Attachment 17622 Details for Bug 15203 – Samba advisory v1

Samba advisory v1

CVE-2022-42898-advisory-v1.txt (text/plain), 2.96 KB, created by Jennifer Sutton on 2022-11-04 02:37:04 UTC

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Creator: Jennifer Sutton

Created: 2022-11-04 02:37:04 UTC

Size: 2.96 KB

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obsolete

>===========================================================
>== Subject:     Samba buffer overflow vulnerabilities on 32-bit
>==              systems
>==
>== CVE ID#:     CVE-2022-42898
>==
>== Versions:    All versions of Samba prior to 4.15.next, 4.16.next, 4.17.next
>==
>== Summary:     Samba's Kerberos libraries failed to guard against
>==              integer overflows when parsing a PAC on a 32-bit
>==              system, which allowed an attacker with a forged PAC to
>==              corrupt the heap.
>===========================================================
>
>===========
>Description
>===========
>
>The Kerberos libraries used by Samba provide a mechanism for
>authenticating a user or service by means of tickets that can contain
>Privilege Attribute Certificates (PACs). Both the Heimdal and MIT
>Kerberos libraries, when calculating how many bytes to allocate for a
>buffer that was to receive a parsed PAC, failed to handle the case in
>which the result overflowed. Because the user's control over this
>calculation is limited to an unsigned 32-bit value, such an outcome
>may be considered, if the calculation is performed in the ample
>integer range of a 64-bit system, a practical impossibility.
>
>On a 32-bit system the situation is more grave. An overflow in that
>case will result in a buffer on the heap that is too short. Into this
>undersized buffer are placed 16-byte chunks of entirely attacker-
>controlled data, which, although subject to consistency checks, are
>not verified until after being written to memory. The server will
>cease parsing once a check has failed, but by this time the heap may
>have already been corrupted and the stage set for a crash or remote
>code execution.
>
>To take advantage of this vulnerability, an attacker must cause an
>unsuspecting server to ingest and parse a specially forged PAC. By
>employing a Service for User to Proxy (S4U2Proxy) request, one need
>only posess the key of a server within the realm to be able to encrypt
>an arbitrary PAC into a ticket that the KDC will accept. Furthermore,
>a compromised RODC provides the means to forge malicious tickets which
>the KDC will accept and parse without question.
>
>==================
>Patch Availability
>==================
>
>Patches addressing these issues have been posted to:
>
>    https://www.samba.org/samba/security/
>
>Additionally, Samba 4.15.next, 4.16.next, and 4.17.next have been issued
>as security releases to correct the defect. Samba administrators are
>advised to upgrade to these releases or apply the patch as soon
>as possible.
>
>==================
>CVSSv3 calculation
>==================
>
>CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L (6.4)
>
>==========
>Workaround
>==========
>
>None.
>
>=======
>Credits
>=======
>
>Originally reported by Greg Hudson with the aid of oss-fuzz.
>
>Patches provided by Nicolas Williams of Heimdal and Joseph Sutton of
>the Samba team.
>
>==========================================================
>== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
>== The Samba Team
>==========================================================

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