = NULL;
>+        if (!d)
>+            continue;
> 	if (d && target_domain != NULL && strcasecmp(target_domain, d) != 0)
> 	    continue;
>         *domainp = strdup(d);
>diff --git a/lib/hcrypto/Makefile.am b/lib/hcrypto/Makefile.am
>index 469176b6c..80f88cca6 100644
>--- a/lib/hcrypto/Makefile.am
>+++ b/lib/hcrypto/Makefile.am
>@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ ltmsources = \
> 	libtommath/bn_mp_to_unsigned_bin_n.c
> 
> 
>-$(libhcrypto_la_OBJECTS): hcrypto-link
>+$(libhcrypto_la_OBJECTS) $(test_rand_OBJECTS): hcrypto-link
> 
> libhcrypto_la_CPPFLAGS = -DBUILD_HCRYPTO_LIB $(AM_CPPFLAGS)
> 
>diff --git a/lib/hcrypto/bn.c b/lib/hcrypto/bn.c
>index e7d5b0473..10c76a748 100644
>--- a/lib/hcrypto/bn.c
>+++ b/lib/hcrypto/bn.c
>@@ -142,7 +142,8 @@ BN_bin2bn(const void *s, int len, BIGNUM *bn)
> 	return NULL;
>     }
>     hi->length = len;
>-    memcpy(hi->data, s, len);
>+    if (len)
>+        memcpy(hi->data, s, len);
>     return (BIGNUM *)hi;
> }
> 
>@@ -250,7 +251,7 @@ BN_set_bit(BIGNUM *bn, int bit)
>     unsigned char *p;
> 
>     if ((bit / 8) > hi->length || hi->length == 0) {
>-	size_t len = (bit + 7) / 8;
>+	size_t len = bit == 0 ? 1 : (bit + 7) / 8;
> 	void *d = realloc(hi->data, len);
> 	if (d == NULL)
> 	    return 0;
>diff --git a/lib/hcrypto/test_cipher.c b/lib/hcrypto/test_cipher.c
>index 0131e148b..26bf42c1b 100644
>--- a/lib/hcrypto/test_cipher.c
>+++ b/lib/hcrypto/test_cipher.c
>@@ -295,8 +295,10 @@ test_cipher(int i, const EVP_CIPHER *c, struct tests *t)
> 	hex_encode(d, t->datasize, &s);
> 	errx(1, "%s: %d decrypt not the same: %s", t->name, i, s);
>     }
>-    if (t->outiv)
>-	/* XXXX check  */;
>+    if (t->outiv) {
>+	/* XXXX check  */
>+        ;
>+    }
> 
>     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ectx);
>     EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&dctx);
>diff --git a/lib/hdb/hdb-mitdb.c b/lib/hdb/hdb-mitdb.c
>index f3f8cf24c..7a9438cbe 100644
>--- a/lib/hdb/hdb-mitdb.c
>+++ b/lib/hdb/hdb-mitdb.c
>@@ -1038,6 +1038,9 @@ mdb_remove(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
>     krb5_data key;
>     krb5_data value = { 0, 0 };
> 
>+    code = mdb_principal2key(context, principal, &key);
>+    if (code)
>+        return code;
>     if ((flags & HDB_F_PRECHECK)) {
>         code = db->hdb__get(context, db, key, &value);
>         krb5_data_free(&key);
>@@ -1048,7 +1051,6 @@ mdb_remove(krb5_context context, HDB *db,
>         return code;
>     }
> 
>-    mdb_principal2key(context, principal, &key);
>     code = db->hdb__del(context, db, key);
>     krb5_data_free(&key);
>     return code;
>@@ -1116,7 +1118,7 @@ krb5_error_code
> hdb_mitdb_create(krb5_context context, HDB **db,
> 		 const char *filename)
> {
>-    MITDB **mdb (MITDB **)db;
>+    MITDB **mdb = (MITDB **)db;
>     *mdb = calloc(1, sizeof(**mdb));
>     if (*mdb == NULL) {
> 	krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "malloc: out of memory");
>diff --git a/lib/hx509/hxtool.c b/lib/hx509/hxtool.c
>index 0a7048bdf..af339c50a 100644
>--- a/lib/hx509/hxtool.c
>+++ b/lib/hx509/hxtool.c
>@@ -1327,6 +1327,7 @@ request_create(struct request_create_options *opt, int argc, char **argv)
>     const char *outfile = argv[0];
> 
>     memset(&key, 0, sizeof(key));
>+    memset(&signer, 0, sizeof(signer));
> 
>     get_key(opt->key_string,
> 	    opt->generate_key_string,
>diff --git a/lib/hx509/ks_file.c b/lib/hx509/ks_file.c
>index d7726f084..b9c2f420d 100644
>--- a/lib/hx509/ks_file.c
>+++ b/lib/hx509/ks_file.c
>@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@ store_func(hx509_context context, void *ctx, hx509_cert c)
> {
>     struct store_ctx *sc = ctx;
>     heim_octet_string data;
>-    int ret;
>+    int ret = 0;
> 
>     ret = hx509_cert_binary(context, c, &data);
>     if (ret)
>@@ -554,14 +554,14 @@ store_func(hx509_context context, void *ctx, hx509_cert c)
> 					    HX509_KEY_FORMAT_DER, &data);
> 	    if (ret)
> 		break;
>-	    hx509_pem_write(context, _hx509_private_pem_name(key), NULL, sc->f,
>-			    data.data, data.length);
>+            ret = hx509_pem_write(context, _hx509_private_pem_name(key), NULL,
>+                                  sc->f, data.data, data.length);
> 	    free(data.data);
> 	}
> 	break;
>     }
> 
>-    return 0;
>+    return ret;
> }
> 
> static int
>diff --git a/lib/hx509/name.c b/lib/hx509/name.c
>index ee192e593..5cb344b6c 100644
>--- a/lib/hx509/name.c
>+++ b/lib/hx509/name.c
>@@ -952,6 +952,7 @@ int
> hx509_general_name_unparse(GeneralName *name, char **str)
> {
>     struct rk_strpool *strpool = NULL;
>+    int ret = 0;
> 
>     *str = NULL;
> 
>@@ -978,7 +979,6 @@ hx509_general_name_unparse(GeneralName *name, char **str)
>     case choice_GeneralName_directoryName: {
> 	Name dir;
> 	char *s;
>-	int ret;
> 	memset(&dir, 0, sizeof(dir));
> 	dir.element = (enum Name_enum)name->u.directoryName.element;
> 	dir.u.rdnSequence = name->u.directoryName.u.rdnSequence;
>@@ -1031,10 +1031,9 @@ hx509_general_name_unparse(GeneralName *name, char **str)
>     default:
> 	return EINVAL;
>     }
>-    if (strpool == NULL)
>+    if (ret)
>+        rk_strpoolfree(strpool);
>+    else if (strpool == NULL || (*str = rk_strpoolcollect(strpool)) == NULL)
> 	return ENOMEM;
>-
>-    *str = rk_strpoolcollect(strpool);
>-
>-    return 0;
>+    return ret;
> }
>diff --git a/lib/hx509/softp11.c b/lib/hx509/softp11.c
>index f93863b7c..eeb9ae373 100644
>--- a/lib/hx509/softp11.c
>+++ b/lib/hx509/softp11.c
>@@ -342,6 +342,9 @@ add_object_attribute(struct st_object *o,
>     struct st_attr *a;
>     int i;
> 
>+    if (pValue == NULL && ulValueLen)
>+        return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
>+
>     i = o->num_attributes;
>     a = realloc(o->attrs, (i + 1) * sizeof(o->attrs[0]));
>     if (a == NULL)
>@@ -352,7 +355,8 @@ add_object_attribute(struct st_object *o,
>     o->attrs[i].attribute.pValue = malloc(ulValueLen);
>     if (o->attrs[i].attribute.pValue == NULL && ulValueLen != 0)
> 	return CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY;
>-    memcpy(o->attrs[i].attribute.pValue, pValue, ulValueLen);
>+    if (ulValueLen)
>+        memcpy(o->attrs[i].attribute.pValue, pValue, ulValueLen);
>     o->attrs[i].attribute.ulValueLen = ulValueLen;
>     o->num_attributes++;
> 
>diff --git a/lib/ipc/client.c b/lib/ipc/client.c
>index a51e91c99..b49cb22cf 100644
>--- a/lib/ipc/client.c
>+++ b/lib/ipc/client.c
>@@ -332,10 +332,8 @@ connect_unix(struct path_ctx *s)
> 	return errno;
>     rk_cloexec(s->fd);
> 
>-    if (connect(s->fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) != 0) {
>-	close(s->fd);
>+    if (connect(s->fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) != 0)
> 	return errno;
>-    }
> 
>     return 0;
> }
>diff --git a/lib/kadm5/get_s.c b/lib/kadm5/get_s.c
>index 8f9e7e908..ca60fc724 100644
>--- a/lib/kadm5/get_s.c
>+++ b/lib/kadm5/get_s.c
>@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ kadm5_s_get_principal(void *server_handle,
> 	    ret = hdb_entry_get_password(context->context,
> 					 context->db, &ent.entry, &pw);
> 	    if (ret == 0) {
>-		ret = add_tl_data(out, KRB5_TL_PASSWORD, pw, strlen(pw) + 1);
>+		(void) add_tl_data(out, KRB5_TL_PASSWORD, pw, strlen(pw) + 1);
> 		free(pw);
> 	    }
> 	    krb5_clear_error_message(context->context);
>diff --git a/lib/kadm5/init_c.c b/lib/kadm5/init_c.c
>index 6eddfb871..0436fb127 100644
>--- a/lib/kadm5/init_c.c
>+++ b/lib/kadm5/init_c.c
>@@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ kadm5_c_init_with_context(krb5_context context,
> 			  void **server_handle)
> {
>     kadm5_ret_t ret;
>-    kadm5_client_context *ctx;
>+    kadm5_client_context *ctx = NULL;
>     krb5_ccache cc;
> 
>     ret = _kadm5_c_init_context(&ctx, realm_params, context);
>diff --git a/lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c b/lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c
>index d0fdc8e26..208151a5e 100644
>--- a/lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c
>+++ b/lib/kadm5/ipropd_master.c
>@@ -372,6 +372,8 @@ write_dump (krb5_context context, krb5_storage *dump,
>      */
> 
>     ret = krb5_store_uint32(dump, 0);
>+    if (ret)
>+        return ret;
> 
>     ret = hdb_create (context, &db, database);
>     if (ret)
>@@ -1044,7 +1046,10 @@ write_stats(krb5_context context, slave *slaves, uint32_t current_version)
> 	    rtbl_add_column_entry(tbl, SLAVE_STATUS, "Up");
> 
> 	ret = krb5_format_time(context, slaves->seen, str, sizeof(str), TRUE);
>-	rtbl_add_column_entry(tbl, SLAVE_SEEN, str);
>+        if (ret)
>+            rtbl_add_column_entry(tbl, SLAVE_SEEN, "<error-formatting-time>");
>+        else
>+            rtbl_add_column_entry(tbl, SLAVE_SEEN, str);
> 
> 	slaves = slaves->next;
>     }
>diff --git a/lib/kadm5/set_keys.c b/lib/kadm5/set_keys.c
>index c3fcc2e6d..7a63358ed 100644
>--- a/lib/kadm5/set_keys.c
>+++ b/lib/kadm5/set_keys.c
>@@ -177,6 +177,8 @@ _kadm5_set_keys2(kadm5_server_context *context,
> 	    /* A current key; add to current key set */
> 	    setup_Key(&key, &salt, key_data, i);
> 	    ret = add_Keys(&keys, &key);
>+            if (ret)
>+                goto out;
> 	    continue;
> 	}
> 
>diff --git a/lib/kafs/afskrb5.c b/lib/kafs/afskrb5.c
>index 6033f2958..0077016f6 100644
>--- a/lib/kafs/afskrb5.c
>+++ b/lib/kafs/afskrb5.c
>@@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ v5_to_kt(krb5_creds *cred, uid_t uid, struct kafs_token *kt, int local524)
> 	    return ENOMEM;
> 	kt->ticket_len = cred->ticket.length;
> 	memcpy(kt->ticket, cred->ticket.data, kt->ticket_len);
>-
>-	ret = 0;
>     }
> 
> 
>diff --git a/lib/kafs/rxkad_kdf.c b/lib/kafs/rxkad_kdf.c
>index 21dd3543d..174fa3a61 100644
>--- a/lib/kafs/rxkad_kdf.c
>+++ b/lib/kafs/rxkad_kdf.c
>@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
>  * SUCH DAMAGE.
>  */
> 
>+#define HC_DEPRECATED_CRYPTO
> #include "kafs_locl.h"
> 
> static int rxkad_derive_des_key(const void *, size_t, char[8]);
>diff --git a/lib/krb5/acl.c b/lib/krb5/acl.c
>index 90c91e661..4365a7a0f 100644
>--- a/lib/krb5/acl.c
>+++ b/lib/krb5/acl.c
>@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ krb5_acl_match_file(krb5_context context,
> 		    ...)
> {
>     krb5_error_code ret;
>-    struct acl_field *acl;
>+    struct acl_field *acl = NULL;
>     char buf[256];
>     va_list ap;
>     FILE *f;
>diff --git a/lib/krb5/addr_families.c b/lib/krb5/addr_families.c
>index 7ac0fa93f..16fe4a8c1 100644
>--- a/lib/krb5/addr_families.c
>+++ b/lib/krb5/addr_families.c
>@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ arange_parse_addr (krb5_context context,
> 	    return ret;
> 	}
> 
>-	if(high.len != 1 && high.val[0].addr_type != low.val[0].addr_type) {
>+	if(high.len != 1 || high.val[0].addr_type != low.val[0].addr_type) {
> 	    krb5_free_addresses(context, &low);
> 	    krb5_free_addresses(context, &high);
> 	    return -1;
>diff --git a/lib/krb5/context.c b/lib/krb5/context.c
>index 5660f7f36..58ed47610 100644
>--- a/lib/krb5/context.c
>+++ b/lib/krb5/context.c
>@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ init_context_from_config_file(krb5_context context)
>     krb5_error_code ret;
>     const char * tmp;
>     char **s;
>-    krb5_enctype *tmptypes;
>+    krb5_enctype *tmptypes = NULL;
> 
>     INIT_FIELD(context, time, max_skew, 5 * 60, "clockskew");
>     INIT_FIELD(context, time, kdc_timeout, 30, "kdc_timeout");
>diff --git a/lib/krb5/deprecated.c b/lib/krb5/deprecated.c
>index 5530e841b..0871aaf71 100644
>--- a/lib/krb5/deprecated.c
>+++ b/lib/krb5/deprecated.c
>@@ -324,15 +324,13 @@ krb5_keytab_key_proc (krb5_context context,
> 
>     ret = krb5_kt_get_entry (context, real_keytab, principal,
> 			     0, enctype, &entry);
>+    if (ret == 0) {
>+        ret = krb5_copy_keyblock (context, &entry.keyblock, key);
>+        krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry);
>+    }
> 
>     if (keytab == NULL)
> 	krb5_kt_close (context, real_keytab);
>-
>-    if (ret)
>-	return ret;
>-
>-    ret = krb5_copy_keyblock (context, &entry.keyblock, key);
>-    krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry);
>     return ret;
> }
> 
>diff --git a/lib/krb5/enomem.c b/lib/krb5/enomem.c
>index 0e67fa879..7f0aaeb35 100644
>--- a/lib/krb5/enomem.c
>+++ b/lib/krb5/enomem.c
>@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@
> 
> #include "krb5_locl.h"
> 
>+#undef krb5_enomem
> krb5_error_code
> krb5_enomem(krb5_context context)
> {
>     krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, N_("malloc: out of memory", ""));
>     return ENOMEM;
> }
>-
>diff --git a/lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c b/lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c
>index a225a5f44..4e1088be1 100644
>--- a/lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c
>+++ b/lib/krb5/init_creds_pw.c
>@@ -1541,15 +1541,13 @@ keytab_key_proc(krb5_context context, krb5_enctype enctype,
> 
>     ret = krb5_kt_get_entry (context, real_keytab, principal,
> 			     0, enctype, &entry);
>+    if (ret == 0) {
>+        ret = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, &entry.keyblock, key);
>+        krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry);
>+    }
> 
>     if (keytab == NULL)
> 	krb5_kt_close (context, real_keytab);
>-
>-    if (ret)
>-	return ret;
>-
>-    ret = krb5_copy_keyblock (context, &entry.keyblock, key);
>-    krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry);
>     return ret;
> }
> 
>diff --git a/lib/krb5/keytab.c b/lib/krb5/keytab.c
>index ca37e292a..4977a62f2 100644
>--- a/lib/krb5/keytab.c
>+++ b/lib/krb5/keytab.c
>@@ -359,10 +359,11 @@ krb5_kt_read_service_key(krb5_context context,
> 			 krb5_enctype enctype,
> 			 krb5_keyblock **key)
> {
>-    krb5_keytab keytab;
>+    krb5_keytab keytab = NULL; /* Quiet lint */
>     krb5_keytab_entry entry;
>     krb5_error_code ret;
> 
>+    memset(&entry, 0, sizeof(entry));
>     if (keyprocarg)
> 	ret = krb5_kt_resolve (context, keyprocarg, &keytab);
>     else
>@@ -372,11 +373,11 @@ krb5_kt_read_service_key(krb5_context context,
> 	return ret;
> 
>     ret = krb5_kt_get_entry (context, keytab, principal, vno, enctype, &entry);
>+    if (ret == 0) {
>+        ret = krb5_copy_keyblock (context, &entry.keyblock, key);
>+        krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry);
>+    }
>     krb5_kt_close (context, keytab);
>-    if (ret)
>-	return ret;
>-    ret = krb5_copy_keyblock (context, &entry.keyblock, key);
>-    krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry);
>     return ret;
> }
> 
>@@ -483,11 +484,13 @@ KRB5_LIB_FUNCTION krb5_error_code KRB5_LIB_CALL
> krb5_kt_close(krb5_context context,
> 	      krb5_keytab id)
> {
>-    krb5_error_code ret;
>+    krb5_error_code ret = 0;
> 
>-    ret = (*id->close)(context, id);
>-    memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
>-    free(id);
>+    if (id) {
>+        ret = (id->close)(context, id);
>+        memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
>+        free(id);
>+    }
>     return ret;
> }
> 
>@@ -621,6 +624,7 @@ krb5_kt_get_entry_wrapped(krb5_context context,
>     if(id->get)
> 	return (*id->get)(context, id, principal, kvno, enctype, entry);
> 
>+    memset(&tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
>     ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get (context, id, &cursor);
>     if (ret) {
> 	/* This is needed for krb5_verify_init_creds, but keep error
>@@ -732,21 +736,21 @@ krb5_kt_copy_entry_contents(krb5_context context,
>     krb5_error_code ret;
> 
>     memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out));
>-    out->vno = in->vno;
> 
>     ret = krb5_copy_principal (context, in->principal, &out->principal);
>     if (ret)
>-	goto fail;
>+	return ret;
>     ret = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents (context,
> 				       &in->keyblock,
> 				       &out->keyblock);
>-    if (ret)
>-	goto fail;
>+    if (ret) {
>+        krb5_free_principal(context, out->principal);
>+        memset(out, 0, sizeof(*out));
>+        return ret;
>+    }
>+    out->vno = in->vno;
>     out->timestamp = in->timestamp;
>     return 0;
>-fail:
>-    krb5_kt_free_entry (context, out);
>-    return ret;
> }
> 
> /**
>@@ -927,6 +931,7 @@ krb5_kt_have_content(krb5_context context,
>     krb5_error_code ret;
>     char *name;
> 
>+    memset(&entry, 0, sizeof(entry));
>     ret = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(context, id, &cursor);
>     if (ret)
> 	goto notfound;
>diff --git a/lib/krb5/krb5.h b/lib/krb5/krb5.h
>index b6745a5b7..664219f2b 100644
>--- a/lib/krb5/krb5.h
>+++ b/lib/krb5/krb5.h
>@@ -117,55 +117,52 @@ typedef struct krb5_enc_data {
> } krb5_enc_data;
> 
> /* alternative names */
>-enum {
>-    ENCTYPE_NULL		= KRB5_ENCTYPE_NULL,
>-    ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC		= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
>-    ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4		= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4,
>-    ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5		= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5,
>-    ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5,
>-    ENCTYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1,
>-    ENCTYPE_SIGN_DSA_GENERATE	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_SIGN_DSA_GENERATE,
>-    ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PRIV	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PRIV,
>-    ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PUB	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PUB,
>-    ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1,
>-    ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 = KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
>-    ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 = KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
>-    ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,
>-    ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,
>-    ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56,
>-    ENCTYPE_ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS,
>-    ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_NONE	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_NONE,
>-    ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE,
>-    ENCTYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE,
>-    ENCTYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE,
>-    ETYPE_NULL			= KRB5_ENCTYPE_NULL,
>-    ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC		= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC,
>-    ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4		= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4,
>-    ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5		= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5,
>-    ETYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5		= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5,
>-    ETYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1,
>-    ETYPE_SIGN_DSA_GENERATE	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_SIGN_DSA_GENERATE,
>-    ETYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PRIV	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PRIV,
>-    ETYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PUB	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PUB,
>-    ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1		= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1,
>-    ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
>-    ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96,
>-    ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128,
>-    ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192,
>-    ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5,
>-    ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56,
>-    ETYPE_ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS,
>-    ETYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4		= KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4,
>-    ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD,
>-    ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP,
>-    ETYPE_DES_CBC_NONE		= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_NONE,
>-    ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE		= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE,
>-    ETYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE,
>-    ETYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE		= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE,
>-    ETYPE_DIGEST_MD5_NONE	= KRB5_ENCTYPE_DIGEST_MD5_NONE,
>-    ETYPE_CRAM_MD5_NONE		= KRB5_ENCTYPE_CRAM_MD5_NONE
>-
>-};
>+#define ENCTYPE_NULL KRB5_ENCTYPE_NULL
>+#define ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
>+#define ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4 KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
>+#define ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5 KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5
>+#define ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5 KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5
>+#define ENCTYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1 KRB5_ENCTYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1
>+#define ENCTYPE_SIGN_DSA_GENERATE KRB5_ENCTYPE_SIGN_DSA_GENERATE
>+#define ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PRIV KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PRIV
>+#define ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PUB KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PUB
>+#define ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1
>+#define ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
>+#define ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
>+#define ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5
>+#define ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5 KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5
>+#define ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56 KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56
>+#define ENCTYPE_ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS
>+#define ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_NONE KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_NONE
>+#define ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE
>+#define ENCTYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE
>+#define ENCTYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE
>+#define ETYPE_NULL KRB5_ENCTYPE_NULL
>+#define ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
>+#define ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4 KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
>+#define ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5 KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5
>+#define ETYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5 KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_MD5
>+#define ETYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1 KRB5_ENCTYPE_OLD_DES3_CBC_SHA1
>+#define ETYPE_SIGN_DSA_GENERATE KRB5_ENCTYPE_SIGN_DSA_GENERATE
>+#define ETYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PRIV KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PRIV
>+#define ETYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PUB KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCRYPT_RSA_PUB
>+#define ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1 KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1
>+#define ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
>+#define ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96 KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96
>+#define ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128 KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA256_128
>+#define ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192 KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192
>+#define ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5 KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5
>+#define ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56 KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56
>+#define ETYPE_ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS KRB5_ENCTYPE_ENCTYPE_PK_CROSS
>+#define ETYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4 KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4
>+#define ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD
>+#define ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP KRB5_ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP
>+#define ETYPE_DES_CBC_NONE KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_NONE
>+#define ETYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_NONE
>+#define ETYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_CFB64_NONE
>+#define ETYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE KRB5_ENCTYPE_DES_PCBC_NONE
>+#define ETYPE_DIGEST_MD5_NONE KRB5_ENCTYPE_DIGEST_MD5_NONE
>+#define ETYPE_CRAM_MD5_NONE KRB5_ENCTYPE_CRAM_MD5_NONE
> 
> /* PDU types */
> typedef enum krb5_pdu {
>@@ -994,5 +991,24 @@ extern KRB5_LIB_VARIABLE const char *krb5_cc_type_kcm;
> extern KRB5_LIB_VARIABLE const char *krb5_cc_type_scc;
> extern KRB5_LIB_VARIABLE const char *krb5_cc_type_dcc;
> 
>+/* clang analyzer workarounds */
>+
>+#ifdef __clang_analyzer__
>+/*
>+ * The clang analyzer (lint) can't know that krb5_enomem() always returns
>+ * non-zero, so code like:
>+ *
>+ *      if ((x = malloc(...)) == NULL)
>+ *          ret = krb5_enomem(context)
>+ *      if (ret == 0)
>+ *          *x = ...;
>+ *
>+ * causes false positives.
>+ *
>+ * The fix is to make krb5_enomem() a macro that always evaluates to ENOMEM.
>+ */
>+#define krb5_enomem(c) (krb5_enomem(c), ENOMEM)
>+#endif
>+
> #endif /* __KRB5_H__ */
> 
>diff --git a/lib/krb5/krb5_ccapi.h b/lib/krb5/krb5_ccapi.h
>index 5a7fe6a41..89e5665af 100644
>--- a/lib/krb5/krb5_ccapi.h
>+++ b/lib/krb5/krb5_ccapi.h
>@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
> 
> #include <krb5-types.h>
> 
>- #ifdef __APPLE__
>+#ifdef __APPLE__
> #pragma pack(push,2)
> #endif
> 
>diff --git a/lib/krb5/krbhst.c b/lib/krb5/krbhst.c
>index f53512883..36da64b0e 100644
>--- a/lib/krb5/krbhst.c
>+++ b/lib/krb5/krbhst.c
>@@ -106,6 +106,12 @@ srv_find_realm(krb5_context context, krb5_krbhst_info ***res, int *count,
> 	if(rr->type == rk_ns_t_srv)
> 	    num_srv++;
> 
>+    if (num_srv == 0) {
>+	_krb5_debug(context, 0,
>+		    "DNS SRV RR lookup domain nodata: %s", domain);
>+	return KRB5_KDC_UNREACH;
>+    }
>+
>     *res = malloc(num_srv * sizeof(**res));
>     if(*res == NULL) {
> 	rk_dns_free_data(r);
>diff --git a/lib/krb5/plugin.c b/lib/krb5/plugin.c
>index 03f64000f..f4bf99953 100644
>--- a/lib/krb5/plugin.c
>+++ b/lib/krb5/plugin.c
>@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ _krb5_plugin_run_f(krb5_context context,
>     struct krb5_plugin *p;
> 
>     /* Get registered plugins */
>-    (void) _krb5_plugin_find(context, SYMBOL, name, &registered_plugins);
>+    (void) _krb5_plugin_find(context, PLUGIN_TYPE_DATA, name, &registered_plugins);
> 
>     HEIMDAL_MUTEX_lock(&plugin_mutex);
> 
>diff --git a/lib/krb5/rd_req.c b/lib/krb5/rd_req.c
>index fbced144e..3937dc5ab 100644
>--- a/lib/krb5/rd_req.c
>+++ b/lib/krb5/rd_req.c
>@@ -773,11 +773,10 @@ get_key_from_keytab(krb5_context context,
> 			     kvno,
> 			     ap_req->ticket.enc_part.etype,
> 			     &entry);
>-    if(ret)
>-	goto out;
>-    ret = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, &entry.keyblock, out_key);
>-    krb5_kt_free_entry (context, &entry);
>-out:
>+    if(ret == 0) {
>+        ret = krb5_copy_keyblock(context, &entry.keyblock, out_key);
>+        krb5_kt_free_entry(context, &entry);
>+    }
>     if(keytab == NULL)
> 	krb5_kt_close(context, real_keytab);
> 
>diff --git a/lib/krb5/test_store.c b/lib/krb5/test_store.c
>index 5fac75cd1..6876cc1db 100644
>--- a/lib/krb5/test_store.c
>+++ b/lib/krb5/test_store.c
>@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ test_int16(krb5_context context, krb5_storage *sp)
>     krb5_error_code ret;
>     int i;
>     int16_t val[] = {
>-	0, 1, -1, 32768, -32767
>+	0, 1, -1, 32767, -32768
>     }, v;
> 
>     krb5_storage_truncate(sp, 0);
>diff --git a/lib/krb5/transited.c b/lib/krb5/transited.c
>index 35c00e65a..8ad122afa 100644
>--- a/lib/krb5/transited.c
>+++ b/lib/krb5/transited.c
>@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ decode_realms(krb5_context context,
> 	    r = make_realm(tmp);
> 	    if(r == NULL){
> 		free_realms(*realms);
>+                *realms = NULL;
> 		return krb5_enomem(context);
> 	    }
> 	    *realms = append_realm(*realms, r);
>@@ -289,7 +290,8 @@ decode_realms(krb5_context context,
>     }
>     tmp = malloc(tr + i - start + 1);
>     if(tmp == NULL){
>-	free(*realms);
>+        free_realms(*realms);
>+        *realms = NULL;
> 	return krb5_enomem(context);
>     }
>     memcpy(tmp, start, tr + i - start);
>@@ -297,6 +299,7 @@ decode_realms(krb5_context context,
>     r = make_realm(tmp);
>     if(r == NULL){
> 	free_realms(*realms);
>+        *realms = NULL;
> 	return krb5_enomem(context);
>     }
>     *realms = append_realm(*realms, r);
>diff --git a/lib/roken/getaddrinfo.c b/lib/roken/getaddrinfo.c
>index c8ed95413..ae21bf110 100644
>--- a/lib/roken/getaddrinfo.c
>+++ b/lib/roken/getaddrinfo.c
>@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ get_null (const struct addrinfo *hints,
>     struct addrinfo *first = NULL;
>     struct addrinfo **current = &first;
>     int family = PF_UNSPEC;
>-    int ret;
>+    int ret = 0;
> 
>     if (hints != NULL)
> 	family = hints->ai_family;
>@@ -209,6 +209,8 @@ get_null (const struct addrinfo *hints,
>     if (family == PF_INET6 || family == PF_UNSPEC) {
> 	ret = add_one (port, protocol, socktype,
> 		       &current, const_v6, &v6_addr, NULL);
>+        if (ret)
>+            return ret;
>     }
> #endif
>     if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_UNSPEC) {
>@@ -216,7 +218,7 @@ get_null (const struct addrinfo *hints,
> 		       &current, const_v4, &v4_addr, NULL);
>     }
>     *res = first;
>-    return 0;
>+    return ret;
> }
> 
> static int
>diff --git a/lib/roken/getxxyyy.c b/lib/roken/getxxyyy.c
>index 5beed69df..25ce38b3e 100644
>--- a/lib/roken/getxxyyy.c
>+++ b/lib/roken/getxxyyy.c
>@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ rk_getpwnam_r(const char *name, struct passwd *pwd, char *buffer,
> 	      size_t bufsize, struct passwd **result)
> {
>      struct passwd *p;
>-     size_t slen, n = 0;
>+     size_t slen;
>      
>      *result = NULL;
> 
>diff --git a/lib/sl/sl.c b/lib/sl/sl.c
>index f6f4bc52e..37e9659d2 100644
>--- a/lib/sl/sl.c
>+++ b/lib/sl/sl.c
>@@ -460,6 +460,8 @@ sl_did_you_mean(SL_cmd *cmds, const char *match)
> 
>     for (n = 0, c = cmds; c->name; c++, n++)
>         ;
>+    if (n == 0)
>+        return;
>     metrics = calloc(n, sizeof(metrics[0]));
>     if (metrics == NULL)
>         return;
>diff --git a/lib/sqlite/Makefile.am b/lib/sqlite/Makefile.am
>index bd0396922..ea3cb1f5b 100644
>--- a/lib/sqlite/Makefile.am
>+++ b/lib/sqlite/Makefile.am
>@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ if ENABLE_PTHREAD_SUPPORT
> AM_CPPFLAGS += -DSQLITE_THREADSAFE=1
> endif
> 
>+AM_CFLAGS += -Wno-error
>+
> lib_LTLIBRARIES = libheimsqlite.la
> 
> noinst_HEADERS = sqlite3.h sqlite3ext.h
>diff --git a/lib/wind/idn-lookup.c b/lib/wind/idn-lookup.c
>index 1bc63a33d..378c912a3 100644
>--- a/lib/wind/idn-lookup.c
>+++ b/lib/wind/idn-lookup.c
>@@ -156,7 +156,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
>     if (argc == 0)
> 	usage(1);
> 
>-    for (i = 0; i < argc; ++i)
>-	lookup(argv[i]);
>+    for (i = 0; i < argc; ++i) {
>+        if (argv[i][0]) /* Quiet lint */
>+            lookup(argv[i]);
>+    }
>     return 0;
> }
>diff --git a/tests/gss/check-context.in b/tests/gss/check-context.in
>index ba06aaa02..2045ccaa2 100644
>--- a/tests/gss/check-context.in
>+++ b/tests/gss/check-context.in
>@@ -152,13 +152,9 @@ mv ${keytabfile} ${keytabfile}.no
> echo "checking non existant keytabfile (krb5)" ; > messages.log
> ${context} --mech-type=krb5 host@lucid.test.h5l.se  > test_context.log 2>&1 && \
> 	{ eval "$testfailed"; }
>-grep ${keytabfile} test_context.log > /dev/null || \
>-	{ echo "string missing failed"; cat test_context.log ; eval "$testfailed"; }
>-echo "checking non existant keytabfile (spengo)" ; > messages.log
>+echo "checking non existant keytabfile (spnego)" ; > messages.log
> ${context} --mech-type=spnego host@lucid.test.h5l.se > test_context.log 2>&1 && \
> 	{ eval "$testfailed"; }
>-grep ${keytabfile} test_context.log > /dev/null || \
>-	{ echo "string missing failed"; cat test_context.log ; eval "$testfailed"; }
> 
> mv ${keytabfile}.no ${keytabfile}
> 
>-- 
>2.32.0
>
>
>From f9ec7002cdd526ae84fbacbf153162e118f22580 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Nicolas Williams <nico@twosigma.com>
>Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 10:18:52 -0600
>Subject: [PATCH 03/17] spnego: CVE-2021-44758 send_reject when no mech
> selected
>
>This fixes a DoS where an initial SPNEGO token that has no acceptable
>mechanisms causes a NULL dereference in acceptors.
>
>send_accept() when called with a non-zero 'initial_response' did
>not handle the case of gssspnego_ctx.preferred_mech_type equal
>to GSS_C_NO_OID.
>
>The failure to handle GSS_C_NO_OID has been present since the
>initial revision of gssapi/spnego,
>2baa7e7d613c26b2b037b368931519a84baec53d but might not have
>been exercised until later revisions.
>
>The introduction of opportunistic token handling in
>gss_accept_sec_context(), 3c9d3266f47f594a29068c9d629908e7000ac663,
>introduced two bugs:
>
> 1. The optional mechToken field is used unconditionally
>    possibly resulting in a segmentation fault.
>
> 2. If use of the opportunistic token is unsuccessful and the
>    mech type list length is one, send_accept() can be called
>    with 'initial_response' true and preferred mech set to
>    GSS_C_NO_OID.
>
>b53c90da0890a9cce6f95c552f094ff6d69027bf ("Make error reporting
>somewhat more correct for SPNEGO") attempted to fix the first
>issue and increased the likelihood of the second.
>
>This change alters the behavior of acceptor_start() so it calls
>send_reject() when no mechanism was selected.
>---
> lib/gssapi/spnego/accept_sec_context.c | 14 ++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/spnego/accept_sec_context.c b/lib/gssapi/spnego/accept_sec_context.c
>index 48b786c29..5fe1a1a64 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/spnego/accept_sec_context.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/spnego/accept_sec_context.c
>@@ -619,13 +619,15 @@ acceptor_start
> 	    if (ret == 0)
> 		break;
> 	}
>-	if (preferred_mech_type == GSS_C_NO_OID) {
>-	    HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->ctx_id_mutex);
>-	    free_NegotiationToken(&nt);
>-	    return ret;
>-	}
>+    }
>+
>+    ctx->preferred_mech_type = preferred_mech_type;
> 
>-	ctx->preferred_mech_type = preferred_mech_type;
>+    if (preferred_mech_type == GSS_C_NO_OID) {
>+        send_reject(minor_status, output_token);
>+        HEIMDAL_MUTEX_unlock(&ctx->ctx_id_mutex);
>+        free_NegotiationToken(&nt);
>+        return ret;
>     }
> 
>     /*
>-- 
>2.32.0
>
>
>From ea5ec8f174920cb80ce2b168b49195378420449e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Nicolas Williams <nico@twosigma.com>
>Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2021 16:49:04 -0600
>Subject: [PATCH 04/17] asn1: CVE-2022-44640 Invalid free in ASN.1 codec
>
>This is a 10.0 on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) v3.
>
>Heimdal's ASN.1 compiler generates code that allows specially
>crafted DER encodings of CHOICEs to invoke the wrong free function
>on the decoded structure upon decode error.  This is known to impact
>the Heimdal KDC, leading to an invalid free() of an address partly
>or wholly under the control of the attacker, in turn leading to a
>potential remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability.
>
>This error affects the DER codec for all CHOICE types used in
>Heimdal, though not all cases will be exploitable.  We have not
>completed a thorough analysis of all the Heimdal components
>affected, thus the Kerberos client, the X.509 library, and other
>parts, may be affected as well.
>
>This bug has been in Heimdal since 2005.  It was first reported by
>Douglas Bagnall, though it had been found independently by the
>Heimdal maintainers via fuzzing a few weeks earlier.
>
>While no zero-day exploit is known, such an exploit will likely be
>available soon after public disclosure.
>---
> lib/asn1/fuzz-inputs/KrbFastArmoredReq | Bin 0 -> 55 bytes
> lib/asn1/gen_decode.c                  |  12 ++++++------
> lib/asn1/gen_free.c                    |   7 +++++++
> lib/asn1/krb5.asn1                     |   1 +
> 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 lib/asn1/fuzz-inputs/KrbFastArmoredReq
>
>diff --git a/lib/asn1/fuzz-inputs/KrbFastArmoredReq b/lib/asn1/fuzz-inputs/KrbFastArmoredReq
>new file mode 100644
>index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..21ac3601bcc9c657454ac0f2dbca099eac73b6af
>GIT binary patch
>literal 55
>zcmZ2rYM{GN+dy>z9}|n9lCg^~qYw)N0|TS-_r7}*OBkxJGYhg*WKU{RoAhw&D#O=i
>LC2rpt>V16ysnrq}
>
>literal 0
>HcmV?d00001
>
>diff --git a/lib/asn1/gen_decode.c b/lib/asn1/gen_decode.c
>index 650017fa6..fd193208b 100644
>--- a/lib/asn1/gen_decode.c
>+++ b/lib/asn1/gen_decode.c
>@@ -594,14 +594,14 @@ decode_type (const char *name, const Type *t, int optional,
> 		    classname(cl),
> 		    ty ? "CONS" : "PRIM",
> 		    valuename(cl, tag));
>+	    fprintf(codefile,
>+		    "(%s)->element = %s;\n",
>+		    name, m->label);
> 	    if (asprintf (&s, "%s(%s)->u.%s", m->optional ? "" : "&",
> 			  name, m->gen_name) < 0 || s == NULL)
> 		errx(1, "malloc");
> 	    decode_type (s, m->type, m->optional, forwstr, m->gen_name, NULL,
> 		depth + 1);
>-	    fprintf(codefile,
>-		    "(%s)->element = %s;\n",
>-		    name, m->label);
> 	    free(s);
> 	    fprintf(codefile,
> 		    "}\n");
>@@ -610,23 +610,23 @@ decode_type (const char *name, const Type *t, int optional,
> 	if (have_ellipsis) {
> 	    fprintf(codefile,
> 		    "else {\n"
>+		    "(%s)->element = %s;\n"
> 		    "(%s)->u.%s.data = calloc(1, len);\n"
> 		    "if ((%s)->u.%s.data == NULL) {\n"
> 		    "e = ENOMEM; %s;\n"
> 		    "}\n"
> 		    "(%s)->u.%s.length = len;\n"
> 		    "memcpy((%s)->u.%s.data, p, len);\n"
>-		    "(%s)->element = %s;\n"
> 		    "p += len;\n"
> 		    "ret += len;\n"
> 		    "len = 0;\n"
> 		    "}\n",
>+		    name, have_ellipsis->label,
> 		    name, have_ellipsis->gen_name,
> 		    name, have_ellipsis->gen_name,
> 		    forwstr,
> 		    name, have_ellipsis->gen_name,
>-		    name, have_ellipsis->gen_name,
>-		    name, have_ellipsis->label);
>+		    name, have_ellipsis->gen_name);
> 	} else {
> 	    fprintf(codefile,
> 		    "else {\n"
>diff --git a/lib/asn1/gen_free.c b/lib/asn1/gen_free.c
>index b9cae7533..74449fe6c 100644
>--- a/lib/asn1/gen_free.c
>+++ b/lib/asn1/gen_free.c
>@@ -61,6 +61,13 @@ free_type (const char *name, const Type *t, int preserve)
>     case TNull:
>     case TGeneralizedTime:
>     case TUTCTime:
>+        /*
>+         * This doesn't do much, but it leaves zeros where garbage might
>+         * otherwise have been found.  Gets us closer to having the equivalent
>+         * of a memset()-to-zero data structure after calling the free
>+         * functions.
>+         */
>+        fprintf(codefile, "*%s = 0;\n", name);
> 	break;
>     case TBitString:
> 	if (ASN1_TAILQ_EMPTY(t->members))
>diff --git a/lib/asn1/krb5.asn1 b/lib/asn1/krb5.asn1
>index 9183fc19a..4e8b6db7a 100644
>--- a/lib/asn1/krb5.asn1
>+++ b/lib/asn1/krb5.asn1
>@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ EXPORTS
> 	KrbFastFinished,
> 	KrbFastReq,
> 	KrbFastArmor,
>+	KrbFastArmoredReq,
> 	KDCFastState,
> 	KDCFastCookie,
> 	KDC-PROXY-MESSAGE,
>-- 
>2.32.0
>
>
>From 0495a19a938ad68283078e62c659e4f1c5980815 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
>Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2019 02:35:35 +0100
>Subject: [PATCH 05/17] kdc: CVE-2019-14870 Always lookup impersonate client in
> DB
>
>Signed-off-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
>---
> kdc/krb5tgs.c          | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
> tests/kdc/check-kdc.in |  4 ++++
> 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/kdc/krb5tgs.c b/kdc/krb5tgs.c
>index bea20c74b..a1cf9f1f3 100644
>--- a/kdc/krb5tgs.c
>+++ b/kdc/krb5tgs.c
>@@ -2103,30 +2103,32 @@ server_lookup:
> 	    if (ret)
> 		goto out;
> 
>+	    ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, tp, HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags,
>+				NULL, &s4u2self_impersonated_clientdb,
>+				&s4u2self_impersonated_client);
>+	    if (ret) {
>+		const char *msg;
>+
>+		/*
>+		 * If the client belongs to the same realm as our krbtgt, it
>+		 * should exist in the local database.
>+		 *
>+		 */
>+
>+		if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
>+		    ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
>+		msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
>+		kdc_log(context, config, 2,
>+			"S4U2Self principal to impersonate %s not found in database: %s",
>+			tpn, msg);
>+		krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
>+		goto out;
>+	    }
>+
> 	    /* If we were about to put a PAC into the ticket, we better fix it to be the right PAC */
> 	    if(rspac.data) {
> 		krb5_pac p = NULL;
> 		krb5_data_free(&rspac);
>-		ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, tp, HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags,
>-				    NULL, &s4u2self_impersonated_clientdb, &s4u2self_impersonated_client);
>-		if (ret) {
>-		    const char *msg;
>-
>-		    /*
>-		     * If the client belongs to the same realm as our krbtgt, it
>-		     * should exist in the local database.
>-		     *
>-		     */
>-
>-		    if (ret == HDB_ERR_NOENTRY)
>-			ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
>-		    msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
>-		    kdc_log(context, config, 1,
>-			    "S2U4Self principal to impersonate %s not found in database: %s",
>-			    tpn, msg);
>-		    krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
>-		    goto out;
>-		}
> 		ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, s4u2self_impersonated_client, &p);
> 		if (ret) {
> 		    kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
>diff --git a/tests/kdc/check-kdc.in b/tests/kdc/check-kdc.in
>index a57253b5a..d0b454f50 100644
>--- a/tests/kdc/check-kdc.in
>+++ b/tests/kdc/check-kdc.in
>@@ -805,6 +805,10 @@ echo "  negative check"
> ${kgetcred_imp} --impersonate=bar@${R} foo@${R} 2>/dev/null && \
> 	{ ec=1 ; eval "${testfailed}"; }
> 
>+echo "test impersonate unknown client"; > messages.log
>+${kgetcred_imp} --forward --impersonate=unknown@${R} ${ps} && \
>+	{ ec=1 ; eval "${testfailed}"; }
>+
> echo "test constrained delegation"; > messages.log
> ${kgetcred_imp} --forward --impersonate=bar@${R} ${ps} || \
> 	{ ec=1 ; eval "${testfailed}"; }
>-- 
>2.32.0
>
>
>From bdd1d0227720c252771f2db65c31f02bc9fc493c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
>Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2019 02:37:30 +0100
>Subject: [PATCH 06/17] kdc: CVE-2019-14870 Apply forwardable policy in
> protocol-transition
>
>Signed-off-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
>---
> kdc/krb5tgs.c          |  6 ++++--
> tests/kdc/check-kdc.in | 11 +++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/kdc/krb5tgs.c b/kdc/krb5tgs.c
>index a1cf9f1f3..39b3460d6 100644
>--- a/kdc/krb5tgs.c
>+++ b/kdc/krb5tgs.c
>@@ -2164,10 +2164,12 @@ server_lookup:
> 
> 	    /*
> 	     * If the service isn't trusted for authentication to
>-	     * delegation, remove the forward flag.
>+	     * delegation or if the impersonate client is disallowed
>+	     * forwardable, remove the forwardable flag.
> 	     */
> 
>-	    if (client->entry.flags.trusted_for_delegation) {
>+	    if (client->entry.flags.trusted_for_delegation &&
>+		s4u2self_impersonated_client->entry.flags.forwardable) {
> 		str = "[forwardable]";
> 	    } else {
> 		b->kdc_options.forwardable = 0;
>diff --git a/tests/kdc/check-kdc.in b/tests/kdc/check-kdc.in
>index d0b454f50..a0dd887e9 100644
>--- a/tests/kdc/check-kdc.in
>+++ b/tests/kdc/check-kdc.in
>@@ -217,6 +217,8 @@ ${kadmin} add -p kaka --use-defaults kt-des3@${R} || exit 1
> ${kadmin} add -p kaka --use-defaults foo/des3-only@${R} || exit 1
> ${kadmin} add -p kaka --use-defaults bar/des3-only@${R} || exit 1
> ${kadmin} add -p kaka --use-defaults foo/aes-only@${R} || exit 1
>+
>+${kadmin} add -p sens --use-defaults --attributes=disallow-forwardable sensitive@${R} || exit 1
> ${kadmin} add -p foo --use-defaults ${ps} || exit 1
> ${kadmin} modify --attributes=+trusted-for-delegation ${ps} || exit 1
> ${kadmin} modify --constrained-delegation=${server} ${ps} || exit 1
>@@ -809,6 +811,15 @@ echo "test impersonate unknown client"; > messages.log
> ${kgetcred_imp} --forward --impersonate=unknown@${R} ${ps} && \
> 	{ ec=1 ; eval "${testfailed}"; }
> 
>+echo "test delegate sensitive client"; > messages.log
>+${kgetcred_imp} --forward --impersonate=sensitive@${R} ${ps} || \
>+	{ ec=1 ; eval "${testfailed}"; }
>+${kgetcred} \
>+	--out-cache=${o2cache} \
>+	--delegation-credential-cache=${ocache} \
>+	${server}@${R} && \
>+	{ ec=1 ; eval "${testfailed}"; }
>+
> echo "test constrained delegation"; > messages.log
> ${kgetcred_imp} --forward --impersonate=bar@${R} ${ps} || \
> 	{ ec=1 ; eval "${testfailed}"; }
>-- 
>2.32.0
>
>
>From fd43016f2f4b58cf4f0cf3f47b2541f2ab11b2b8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
>Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2019 00:05:05 +0100
>Subject: [PATCH 07/17] kdc: CVE-2019-14870 Validate client attributes in
> protocol-transition
>
>Signed-off-by: Isaac Boukris <iboukris@gmail.com>
>---
> kdc/krb5tgs.c          | 11 +++++++++++
> tests/kdc/check-kdc.in |  8 ++++++++
> 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/kdc/krb5tgs.c b/kdc/krb5tgs.c
>index 39b3460d6..89bd1f2e1 100644
>--- a/kdc/krb5tgs.c
>+++ b/kdc/krb5tgs.c
>@@ -2125,6 +2125,17 @@ server_lookup:
> 		goto out;
> 	    }
> 
>+	    /* Ignore require_pwchange and pw_end attributes (as Windows does),
>+	     * since S4U2Self is not password authentication. */
>+	    s4u2self_impersonated_client->entry.flags.require_pwchange = FALSE;
>+	    free(s4u2self_impersonated_client->entry.pw_end);
>+	    s4u2self_impersonated_client->entry.pw_end = NULL;
>+
>+	    ret = kdc_check_flags(context, config, s4u2self_impersonated_client, tpn,
>+				  NULL, NULL, FALSE);
>+	    if (ret)
>+		goto out;
>+
> 	    /* If we were about to put a PAC into the ticket, we better fix it to be the right PAC */
> 	    if(rspac.data) {
> 		krb5_pac p = NULL;
>diff --git a/tests/kdc/check-kdc.in b/tests/kdc/check-kdc.in
>index a0dd887e9..ae963a735 100644
>--- a/tests/kdc/check-kdc.in
>+++ b/tests/kdc/check-kdc.in
>@@ -811,6 +811,14 @@ echo "test impersonate unknown client"; > messages.log
> ${kgetcred_imp} --forward --impersonate=unknown@${R} ${ps} && \
> 	{ ec=1 ; eval "${testfailed}"; }
> 
>+echo "test impersonate account-expired client"; > messages.log
>+${kgetcred_imp} --forward --impersonate=account-expired@${R} ${ps} && \
>+	{ ec=1 ; eval "${testfailed}"; }
>+
>+echo "test impersonate pw-expired client"; > messages.log
>+${kgetcred_imp} --forward --impersonate=pw-expired@${R} ${ps} || \
>+	{ ec=1 ; eval "${testfailed}"; }
>+
> echo "test delegate sensitive client"; > messages.log
> ${kgetcred_imp} --forward --impersonate=sensitive@${R} ${ps} || \
> 	{ ec=1 ; eval "${testfailed}"; }
>-- 
>2.32.0
>
>
>From f6edaafcfefd843ca1b1a041f942a853d85ee7c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2022 13:57:13 +1300
>Subject: [PATCH 08/17] gsskrb5: CVE-2022-3437 Use constant-time memcmp() for
> arcfour unwrap
>
>Samba BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15134
>
>Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
>---
> lib/gssapi/krb5/arcfour.c | 16 ++++++++--------
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/krb5/arcfour.c b/lib/gssapi/krb5/arcfour.c
>index e6d1f2403..e838d007a 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/krb5/arcfour.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/krb5/arcfour.c
>@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ _gssapi_verify_mic_arcfour(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
> 	return GSS_S_FAILURE;
>     }
> 
>-    cmp = ct_memcmp(cksum_data, p + 8, 8);
>+    cmp = (ct_memcmp(cksum_data, p + 8, 8) == 0);
>     if (cmp) {
> 	*minor_status = 0;
> 	return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
>@@ -385,9 +385,9 @@ _gssapi_verify_mic_arcfour(OM_uint32 * minor_status,
>     _gsskrb5_decode_be_om_uint32(SND_SEQ, &seq_number);
> 
>     if (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL)
>-	cmp = memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4);
>+	cmp = (ct_memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4) != 0);
>     else
>-	cmp = (memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4) != 0);
>+	cmp = (ct_memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4) != 0);
> 
>     memset_s(SND_SEQ, sizeof(SND_SEQ), 0, sizeof(SND_SEQ));
>     if (cmp != 0) {
>@@ -656,9 +656,9 @@ OM_uint32 _gssapi_unwrap_arcfour(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
>     _gsskrb5_decode_be_om_uint32(SND_SEQ, &seq_number);
> 
>     if (context_handle->more_flags & LOCAL)
>-	cmp = memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4);
>+	cmp = (ct_memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4) != 0);
>     else
>-	cmp = (memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4) != 0);
>+	cmp = (ct_memcmp(&SND_SEQ[4], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4) != 0);
> 
>     if (cmp != 0) {
> 	*minor_status = 0;
>@@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ OM_uint32 _gssapi_unwrap_arcfour(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
> 	return GSS_S_FAILURE;
>     }
> 
>-    cmp = ct_memcmp(cksum_data, p0 + 16, 8); /* SGN_CKSUM */
>+    cmp = (ct_memcmp(cksum_data, p0 + 16, 8) == 0); /* SGN_CKSUM */
>     if (cmp) {
> 	_gsskrb5_release_buffer(minor_status, output_message_buffer);
> 	*minor_status = 0;
>@@ -1272,9 +1272,9 @@ _gssapi_unwrap_iov_arcfour(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
>     _gsskrb5_decode_be_om_uint32(snd_seq, &seq_number);
> 
>     if (ctx->more_flags & LOCAL) {
>-	cmp = memcmp(&snd_seq[4], "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4);
>+	cmp = (ct_memcmp(&snd_seq[4], "\xff\xff\xff\xff", 4) != 0);
>     } else {
>-	cmp = (memcmp(&snd_seq[4], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4) != 0);
>+	cmp = (ct_memcmp(&snd_seq[4], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4) != 0);
>     }
>     if (cmp != 0) {
> 	*minor_status = 0;
>-- 
>2.32.0
>
>
>From c9cc34334bd64b08fe91a2f720262462e9f6bb49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2022 13:57:55 +1300
>Subject: [PATCH 09/17] gsskrb5: CVE-2022-3437 Use constant-time memcmp() in
> unwrap_des3()
>
>The surrounding checks all use ct_memcmp(), so this one was presumably
>meant to as well.
>
>Samba BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15134
>
>Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
>---
> lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c b/lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c
>index da939c052..61a341ee4 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c
>@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ unwrap_des3
>   if (ret)
>       return ret;
> 
>-  if (memcmp (p, "\x04\x00", 2) != 0) /* HMAC SHA1 DES3_KD */
>+  if (ct_memcmp (p, "\x04\x00", 2) != 0) /* HMAC SHA1 DES3_KD */
>     return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
>   p += 2;
>   if (ct_memcmp (p, "\x02\x00", 2) == 0) {
>-- 
>2.32.0
>
>
>From a587a4bcb28d5b9047f332573b1e7c8f89ca3edd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2022 13:57:42 +1300
>Subject: [PATCH 10/17] gsskrb5: CVE-2022-3437 Don't pass NULL pointers to
> memcpy() in DES unwrap
>
>Samba BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15134
>
>Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
>---
> lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c | 14 ++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c b/lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c
>index 61a341ee4..d3987240d 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c
>@@ -180,9 +180,10 @@ unwrap_des
>   output_message_buffer->value  = malloc(output_message_buffer->length);
>   if(output_message_buffer->length != 0 && output_message_buffer->value == NULL)
>       return GSS_S_FAILURE;
>-  memcpy (output_message_buffer->value,
>-	  p + 24,
>-	  output_message_buffer->length);
>+  if (output_message_buffer->value != NULL)
>+      memcpy (output_message_buffer->value,
>+	      p + 24,
>+	      output_message_buffer->length);
>   return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
> }
> #endif
>@@ -374,9 +375,10 @@ unwrap_des3
>   output_message_buffer->value  = malloc(output_message_buffer->length);
>   if(output_message_buffer->length != 0 && output_message_buffer->value == NULL)
>       return GSS_S_FAILURE;
>-  memcpy (output_message_buffer->value,
>-	  p + 36,
>-	  output_message_buffer->length);
>+  if (output_message_buffer->value != NULL)
>+      memcpy (output_message_buffer->value,
>+	      p + 36,
>+	      output_message_buffer->length);
>   return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
> }
> 
>-- 
>2.32.0
>
>
>From c758910eaad3c0de2cfb68830a661c4739675a7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 16:53:45 +1200
>Subject: [PATCH 11/17] gsskrb5: CVE-2022-3437 Avoid undefined behaviour in
> _gssapi_verify_pad()
>
>By decrementing 'pad' only when we know it's safe, we ensure we can't
>stray backwards past the start of a buffer, which would be undefined
>behaviour.
>
>In the previous version of the loop, 'i' is the number of bytes left to
>check, and 'pad' is the current byte we're checking. 'pad' was
>decremented at the end of each loop iteration. If 'i' was 1 (so we
>checked the final byte), 'pad' could potentially be pointing to the
>first byte of the input buffer, and the decrement would put it one
>byte behind the buffer.
>
>That would be undefined behaviour.
>
>The patch changes it so that 'pad' is the byte we previously checked,
>which allows us to ensure that we only decrement it when we know we
>have a byte to check.
>
>Samba BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15134
>
>Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
>---
> lib/gssapi/krb5/decapsulate.c | 6 +++---
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/krb5/decapsulate.c b/lib/gssapi/krb5/decapsulate.c
>index 86085f569..4e3fcd659 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/krb5/decapsulate.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/krb5/decapsulate.c
>@@ -193,13 +193,13 @@ _gssapi_verify_pad(gss_buffer_t wrapped_token,
>     if (wrapped_token->length < 1)
> 	return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
> 
>-    pad = (u_char *)wrapped_token->value + wrapped_token->length - 1;
>-    padlength = *pad;
>+    pad = (u_char *)wrapped_token->value + wrapped_token->length;
>+    padlength = pad[-1];
> 
>     if (padlength > datalen)
> 	return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
> 
>-    for (i = padlength; i > 0 && *pad == padlength; i--, pad--)
>+    for (i = padlength; i > 0 && *--pad == padlength; i--)
> 	;
>     if (i != 0)
> 	return GSS_S_BAD_MIC;
>-- 
>2.32.0
>
>
>From 414b2a77fd61c26d64562e3800dc5578d9d0f15d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 16:53:55 +1200
>Subject: [PATCH 12/17] gsskrb5: CVE-2022-3437 Check the result of
> _gsskrb5_get_mech()
>
>We should make sure that the result of 'total_len - mech_len' won't
>overflow, and that we don't memcmp() past the end of the buffer.
>
>Samba BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15134
>
>Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
>---
> lib/gssapi/krb5/decapsulate.c | 4 ++++
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/krb5/decapsulate.c b/lib/gssapi/krb5/decapsulate.c
>index 4e3fcd659..031a621ea 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/krb5/decapsulate.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/krb5/decapsulate.c
>@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ _gssapi_verify_mech_header(u_char **str,
> 
>     if (mech_len != mech->length)
> 	return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
>+    if (mech_len > total_len)
>+	return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
>+    if (p - *str > total_len - mech_len)
>+	return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
>     if (ct_memcmp(p,
> 		  mech->elements,
> 		  mech->length) != 0)
>-- 
>2.32.0
>
>
>From be9bbd93ed8f204b4bc1b92d1bc3c16aac194696 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2022 16:54:23 +1200
>Subject: [PATCH 13/17] gsskrb5: CVE-2022-3437 Check buffer length against
> overflow for DES{,3} unwrap
>
>Samba BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15134
>
>Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
>---
> lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c b/lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c
>index d3987240d..fddb64bc5 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c
>@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ unwrap_des
> 
>   if (IS_DCE_STYLE(context_handle)) {
>      token_len = 22 + 8 + 15; /* 45 */
>+     if (input_message_buffer->length < token_len)
>+	  return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
>   } else {
>      token_len = input_message_buffer->length;
>   }
>@@ -76,6 +78,11 @@ unwrap_des
>   if (ret)
>       return ret;
> 
>+  len = (p - (u_char *)input_message_buffer->value)
>+      + 22 + 8;
>+  if (input_message_buffer->length < len)
>+      return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
>+
>   if (memcmp (p, "\x00\x00", 2) != 0)
>     return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
>   p += 2;
>@@ -216,6 +223,8 @@ unwrap_des3
> 
>   if (IS_DCE_STYLE(context_handle)) {
>      token_len = 34 + 8 + 15; /* 57 */
>+     if (input_message_buffer->length < token_len)
>+	  return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
>   } else {
>      token_len = input_message_buffer->length;
>   }
>@@ -228,6 +237,11 @@ unwrap_des3
>   if (ret)
>       return ret;
> 
>+  len = (p - (u_char *)input_message_buffer->value)
>+      + 34 + 8;
>+  if (input_message_buffer->length < len)
>+      return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
>+
>   if (ct_memcmp (p, "\x04\x00", 2) != 0) /* HMAC SHA1 DES3_KD */
>     return GSS_S_BAD_SIG;
>   p += 2;
>-- 
>2.32.0
>
>
>From c8407ca079294d76a5ed140ba5b546f870d23ed2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Date: Mon, 10 Oct 2022 20:33:09 +1300
>Subject: [PATCH 14/17] gsskrb5: CVE-2022-3437 Check for overflow in
> _gsskrb5_get_mech()
>
>If len_len is equal to total_len - 1 (i.e. the input consists only of a
>0x60 byte and a length), the expression 'total_len - 1 - len_len - 1',
>used as the 'len' parameter to der_get_length(), will overflow to
>SIZE_MAX. Then der_get_length() will proceed to read, unconstrained,
>whatever data follows in memory. Add a check to ensure that doesn't
>happen.
>
>Samba BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15134
>
>Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
>---
> lib/gssapi/krb5/decapsulate.c | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/krb5/decapsulate.c b/lib/gssapi/krb5/decapsulate.c
>index 031a621ea..d7b75a642 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/krb5/decapsulate.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/krb5/decapsulate.c
>@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ _gsskrb5_get_mech (const u_char *ptr,
>     e = der_get_length (p, total_len - 1, &len, &len_len);
>     if (e || 1 + len_len + len != total_len)
> 	return -1;
>+    if (total_len < 1 + len_len + 1)
>+	return -1;
>     p += len_len;
>     if (*p++ != 0x06)
> 	return -1;
>-- 
>2.32.0
>
>
>From 8fb508a25a6a47289c73e3f4339352a73a396eef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Date: Wed, 12 Oct 2022 13:57:33 +1300
>Subject: [PATCH 15/17] gsskrb5: CVE-2022-3437 Pass correct length to
> _gssapi_verify_pad()
>
>We later subtract 8 when calculating the length of the output message
>buffer. If padlength is excessively high, this calculation can underflow
>and result in a very large positive value.
>
>Now we properly constrain the value of padlength so underflow shouldn't
>be possible.
>
>Samba BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15134
>
>Signed-off-by: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
>---
> lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c | 4 ++--
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c b/lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c
>index fddb64bc5..bab30f450 100644
>--- a/lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c
>+++ b/lib/gssapi/krb5/unwrap.c
>@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ unwrap_des
>   } else {
>     /* check pad */
>     ret = _gssapi_verify_pad(input_message_buffer,
>-			     input_message_buffer->length - len,
>+			     input_message_buffer->length - len - 8,
> 			     &padlength);
>     if (ret)
>         return ret;
>@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ unwrap_des3
>   } else {
>     /* check pad */
>     ret = _gssapi_verify_pad(input_message_buffer,
>-			     input_message_buffer->length - len,
>+			     input_message_buffer->length - len - 8,
> 			     &padlength);
>     if (ret)
>         return ret;
>-- 
>2.32.0
>
>
>From 1a7a659ba7763c4dd1f428a6284790728f67104d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Joseph Sutton <josephsutton@catalyst.net.nz>
>Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2022 16:58:55 -0500
>Subject: [PATCH 16/17] krb5: CVE-2022-42898 PAC parse integer overflows
>
>Catch overflows that result from adding PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE.
>
>Samba BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15203
>
>Signed-off-by: Nico Williams <nico@twosigma.com>
>---
> lib/krb5/pac.c | 178 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> 1 file changed, 150 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/lib/krb5/pac.c b/lib/krb5/pac.c
>index c26201be9..240845f72 100644
>--- a/lib/krb5/pac.c
>+++ b/lib/krb5/pac.c
>@@ -112,6 +112,56 @@ HMAC_MD5_any_checksum(krb5_context context,
> }
> 
> 
>+static krb5_error_code pac_header_size(krb5_context context,
>+				       uint32_t num_buffers,
>+				       uint32_t *result)
>+{
>+    krb5_error_code ret;
>+    uint32_t header_size;
>+
>+    /* Guard against integer overflow on 32-bit systems. */
>+    if (num_buffers > UINT32_MAX / PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE) {
>+	ret = EINVAL;
>+	krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "PAC has too many buffers");
>+	return ret;
>+    }
>+    header_size = PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE * num_buffers;
>+
>+    /* Guard against integer overflow on 32-bit systems. */
>+    if (header_size > UINT32_MAX - PACTYPE_SIZE) {
>+	ret = EINVAL;
>+	krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "PAC has too many buffers");
>+	return ret;
>+    }
>+    header_size += PACTYPE_SIZE;
>+
>+    *result = header_size;
>+
>+    return 0;
>+}
>+
>+static krb5_error_code pac_aligned_size(krb5_context context,
>+					uint32_t size,
>+					uint32_t *aligned_size)
>+{
>+    krb5_error_code ret;
>+
>+    /* Guard against integer overflow on 32-bit systems. */
>+    if (size > UINT32_MAX - (PAC_ALIGNMENT - 1)) {
>+	ret = EINVAL;
>+	krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun");
>+	return ret;
>+    }
>+    size += PAC_ALIGNMENT - 1;
>+
>+    /* align to PAC_ALIGNMENT */
>+    size = (size / PAC_ALIGNMENT) * PAC_ALIGNMENT;
>+
>+    *aligned_size = size;
>+
>+    return 0;
>+}
>+
> /*
>  *
>  */
>@@ -153,8 +203,12 @@ krb5_pac_parse(krb5_context context, const void *ptr, size_t len,
> 	goto out;
>     }
> 
>-    p->pac = calloc(1,
>-		    sizeof(*p->pac) + (sizeof(p->pac->buffers[0]) * (tmp - 1)));
>+    ret = pac_header_size(context, tmp, &header_end);
>+    if (ret) {
>+	return ret;
>+    }
>+
>+    p->pac = calloc(1, header_end);
>     if (p->pac == NULL) {
> 	ret = krb5_enomem(context);
> 	goto out;
>@@ -163,7 +217,6 @@ krb5_pac_parse(krb5_context context, const void *ptr, size_t len,
>     p->pac->numbuffers = tmp;
>     p->pac->version = tmp2;
> 
>-    header_end = PACTYPE_SIZE + (PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE * p->pac->numbuffers);
>     if (header_end > len) {
> 	ret = EINVAL;
> 	goto out;
>@@ -292,37 +345,65 @@ krb5_pac_add_buffer(krb5_context context, krb5_pac p,
> {
>     krb5_error_code ret;
>     void *ptr;
>-    size_t len, offset, header_end, old_end;
>+    uint32_t unaligned_len, num_buffers, len, offset, header_end, old_end;
>     uint32_t i;
> 
>-    len = p->pac->numbuffers;
>+    if (data->length > UINT32_MAX) {
>+	ret = EINVAL;
>+	krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun");
>+	return ret;
>+    }
>+
>+    num_buffers = p->pac->numbuffers;
>+
>+    if (num_buffers >= UINT32_MAX) {
>+	ret = EINVAL;
>+	krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun");
>+	return ret;
>+    }
>+    ret = pac_header_size(context, num_buffers + 1, &header_end);
>+    if (ret) {
>+	return ret;
>+    }
> 
>-    ptr = realloc(p->pac,
>-		  sizeof(*p->pac) + (sizeof(p->pac->buffers[0]) * len));
>+    ptr = realloc(p->pac, header_end);
>     if (ptr == NULL)
> 	return krb5_enomem(context);
> 
>     p->pac = ptr;
> 
>-    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
>+    for (i = 0; i < num_buffers; i++) {
>+	if (p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo > UINT32_MAX - PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE) {
>+	    ret = EINVAL;
>+	    krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun");
>+	    return ret;
>+	}
>+
> 	p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo += PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE;
>+    }
> 
>+    if (p->data.length > UINT32_MAX - PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE) {
>+	ret = EINVAL;
>+	krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun");
>+	return ret;
>+    }
>     offset = p->data.length + PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE;
> 
>-    p->pac->buffers[len].type = type;
>-    p->pac->buffers[len].buffersize = data->length;
>-    p->pac->buffers[len].offset_lo = offset;
>-    p->pac->buffers[len].offset_hi = 0;
>+    p->pac->buffers[num_buffers].type = type;
>+    p->pac->buffers[num_buffers].buffersize = data->length;
>+    p->pac->buffers[num_buffers].offset_lo = offset;
>+    p->pac->buffers[num_buffers].offset_hi = 0;
> 
>     old_end = p->data.length;
>-    len = p->data.length + data->length + PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE;
>-    if (len < p->data.length) {
>+    if (offset > UINT32_MAX - data->length) {
> 	krb5_set_error_message(context, EINVAL, "integer overrun");
> 	return EINVAL;
>     }
>+    unaligned_len = offset + data->length;
> 
>-    /* align to PAC_ALIGNMENT */
>-    len = ((len + PAC_ALIGNMENT - 1) / PAC_ALIGNMENT) * PAC_ALIGNMENT;
>+    ret = pac_aligned_size(context, unaligned_len, &len);
>+    if (ret)
>+	return ret;
> 
>     ret = krb5_data_realloc(&p->data, len);
>     if (ret) {
>@@ -333,7 +414,7 @@ krb5_pac_add_buffer(krb5_context context, krb5_pac p,
>     /*
>      * make place for new PAC INFO BUFFER header
>      */
>-    header_end = PACTYPE_SIZE + (PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE * p->pac->numbuffers);
>+    header_end -= PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE;
>     memmove((unsigned char *)p->data.data + header_end + PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE,
> 	    (unsigned char *)p->data.data + header_end ,
> 	    old_end - header_end);
>@@ -346,7 +427,7 @@ krb5_pac_add_buffer(krb5_context context, krb5_pac p,
>     memcpy((unsigned char *)p->data.data + offset,
> 	   data->data, data->length);
>     memset((unsigned char *)p->data.data + offset + data->length,
>-	   0, p->data.length - offset - data->length);
>+ 	   0, p->data.length - unaligned_len);
> 
>     p->pac->numbuffers += 1;
> 
>@@ -375,8 +456,8 @@ krb5_pac_get_buffer(krb5_context context, krb5_pac p,
>     uint32_t i;
> 
>     for (i = 0; i < p->pac->numbuffers; i++) {
>-	const size_t len = p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize;
>-	const size_t offset = p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo;
>+	const uint32_t len = p->pac->buffers[i].buffersize;
>+	const uint32_t offset = p->pac->buffers[i].offset_lo;
> 
> 	if (p->pac->buffers[i].type != type)
> 	    continue;
>@@ -981,8 +1062,8 @@ _krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context,
>     size_t server_size, priv_size;
>     uint32_t server_offset = 0, priv_offset = 0;
>     uint32_t server_cksumtype = 0, priv_cksumtype = 0;
>-    int num = 0;
>-    size_t i;
>+    uint32_t num = 0;
>+    uint32_t i;
>     krb5_data logon, d;
> 
>     krb5_data_zero(&logon);
>@@ -1030,8 +1111,18 @@ _krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context,
> 
>     if (num) {
> 	void *ptr;
>-
>-	ptr = realloc(p->pac, sizeof(*p->pac) + (sizeof(p->pac->buffers[0]) * (p->pac->numbuffers + num - 1)));
>+        uint32_t len;
>+
>+ 	if (p->pac->numbuffers > UINT32_MAX - num) {
>+ 	    ret = EINVAL;
>+ 	    krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun");
>+ 	    goto out;
>+ 	}
>+ 	ret = pac_header_size(context, p->pac->numbuffers + num, &len);
>+ 	if (ret)
>+ 	    goto out;
>+ 
>+ 	ptr = realloc(p->pac, len);
> 	if (ptr == NULL)
> 	    return krb5_enomem(context);
> 
>@@ -1084,7 +1175,9 @@ _krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context,
>     CHECK(ret, krb5_store_uint32(sp, p->pac->numbuffers), out);
>     CHECK(ret, krb5_store_uint32(sp, p->pac->version), out);
> 
>-    end = PACTYPE_SIZE + (PAC_INFO_BUFFER_SIZE * p->pac->numbuffers);
>+    ret = pac_header_size(context, p->pac->numbuffers, &end);
>+    if (ret)
>+        goto out;
> 
>     for (i = 0; i < p->pac->numbuffers; i++) {
> 	uint32_t len;
>@@ -1094,11 +1187,31 @@ _krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context,
> 	/* store data */
> 
> 	if (p->pac->buffers[i].type == PAC_SERVER_CHECKSUM) {
>+	    if (server_size > UINT32_MAX - 4) {
>+		ret = EINVAL;
>+		krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun");
>+		goto out;
>+	    }
>+	    if (end > UINT32_MAX - 4) {
>+		ret = EINVAL;
>+		krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun");
>+		goto out;
>+	    }
> 	    len = server_size + 4;
> 	    server_offset = end + 4;
> 	    CHECK(ret, krb5_store_uint32(spdata, server_cksumtype), out);
> 	    CHECK(ret, fill_zeros(context, spdata, server_size), out);
> 	} else if (p->pac->buffers[i].type == PAC_PRIVSVR_CHECKSUM) {
>+	    if (priv_size > UINT32_MAX - 4) {
>+		ret = EINVAL;
>+		krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun");
>+		goto out;
>+	    }
>+	    if (end > UINT32_MAX - 4) {
>+		ret = EINVAL;
>+		krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun");
>+		goto out;
>+	    }
> 	    len = priv_size + 4;
> 	    priv_offset = end + 4;
> 	    CHECK(ret, krb5_store_uint32(spdata, priv_cksumtype), out);
>@@ -1129,11 +1242,20 @@ _krb5_pac_sign(krb5_context context,
> 
> 	/* advance data endpointer and align */
> 	{
>-	    int32_t e;
>+	    uint32_t e;
> 
>+	    if (end > UINT32_MAX - len) {
>+		ret = EINVAL;
>+		krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "integer overrun");
>+		goto out;
>+	    }
> 	    end += len;
>-	    e = ((end + PAC_ALIGNMENT - 1) / PAC_ALIGNMENT) * PAC_ALIGNMENT;
>-	    if ((int32_t)end != e) {
>+
>+	    ret = pac_aligned_size(context, end, &e);
>+	    if (ret)
>+		goto out;
>+
>+	    if (end != e) {
> 		CHECK(ret, fill_zeros(context, spdata, e - end), out);
> 	    }
> 	    end = e;
>-- 
>2.32.0
>
>
>From aa3739c932f209e824da6849e91d2829fc7a7ea8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@secure-endpoints.com>
>Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 20:00:29 -0500
>Subject: [PATCH 17/17] lib/wind: find_normalize read past end of array
>
>find_normalize() can under some circumstances read one element
>beyond the input array.  The contents are discarded immediately
>without further use.
>
>This change prevents the unintended read.
>
>(cherry picked from commit 357a38fc7fb582ae73f4b7f4a90a4b0b871b149e)
>
>Change-Id: Ia2759a5632d64f7fa6553f879b5bbbf43ba3513e
>---
> lib/wind/normalize.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
>diff --git a/lib/wind/normalize.c b/lib/wind/normalize.c
>index 20e8a4a04..8f3991d10 100644
>--- a/lib/wind/normalize.c
>+++ b/lib/wind/normalize.c
>@@ -227,9 +227,9 @@ find_composition(const uint32_t *in, unsigned in_len)
> 	unsigned i;
> 
> 	if (n % 5 == 0) {
>-	    cur = *in++;
> 	    if (in_len-- == 0)
> 		return c->val;
>+	    cur = *in++;
> 	}
> 
> 	i = cur >> 16;
>-- 
>2.32.0
>

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Attachments on bug 15203: 17565 | 17567 | 17597 | 17600 | 17617 | 17618 | 17619 | 17620 | 17621 | 17622 | 17623 | 17624 | 17625 | 17627 | 17657 | 17658 | 17659