The Samba-Bugzilla – Attachment 16975 Details for
Bug 14468
CVE-2021-3738 [SECURITY] crash in dsdb stack
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[patch]
patch from master backported to 4.10 (v01)
CVE-2021-3738-dsdb-crash-4.10-v01.patch (text/plain), 47.77 KB, created by
Jo Sutton
on 2021-11-09 04:06:14 UTC
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Description:
patch from master backported to 4.10 (v01)
Filename:
MIME Type:
Creator:
Jo Sutton
Created:
2021-11-09 04:06:14 UTC
Size:
47.77 KB
patch
obsolete
>From 4fa3d6bcb54e5bc907c073292e22cc5445aada03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2021 11:24:26 +0200 >Subject: [PATCH 01/11] CVE-2021-3738 s4:torture/drsuapi: don't pass DsPrivate > to test_DsBind() > >This will make it easier to reuse. > >BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468 > >Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> >--- > source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- > source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.h | 1 - > source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi_cracknames.c | 2 +- > 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) > >diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c b/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c >index a424a3160c6..5f3c04852b6 100644 >--- a/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c >+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c >@@ -28,12 +28,14 @@ > > #define TEST_MACHINE_NAME "torturetest" > >-bool test_DsBind(struct dcerpc_pipe *p, >- struct torture_context *tctx, >- struct DsPrivate *priv) >+static bool test_DsBind(struct dcerpc_pipe *p, >+ struct torture_context *tctx, >+ struct policy_handle *bind_handle, >+ struct drsuapi_DsBindInfo28 *srv_info28) > { > NTSTATUS status; > struct drsuapi_DsBind r; >+ struct GUID bind_guid; > struct drsuapi_DsBindInfo28 *bind_info28; > struct drsuapi_DsBindInfoCtr bind_info_ctr; > >@@ -70,19 +72,20 @@ bool test_DsBind(struct dcerpc_pipe *p, > bind_info28->supported_extensions |= DRSUAPI_SUPPORTED_EXTENSION_GETCHGREPLY_V7; > bind_info28->supported_extensions |= DRSUAPI_SUPPORTED_EXTENSION_VERIFY_OBJECT; > >- GUID_from_string(DRSUAPI_DS_BIND_GUID, &priv->bind_guid); >+ GUID_from_string(DRSUAPI_DS_BIND_GUID, &bind_guid); > >- r.in.bind_guid = &priv->bind_guid; >+ r.in.bind_guid = &bind_guid; > r.in.bind_info = &bind_info_ctr; >- r.out.bind_handle = &priv->bind_handle; >+ r.out.bind_handle = bind_handle; > > torture_comment(tctx, "Testing DsBind\n"); > > status = dcerpc_drsuapi_DsBind_r(p->binding_handle, tctx, &r); > torture_drsuapi_assert_call(tctx, p, status, &r, "dcerpc_drsuapi_DsBind"); > >- /* cache server supported extensions, i.e. bind_info */ >- priv->srv_bind_info = r.out.bind_info->info.info28; >+ if (srv_info28 != NULL) { >+ *srv_info28 = r.out.bind_info->info.info28; >+ } > > return true; > } >@@ -792,7 +795,10 @@ bool torture_drsuapi_tcase_setup_common(struct torture_context *tctx, struct DsP > &machine_credentials); > torture_assert(tctx, priv->join, "Failed to join as BDC"); > >- if (!test_DsBind(priv->drs_pipe, tctx, priv)) { >+ if (!test_DsBind(priv->drs_pipe, tctx, >+ &priv->bind_handle, >+ &priv->srv_bind_info)) >+ { > /* clean up */ > torture_drsuapi_tcase_teardown_common(tctx, priv); > torture_fail(tctx, "Failed execute test_DsBind()"); >diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.h b/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.h >index f1a5bba05b8..e81b2fe3746 100644 >--- a/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.h >+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.h >@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ > struct DsPrivate { > struct dcerpc_pipe *drs_pipe; > struct policy_handle bind_handle; >- struct GUID bind_guid; > struct drsuapi_DsBindInfo28 srv_bind_info; > > const char *domain_obj_dn; >diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi_cracknames.c b/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi_cracknames.c >index 33917832069..ad66211d0f6 100644 >--- a/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi_cracknames.c >+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi_cracknames.c >@@ -798,7 +798,7 @@ bool test_DsCrackNames(struct torture_context *tctx, > .format_offered = DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_GUID, > .format_desired = DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_FQDN_1779, > .comment = "BIND GUID (ie, not in the directory)", >- .str = GUID_string2(mem_ctx, &priv->bind_guid), >+ .str = DRSUAPI_DS_BIND_GUID, > .status = DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_STATUS_NOT_FOUND > }, > { >-- >2.25.1 > > >From 2a33ae83a37b2771d7920f5f057bac9d6016bc24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2021 09:58:37 +0200 >Subject: [PATCH 02/11] CVE-2021-3738 s4:torture/drsuapi: maintain > priv->dc_credentials > >We want to use the credentials of the joined dc account >in future tests. > >BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468 > >Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> >--- > source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c | 3 +-- > source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.h | 1 + > 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > >diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c b/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c >index 5f3c04852b6..17e46dac8ff 100644 >--- a/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c >+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c >@@ -780,7 +780,6 @@ bool torture_drsuapi_tcase_setup_common(struct torture_context *tctx, struct DsP > NTSTATUS status; > int rnd = rand() % 1000; > char *name = talloc_asprintf(tctx, "%s%d", TEST_MACHINE_NAME, rnd); >- struct cli_credentials *machine_credentials; > > torture_assert(tctx, priv, "Invalid argument"); > >@@ -792,7 +791,7 @@ bool torture_drsuapi_tcase_setup_common(struct torture_context *tctx, struct DsP > > torture_comment(tctx, "About to join domain with name %s\n", name); > priv->join = torture_join_domain(tctx, name, ACB_SVRTRUST, >- &machine_credentials); >+ &priv->dc_credentials); > torture_assert(tctx, priv->join, "Failed to join as BDC"); > > if (!test_DsBind(priv->drs_pipe, tctx, >diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.h b/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.h >index e81b2fe3746..f327c54cda4 100644 >--- a/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.h >+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.h >@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ struct DsPrivate { > struct GUID domain_guid; > struct drsuapi_DsGetDCInfo2 dcinfo; > struct test_join *join; >+ struct cli_credentials *dc_credentials; > }; > > /** >-- >2.25.1 > > >From 8d8776eaea05a4068e0975c8c6a4a6ea21f7f16c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2021 10:34:06 +0200 >Subject: [PATCH 03/11] CVE-2021-3738 s4:torture/drsuapi: maintain > priv->admin_credentials > >This will be used in the next commits. > >BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468 > >Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> > >[abartlet@samba.org Backported from patch for master to use > the older popt functions as master has the new common command > line handling] >--- > source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c | 3 +++ > source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.h | 1 + > 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) > >diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c b/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c >index 17e46dac8ff..fc72577c76d 100644 >--- a/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c >+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c >@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ > */ > > #include "includes.h" >+#include "lib/cmdline/popt_common.h" > #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsuapi_c.h" > #include "torture/rpc/torture_rpc.h" > #include "param/param.h" >@@ -783,6 +784,8 @@ bool torture_drsuapi_tcase_setup_common(struct torture_context *tctx, struct DsP > > torture_assert(tctx, priv, "Invalid argument"); > >+ priv->admin_credentials = popt_get_cmdline_credentials(); >+ > torture_comment(tctx, "Create DRSUAPI pipe\n"); > status = torture_rpc_connection(tctx, > &priv->drs_pipe, >diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.h b/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.h >index f327c54cda4..3cc4be49d99 100644 >--- a/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.h >+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.h >@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ > * Data structure common for most of DRSUAPI tests > */ > struct DsPrivate { >+ struct cli_credentials *admin_credentials; > struct dcerpc_pipe *drs_pipe; > struct policy_handle bind_handle; > struct drsuapi_DsBindInfo28 srv_bind_info; >-- >2.25.1 > > >From 532e3aa66cf34b0da17c128f6407ee9d374c4d01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2021 11:26:16 +0200 >Subject: [PATCH 04/11] CVE-2021-3738 s4:torture/drsuapi: DsBindAssocGroup* > tests > >This adds a reproducer for an invalid memory access, when >using the context handle from DsBind across multiple connections >within an association group. > >BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468 > >Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> >--- > .../knownfail.d/drsuapi.DsBindAssocGroupWS | 1 + > source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c | 172 ++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 173 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/drsuapi.DsBindAssocGroupWS > >diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/drsuapi.DsBindAssocGroupWS b/selftest/knownfail.d/drsuapi.DsBindAssocGroupWS >new file mode 100644 >index 00000000000..9af5a904fdd >--- /dev/null >+++ b/selftest/knownfail.d/drsuapi.DsBindAssocGroupWS >@@ -0,0 +1 @@ >+^samba4.rpc.drsuapi.*drsuapi.DsBindAssocGroupWS >diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c b/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c >index fc72577c76d..4139c7ad4f2 100644 >--- a/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c >+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/drsuapi.c >@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ > #include "lib/cmdline/popt_common.h" > #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsuapi_c.h" > #include "torture/rpc/torture_rpc.h" >+#include "libcli/security/dom_sid.h" > #include "param/param.h" > > #define TEST_MACHINE_NAME "torturetest" >@@ -851,6 +852,173 @@ static bool torture_drsuapi_tcase_teardown(struct torture_context *tctx, void *d > return ret; > } > >+static bool __test_DsBind_assoc_group(struct torture_context *tctx, >+ const char *testname, >+ struct DsPrivate *priv, >+ struct cli_credentials *creds) >+{ >+ NTSTATUS status; >+ const char *err_msg; >+ struct drsuapi_DsCrackNames r; >+ union drsuapi_DsNameRequest req; >+ uint32_t level_out; >+ union drsuapi_DsNameCtr ctr; >+ struct drsuapi_DsNameString names[1]; >+ const char *dom_sid = NULL; >+ struct dcerpc_pipe *p1 = NULL; >+ struct dcerpc_pipe *p2 = NULL; >+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = priv; >+ struct dcerpc_binding *binding = NULL; >+ struct policy_handle ds_bind_handle = { .handle_type = 0, }; >+ >+ torture_comment(tctx, "%s: starting...\n", testname); >+ >+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, >+ torture_rpc_binding(tctx, &binding), >+ "torture_rpc_binding"); >+ >+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, >+ dcerpc_pipe_connect_b(tctx, >+ &p1, >+ binding, >+ &ndr_table_drsuapi, >+ creds, >+ tctx->ev, >+ tctx->lp_ctx), >+ "connect p1"); >+ >+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, >+ dcerpc_pipe_connect_b(tctx, >+ &p2, >+ p1->binding, >+ &ndr_table_drsuapi, >+ creds, >+ tctx->ev, >+ tctx->lp_ctx), >+ "connect p2"); >+ >+ torture_assert(tctx, test_DsBind(p1, tctx, &ds_bind_handle, NULL), "DsBind"); >+ >+ ZERO_STRUCT(r); >+ r.in.bind_handle = &ds_bind_handle; >+ r.in.level = 1; >+ r.in.req = &req; >+ r.in.req->req1.codepage = 1252; /* german */ >+ r.in.req->req1.language = 0x00000407; /* german */ >+ r.in.req->req1.count = 1; >+ r.in.req->req1.names = names; >+ r.in.req->req1.format_flags = DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FLAG_NO_FLAGS; >+ >+ r.in.req->req1.format_offered = DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_SID_OR_SID_HISTORY; >+ r.in.req->req1.format_desired = DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_FORMAT_NT4_ACCOUNT; >+ >+ r.out.level_out = &level_out; >+ r.out.ctr = &ctr; >+ >+ dom_sid = dom_sid_string(mem_ctx, torture_join_sid(priv->join)); >+ >+ names[0].str = dom_sid; >+ >+ torture_comment(tctx, "Testing DsCrackNames on p1 with name '%s'" >+ " offered format: %d desired format:%d\n", >+ names[0].str, >+ r.in.req->req1.format_offered, >+ r.in.req->req1.format_desired); >+ status = dcerpc_drsuapi_DsCrackNames_r(p1->binding_handle, mem_ctx, &r); >+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >+ const char *errstr = nt_errstr(status); >+ err_msg = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "dcerpc_drsuapi_DsCrackNames failed - %s", errstr); >+ torture_fail(tctx, err_msg); >+ } else if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(r.out.result)) { >+ err_msg = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "DsCrackNames failed - %s", win_errstr(r.out.result)); >+ torture_fail(tctx, err_msg); >+ } else if (r.out.ctr->ctr1->array[0].status != DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_STATUS_OK) { >+ err_msg = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "DsCrackNames failed on name - %d", >+ r.out.ctr->ctr1->array[0].status); >+ torture_fail(tctx, err_msg); >+ } >+ >+ torture_comment(tctx, "Testing DsCrackNames on p2 with name '%s'" >+ " offered format: %d desired format:%d\n", >+ names[0].str, >+ r.in.req->req1.format_offered, >+ r.in.req->req1.format_desired); >+ status = dcerpc_drsuapi_DsCrackNames_r(p2->binding_handle, mem_ctx, &r); >+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >+ const char *errstr = nt_errstr(status); >+ err_msg = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "dcerpc_drsuapi_DsCrackNames failed - %s", errstr); >+ torture_fail(tctx, err_msg); >+ } else if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(r.out.result)) { >+ err_msg = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "DsCrackNames failed - %s", win_errstr(r.out.result)); >+ torture_fail(tctx, err_msg); >+ } else if (r.out.ctr->ctr1->array[0].status != DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_STATUS_OK) { >+ err_msg = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "DsCrackNames failed on name - %d", >+ r.out.ctr->ctr1->array[0].status); >+ torture_fail(tctx, err_msg); >+ } >+ >+ TALLOC_FREE(p1); >+ >+ torture_comment(tctx, "Testing DsCrackNames on p2 (with p1 closed) with name '%s'" >+ " offered format: %d desired format:%d\n", >+ names[0].str, >+ r.in.req->req1.format_offered, >+ r.in.req->req1.format_desired); >+ status = dcerpc_drsuapi_DsCrackNames_r(p2->binding_handle, mem_ctx, &r); >+ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >+ const char *errstr = nt_errstr(status); >+ err_msg = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "dcerpc_drsuapi_DsCrackNames failed - %s", errstr); >+ torture_fail(tctx, err_msg); >+ } else if (!W_ERROR_IS_OK(r.out.result)) { >+ err_msg = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "DsCrackNames failed - %s", win_errstr(r.out.result)); >+ torture_fail(tctx, err_msg); >+ } else if (r.out.ctr->ctr1->array[0].status != DRSUAPI_DS_NAME_STATUS_OK) { >+ err_msg = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "DsCrackNames failed on name - %d", >+ r.out.ctr->ctr1->array[0].status); >+ torture_fail(tctx, err_msg); >+ } >+ >+ torture_comment(tctx, "%s: ... finished\n", testname); >+ return true; >+} >+ >+static bool test_DsBindAssocGroupAdmin(struct torture_context *tctx, >+ struct DsPrivate *priv, >+ struct cli_credentials *creds) >+{ >+ return __test_DsBind_assoc_group(tctx, __func__, priv, >+ priv->admin_credentials); >+} >+ >+static bool test_DsBindAssocGroupDC(struct torture_context *tctx, >+ struct DsPrivate *priv, >+ struct cli_credentials *creds) >+{ >+ return __test_DsBind_assoc_group(tctx, __func__, priv, >+ priv->dc_credentials); >+} >+ >+static bool test_DsBindAssocGroupWS(struct torture_context *tctx, >+ struct DsPrivate *priv, >+ struct cli_credentials *creds) >+{ >+ struct test_join *wks_join = NULL; >+ struct cli_credentials *wks_credentials = NULL; >+ int rnd = rand() % 1000; >+ char *wks_name = talloc_asprintf(tctx, "WKS%s%d", TEST_MACHINE_NAME, rnd); >+ bool ret; >+ >+ torture_comment(tctx, "%s: About to join workstation with name %s\n", >+ __func__, wks_name); >+ wks_join = torture_join_domain(tctx, wks_name, ACB_WSTRUST, >+ &wks_credentials); >+ torture_assert(tctx, wks_join, "Failed to join as WORKSTATION"); >+ ret = __test_DsBind_assoc_group(tctx, __func__, priv, >+ wks_credentials); >+ torture_leave_domain(tctx, wks_join); >+ return ret; >+} >+ > /** > * DRSUAPI test case implementation > */ >@@ -880,4 +1048,8 @@ void torture_rpc_drsuapi_tcase(struct torture_suite *suite) > torture_tcase_add_simple_test(tcase, "DsReplicaUpdateRefs", (run_func)test_DsReplicaUpdateRefs); > > torture_tcase_add_simple_test(tcase, "DsGetNCChanges", (run_func)test_DsGetNCChanges); >+ >+ torture_tcase_add_simple_test(tcase, "DsBindAssocGroupAdmin", (run_func)test_DsBindAssocGroupAdmin); >+ torture_tcase_add_simple_test(tcase, "DsBindAssocGroupDC", (run_func)test_DsBindAssocGroupDC); >+ torture_tcase_add_simple_test(tcase, "DsBindAssocGroupWS", (run_func)test_DsBindAssocGroupWS); > } >-- >2.25.1 > > >From 67d0a06ce448d10119780bfd917113b8b9ddc437 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2021 13:30:41 +0200 >Subject: [PATCH 05/11] CVE-2021-3738 auth_util: avoid talloc_tos() in > copy_session_info() > >We want to use this also in code without existing >stackframe. > >BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468 > >Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> >--- > auth/auth_util.c | 9 ++++++--- > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > >diff --git a/auth/auth_util.c b/auth/auth_util.c >index f3586f1fc1e..fe01babd107 100644 >--- a/auth/auth_util.c >+++ b/auth/auth_util.c >@@ -26,26 +26,28 @@ > struct auth_session_info *copy_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, > const struct auth_session_info *src) > { >+ TALLOC_CTX *frame = talloc_stackframe(); > struct auth_session_info *dst; > DATA_BLOB blob; > enum ndr_err_code ndr_err; > > ndr_err = ndr_push_struct_blob( > &blob, >- talloc_tos(), >+ frame, > src, > (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_auth_session_info); > if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { > DBG_ERR("copy_session_info(): ndr_push_auth_session_info " > "failed: %s\n", > ndr_errstr(ndr_err)); >+ TALLOC_FREE(frame); > return NULL; > } > > dst = talloc(mem_ctx, struct auth_session_info); > if (dst == NULL) { > DBG_ERR("talloc failed\n"); >- TALLOC_FREE(blob.data); >+ TALLOC_FREE(frame); > return NULL; > } > >@@ -54,15 +56,16 @@ struct auth_session_info *copy_session_info(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, > dst, > dst, > (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_auth_session_info); >- TALLOC_FREE(blob.data); > > if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) { > DBG_ERR("copy_session_info(): ndr_pull_auth_session_info " > "failed: %s\n", > ndr_errstr(ndr_err)); > TALLOC_FREE(dst); >+ TALLOC_FREE(frame); > return NULL; > } > >+ TALLOC_FREE(frame); > return dst; > } >-- >2.25.1 > > >From 8502b15c688dc685205c672707af19ba35bd27df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2021 14:22:32 +0200 >Subject: [PATCH 06/11] CVE-2021-3738 s4:rpc_server/common: provide assoc_group > aware dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_{system,user}() helpers > >We already had dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system(), but it uses the per >connection memory of auth_session_info and remote_address. > >But in order to use the samdb connection on a per association group >context/policy handle, we need to make copies, which last for the >whole lifetime of the 'samdb' context. > >We need the same logic also for all cases we make use of >the almost same logic where we want to create a samdb context >on behalf of the authenticated user (without allowing system access), >so we introduce dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(). > >In the end we need to replace all direct callers to samdb_connect() >from source4/rpc_server. > >BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468 > >Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> >--- > source4/rpc_server/common/server_info.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++---- > 1 file changed, 105 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) > >diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/common/server_info.c b/source4/rpc_server/common/server_info.c >index 6e475bcc796..a2af37653ef 100644 >--- a/source4/rpc_server/common/server_info.c >+++ b/source4/rpc_server/common/server_info.c >@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@ > #include "param/param.h" > #include "rpc_server/common/common.h" > #include "libds/common/roles.h" >+#include "auth/auth_util.h" >+#include "lib/tsocket/tsocket.h" > > /* > Here are common server info functions used by some dcerpc server interfaces >@@ -188,30 +190,117 @@ bool dcesrv_common_validate_share_name(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, const char *share_na > return true; > } > >-/* >- * Open an ldb connection under the system session and save the remote users >- * session details in a ldb_opaque. This will allow the audit logging to >- * log the original session for operations performed in the system session. >- */ >-struct ldb_context *dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system( >+static struct ldb_context *dcesrv_samdb_connect_common( > TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, >- struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call) >+ struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, >+ bool as_system) > { > struct ldb_context *samdb = NULL; >+ struct auth_session_info *system_session_info = NULL; >+ const struct auth_session_info *call_session_info = >+ dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); >+ struct auth_session_info *user_session_info = NULL; >+ struct auth_session_info *ldb_session_info = NULL; >+ struct auth_session_info *audit_session_info = NULL; >+ struct tsocket_address *remote_address = NULL; >+ >+ if (as_system) { >+ system_session_info = system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx); >+ if (system_session_info == NULL) { >+ return NULL; >+ } >+ } >+ >+ user_session_info = copy_session_info(mem_ctx, call_session_info); >+ if (user_session_info == NULL) { >+ return NULL; >+ } >+ >+ if (dce_call->conn->remote_address != NULL) { >+ remote_address = tsocket_address_copy(dce_call->conn->remote_address, >+ user_session_info); >+ if (remote_address == NULL) { >+ return NULL; >+ } >+ } >+ >+ if (system_session_info != NULL) { >+ ldb_session_info = system_session_info; >+ audit_session_info = user_session_info; >+ } else { >+ ldb_session_info = user_session_info; >+ audit_session_info = NULL; >+ } >+ >+ /* >+ * We need to make sure every argument >+ * stays arround for the lifetime of 'samdb', >+ * typically it is allocated on the scope of >+ * an assoc group, so we can't reference dce_call->conn, >+ * as the assoc group may stay when the current connection >+ * gets disconnected. >+ * >+ * The following are global per process: >+ * - dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx >+ * - dce_call->event_ctx >+ * - system_session >+ * >+ * We make a copy of: >+ * - dce_call->conn->remote_address >+ * - dce_call->auth_state->session_info >+ */ > samdb = samdb_connect( > mem_ctx, > dce_call->event_ctx, > dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, >- system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >+ ldb_session_info, >+ remote_address, > 0); >- if (samdb) { >- struct auth_session_info *session_info = >- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); >- ldb_set_opaque( >- samdb, >- DSDB_NETWORK_SESSION_INFO, >- session_info); >+ if (samdb == NULL) { >+ talloc_free(user_session_info); >+ return NULL; > } >+ talloc_move(samdb, &user_session_info); >+ >+ if (audit_session_info != NULL) { >+ int ret; >+ >+ ret = ldb_set_opaque(samdb, >+ DSDB_NETWORK_SESSION_INFO, >+ audit_session_info); >+ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { >+ talloc_free(samdb); >+ return NULL; >+ } >+ } >+ > return samdb; > } >+ >+/* >+ * Open an ldb connection under the system session and save the remote users >+ * session details in a ldb_opaque. This will allow the audit logging to >+ * log the original session for operations performed in the system session. >+ * >+ * Access checks are required by the caller! >+ */ >+struct ldb_context *dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system( >+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, >+ struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call) >+{ >+ return dcesrv_samdb_connect_common(mem_ctx, dce_call, >+ true /* as_system */); >+} >+ >+/* >+ * Open an ldb connection under the remote users session details. >+ * >+ * Access checks are done at the ldb level. >+ */ >+struct ldb_context *dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user( >+ TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, >+ struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call) >+{ >+ return dcesrv_samdb_connect_common(mem_ctx, dce_call, >+ false /* not as_system */); >+} >-- >2.25.1 > > >From 8af51aee8a905384453991e06c4061a11d772f31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2021 13:31:29 +0200 >Subject: [PATCH 07/11] CVE-2021-3738 s4:rpc_server/drsuapi: make use of > assoc_group aware dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_*() helpers > >This avoids a crash that's triggered by windows clients using >DsCrackNames across multiple connections within an association group >on the same DsBind context(policy) handle. > >It also improves the auditing for the dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system() case. > >BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468 > >Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> >--- > .../knownfail.d/drsuapi.DsBindAssocGroupWS | 1 - > source4/rpc_server/drsuapi/dcesrv_drsuapi.c | 55 +++++++------------ > 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) > delete mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/drsuapi.DsBindAssocGroupWS > >diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/drsuapi.DsBindAssocGroupWS b/selftest/knownfail.d/drsuapi.DsBindAssocGroupWS >deleted file mode 100644 >index 9af5a904fdd..00000000000 >--- a/selftest/knownfail.d/drsuapi.DsBindAssocGroupWS >+++ /dev/null >@@ -1 +0,0 @@ >-^samba4.rpc.drsuapi.*drsuapi.DsBindAssocGroupWS >diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/drsuapi/dcesrv_drsuapi.c b/source4/rpc_server/drsuapi/dcesrv_drsuapi.c >index 7e2b6174d2f..239971d7009 100644 >--- a/source4/rpc_server/drsuapi/dcesrv_drsuapi.c >+++ b/source4/rpc_server/drsuapi/dcesrv_drsuapi.c >@@ -73,9 +73,7 @@ static WERROR dcesrv_drsuapi_DsBind(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_C > uint32_t supported_extensions; > uint32_t req_length; > int ret; >- struct auth_session_info *auth_info; > WERROR werr; >- bool connected_as_system = false; > > r->out.bind_info = NULL; > ZERO_STRUCTP(r->out.bind_handle); >@@ -86,45 +84,30 @@ static WERROR dcesrv_drsuapi_DsBind(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_C > /* if this is a DC connecting, give them system level access */ > werr = drs_security_level_check(dce_call, NULL, SECURITY_DOMAIN_CONTROLLER, NULL); > if (W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) { >- DEBUG(3,(__location__ ": doing DsBind with system_session\n")); >- auth_info = system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx); >- connected_as_system = true; >+ DBG_NOTICE("doing DsBind with system_session\n"); >+ b_state->sam_ctx_system = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system(b_state, dce_call); >+ if (b_state->sam_ctx_system == NULL) { >+ return WERR_DS_UNAVAILABLE; >+ } >+ b_state->sam_ctx = b_state->sam_ctx_system; > } else { >- auth_info = dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); >- } >- >- /* >- * connect to the samdb >- */ >- b_state->sam_ctx = samdb_connect( >- b_state, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, >- auth_info, >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >- if (!b_state->sam_ctx) { >- return WERR_FOOBAR; >- } >+ b_state->sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(b_state, dce_call); >+ if (b_state->sam_ctx == NULL) { >+ return WERR_DS_UNAVAILABLE; >+ } > >- if (connected_as_system) { >- b_state->sam_ctx_system = b_state->sam_ctx; >- } else { >- /* an RODC also needs system samdb access for secret >- attribute replication */ >+ /* >+ * an RODC also needs system samdb access for secret >+ * attribute replication >+ */ > werr = drs_security_level_check(dce_call, NULL, SECURITY_RO_DOMAIN_CONTROLLER, > samdb_domain_sid(b_state->sam_ctx)); > if (W_ERROR_IS_OK(werr)) { >- b_state->sam_ctx_system >- = samdb_connect( >- b_state, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, >- system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >- if (!b_state->sam_ctx_system) { >- return WERR_FOOBAR; >+ DBG_NOTICE("doing DsBind as RODC\n"); >+ b_state->sam_ctx_system = >+ dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system(b_state, dce_call); >+ if (b_state->sam_ctx_system == NULL) { >+ return WERR_DS_UNAVAILABLE; > } > } > } >-- >2.25.1 > > >From 4c18f11beb8a13e46691a800444f6f5fbbd32973 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2021 14:22:47 +0200 >Subject: [PATCH 08/11] CVE-2021-3738 s4:rpc_server/dnsserver: make use of > dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user() helper > >This is not strictly required, but it makes it easier to audit that >source4/rpc_server no longer calls samdb_connect() directly. > >BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468 > >Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> >--- > source4/rpc_server/dnsserver/dcerpc_dnsserver.c | 11 ++--------- > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) > >diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/dnsserver/dcerpc_dnsserver.c b/source4/rpc_server/dnsserver/dcerpc_dnsserver.c >index 910de9a1efd..9da92cb1c8d 100644 >--- a/source4/rpc_server/dnsserver/dcerpc_dnsserver.c >+++ b/source4/rpc_server/dnsserver/dcerpc_dnsserver.c >@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ > #include "includes.h" > #include "talloc.h" > #include "rpc_server/dcerpc_server.h" >+#include "rpc_server/common/common.h" > #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h" > #include "lib/util/dlinklist.h" > #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_dnsserver.h" >@@ -104,8 +105,6 @@ static void dnsserver_reload_zones(struct dnsserver_state *dsstate) > > static struct dnsserver_state *dnsserver_connect(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call) > { >- struct auth_session_info *session_info = >- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); > struct dnsserver_state *dsstate; > struct dnsserver_zone *zones, *z, *znext; > struct dnsserver_partition *partitions, *p; >@@ -125,13 +124,7 @@ static struct dnsserver_state *dnsserver_connect(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_c > > dsstate->lp_ctx = dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx; > >- /* FIXME: create correct auth_session_info for connecting user */ >- dsstate->samdb = samdb_connect(dsstate, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- dsstate->lp_ctx, >- session_info, >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ dsstate->samdb = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(dsstate, dce_call); > if (dsstate->samdb == NULL) { > DEBUG(0,("dnsserver: Failed to open samdb")); > goto failed; >-- >2.25.1 > > >From 4978125fabb80293036dee2f507c8de34fea8488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2021 14:24:25 +0200 >Subject: [PATCH 09/11] CVE-2021-3738 s4:rpc_server/lsa: make use of > dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user() helper > >This avoids a crash that's triggered by windows clients using >handles from OpenPolicy[2]() on across multiple connections within >an association group. > >BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468 > >Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> >--- > source4/rpc_server/lsa/lsa_init.c | 7 +------ > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-) > >diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/lsa/lsa_init.c b/source4/rpc_server/lsa/lsa_init.c >index f33b61c4035..400c5093079 100644 >--- a/source4/rpc_server/lsa/lsa_init.c >+++ b/source4/rpc_server/lsa/lsa_init.c >@@ -71,12 +71,7 @@ NTSTATUS dcesrv_lsa_get_policy_state(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, > } > > /* make sure the sam database is accessible */ >- state->sam_ldb = samdb_connect(state, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, >- session_info, >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ state->sam_ldb = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(state, dce_call); > if (state->sam_ldb == NULL) { > return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; > } >-- >2.25.1 > > >From 03baf7971b457f5d4cacdbea222675e3e4f3ba3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2021 15:09:04 +0200 >Subject: [PATCH 10/11] CVE-2021-3738 s4:rpc_server/netlogon: make use of > dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_*() helper > >This is not strictly required, but it makes it easier to audit that >source4/rpc_server no longer calls samdb_connect() directly and >also improves auditing for the dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system() case. > >BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468 > >Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> > >[jsutton@samba.org Adapted to fix conflict] >--- > source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c | 136 +++--------------- > 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-) > >diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c b/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c >index e640ad1e6f3..b24ba58352f 100644 >--- a/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c >+++ b/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c >@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ > > #include "includes.h" > #include "rpc_server/dcerpc_server.h" >+#include "rpc_server/common/common.h" > #include "auth/auth.h" > #include "auth/auth_sam_reply.h" > #include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h" >@@ -283,12 +284,7 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_ServerAuthenticate3_helper( > return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; > } > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, >- system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; > } >@@ -755,12 +751,7 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_ServerPasswordSet(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call > &creds); > NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(nt_status); > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, >- system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; > } >@@ -823,12 +814,7 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_ServerPasswordSet2(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_cal > &creds); > NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(nt_status); > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, >- system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; > } >@@ -1688,8 +1674,6 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_AccountSync(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALL > static WERROR dcesrv_netr_GetDcName(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, > struct netr_GetDcName *r) > { >- struct auth_session_info *session_info = >- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); > const char * const attrs[] = { NULL }; > struct ldb_context *sam_ctx; > struct ldb_message **res; >@@ -1716,12 +1700,7 @@ static WERROR dcesrv_netr_GetDcName(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_C > */ > } > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, >- session_info, >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return WERR_DS_UNAVAILABLE; > } >@@ -1921,13 +1900,8 @@ static WERROR dcesrv_netr_LogonControl_base_call(struct dcesrv_netr_LogonControl > if (!ok) { > struct ldb_context *sam_ctx; > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect( >- state, >- state->dce_call->event_ctx, >- lp_ctx, >- system_session(lp_ctx), >- state->dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system(state, >+ state->dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return WERR_DS_UNAVAILABLE; > } >@@ -2124,8 +2098,6 @@ static WERROR fill_trusted_domains_array(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, > static WERROR dcesrv_netr_GetAnyDCName(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, > struct netr_GetAnyDCName *r) > { >- struct auth_session_info *session_info = >- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); > struct netr_DomainTrustList *trusts; > struct ldb_context *sam_ctx; > struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx; >@@ -2139,12 +2111,7 @@ static WERROR dcesrv_netr_GetAnyDCName(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLO > r->in.domainname = lpcfg_workgroup(lp_ctx); > } > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- lp_ctx, >- session_info, >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return WERR_DS_UNAVAILABLE; > } >@@ -2286,17 +2253,9 @@ static WERROR dcesrv_netr_NETRLOGONCOMPUTECLIENTDIGEST(struct dcesrv_call_state > static WERROR dcesrv_netr_DsRGetSiteName(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, > struct netr_DsRGetSiteName *r) > { >- struct auth_session_info *session_info = >- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); > struct ldb_context *sam_ctx; >- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx; > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- lp_ctx, >- session_info, >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return WERR_DS_UNAVAILABLE; > } >@@ -2493,12 +2452,7 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_LogonGetDomainInfo(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_cal > } > NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(status); > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, >- system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; > } >@@ -2890,12 +2844,7 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_NetrLogonSendToSam(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_cal > return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; > } > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, >- system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; > } >@@ -2999,8 +2948,6 @@ static void dcesrv_netr_DsRGetDCName_base_done(struct tevent_req *subreq); > static WERROR dcesrv_netr_DsRGetDCName_base_call(struct dcesrv_netr_DsRGetDCName_base_state *state) > { > struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call = state->dce_call; >- struct auth_session_info *session_info = >- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); > TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = state->mem_ctx; > struct netr_DsRGetDCNameEx2 *r = &state->r; > struct ldb_context *sam_ctx; >@@ -3021,12 +2968,7 @@ static WERROR dcesrv_netr_DsRGetDCName_base_call(struct dcesrv_netr_DsRGetDCName > > ZERO_STRUCTP(r->out.info); > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(state, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- lp_ctx, >- session_info, >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return WERR_DS_UNAVAILABLE; > } >@@ -3481,11 +3423,8 @@ static WERROR dcesrv_netr_NetrEnumerateTrustedDomainsEx(struct dcesrv_call_state > static WERROR dcesrv_netr_DsRAddressToSitenamesExW(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, > struct netr_DsRAddressToSitenamesExW *r) > { >- struct auth_session_info *session_info = >- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); > struct ldb_context *sam_ctx; > struct netr_DsRAddressToSitenamesExWCtr *ctr; >- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx; > sa_family_t sin_family; > struct sockaddr_in *addr; > #ifdef HAVE_IPV6 >@@ -3498,12 +3437,7 @@ static WERROR dcesrv_netr_DsRAddressToSitenamesExW(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce > const char *res; > uint32_t i; > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- lp_ctx, >- session_info, >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return WERR_DS_UNAVAILABLE; > } >@@ -3615,18 +3549,10 @@ static WERROR dcesrv_netr_DsRAddressToSitenamesW(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_c > static WERROR dcesrv_netr_DsrGetDcSiteCoverageW(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, > struct netr_DsrGetDcSiteCoverageW *r) > { >- struct auth_session_info *session_info = >- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); > struct ldb_context *sam_ctx; > struct DcSitesCtr *ctr; >- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx; > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- lp_ctx, >- session_info, >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return WERR_DS_UNAVAILABLE; > } >@@ -3752,8 +3678,6 @@ static WERROR dcesrv_netr_DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce > TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, > struct netr_DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts *r) > { >- struct auth_session_info *session_info = >- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); > struct netr_DomainTrustList *trusts; > struct ldb_context *sam_ctx; > int ret; >@@ -3795,12 +3719,7 @@ static WERROR dcesrv_netr_DsrEnumerateDomainTrusts(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce > trusts->count = 0; > r->out.trusts = trusts; > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- lp_ctx, >- session_info, >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return WERR_GEN_FAILURE; > } >@@ -3910,7 +3829,6 @@ static WERROR dcesrv_netr_DsRGetForestTrustInformation(struct dcesrv_call_state > TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, > struct netr_DsRGetForestTrustInformation *r) > { >- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx; > struct auth_session_info *session_info = > dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); > enum security_user_level security_level; >@@ -3932,12 +3850,7 @@ static WERROR dcesrv_netr_DsRGetForestTrustInformation(struct dcesrv_call_state > return WERR_INVALID_FLAGS; > } > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- lp_ctx, >- session_info, >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return WERR_GEN_FAILURE; > } >@@ -4064,9 +3977,6 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_GetForestTrustInformation(struct dcesrv_call_state * > TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, > struct netr_GetForestTrustInformation *r) > { >- struct auth_session_info *session_info = >- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); >- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx; > struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds = NULL; > struct ldb_context *sam_ctx = NULL; > struct ldb_dn *domain_dn = NULL; >@@ -4090,12 +4000,7 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_GetForestTrustInformation(struct dcesrv_call_state * > return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; > } > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- lp_ctx, >- session_info, >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR; > } >@@ -4189,12 +4094,7 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_ServerGetTrustInfo(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_cal > return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; > } > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- lp_ctx, >- system_session(lp_ctx), >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; > } >-- >2.25.1 > > >From e61c9c7da3cde7a4c575994b59144f851beaa995 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Date: Thu, 5 Aug 2021 14:24:40 +0200 >Subject: [PATCH 11/11] CVE-2021-3738 s4:rpc_server/samr: make use of > dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_*() helper > >This avoids a crash that's triggered by windows clients using >handles from samr_Connect*() on across multiple connections within >an association group. > >In other cases is not strictly required, but it makes it easier to audit that >source4/rpc_server no longer calls samdb_connect() directly and also >improves the auditing for the dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system() case. > >BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14468 > >Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> >Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> > >[abartlet@samba.org Backported from master as Samba 4.13 does not > call dcerpc_is_transport_encrypted() and so session_info becomes > unused.] > >[jsutton@samba.org Adapted to fix conflicts] >--- > source4/rpc_server/samr/dcesrv_samr.c | 19 ++------------ > source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c | 33 ++++--------------------- > 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-) > >diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/samr/dcesrv_samr.c b/source4/rpc_server/samr/dcesrv_samr.c >index 1f09b721408..4b7e849be46 100644 >--- a/source4/rpc_server/samr/dcesrv_samr.c >+++ b/source4/rpc_server/samr/dcesrv_samr.c >@@ -210,8 +210,6 @@ exit: > static NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_Connect(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, > struct samr_Connect *r) > { >- struct auth_session_info *session_info = >- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); > struct samr_connect_state *c_state; > struct dcesrv_handle *handle; > >@@ -223,18 +221,12 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_Connect(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_C > } > > /* make sure the sam database is accessible */ >- c_state->sam_ctx = samdb_connect(c_state, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, >- session_info, >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ c_state->sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(c_state, dce_call); > if (c_state->sam_ctx == NULL) { > talloc_free(c_state); > return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; > } > >- > handle = dcesrv_handle_create(dce_call, SAMR_HANDLE_CONNECT); > if (!handle) { > talloc_free(c_state); >@@ -4662,8 +4654,6 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_RemoveMultipleMembersFromAlias(struct dcesrv_call_st > static NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_GetDomPwInfo(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, > struct samr_GetDomPwInfo *r) > { >- struct auth_session_info *session_info = >- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); > struct ldb_message **msgs; > int ret; > const char * const attrs[] = {"minPwdLength", "pwdProperties", NULL }; >@@ -4671,12 +4661,7 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_GetDomPwInfo(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, TAL > > ZERO_STRUCTP(r->out.info); > >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, >- session_info, >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; > } >diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c b/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c >index a80ae56b962..d92e70ddfe8 100644 >--- a/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c >+++ b/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c >@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ > > #include "includes.h" > #include "rpc_server/dcerpc_server.h" >+#include "rpc_server/common/common.h" > #include "rpc_server/samr/dcesrv_samr.h" > #include "system/time.h" > #include "../lib/crypto/crypto.h" >@@ -98,8 +99,6 @@ NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_OemChangePasswordUser2(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, > TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, > struct samr_OemChangePasswordUser2 *r) > { >- struct auth_session_info *session_info = >- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); > NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; > DATA_BLOB new_password, new_unicode_password; > char *new_pass; >@@ -139,12 +138,7 @@ NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_OemChangePasswordUser2(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, > > /* Connect to a SAMDB with system privileges for fetching the old pw > * hashes. */ >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, >- system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; > } >@@ -219,12 +213,7 @@ NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_OemChangePasswordUser2(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, > } > > /* Connect to a SAMDB with user privileges for the password change */ >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, >- session_info, >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; > } >@@ -297,8 +286,6 @@ NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_ChangePasswordUser3(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, > TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, > struct samr_ChangePasswordUser3 *r) > { >- struct auth_session_info *session_info = >- dcesrv_call_session_info(dce_call); > NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; > DATA_BLOB new_password; > struct ldb_context *sam_ctx = NULL; >@@ -340,12 +327,7 @@ NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_ChangePasswordUser3(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, > > /* Connect to a SAMDB with system privileges for fetching the old pw > * hashes. */ >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, >- system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_system(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; > } >@@ -424,12 +406,7 @@ NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_ChangePasswordUser3(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, > } > > /* Connect to a SAMDB with user privileges for the password change */ >- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, >- dce_call->event_ctx, >- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, >- session_info, >- dce_call->conn->remote_address, >- 0); >+ sam_ctx = dcesrv_samdb_connect_as_user(mem_ctx, dce_call); > if (sam_ctx == NULL) { > return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; > } >-- >2.25.1 >
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