Attachment 12739 Details for Bug 12445 – Updated description

Updated description

CVE-2016-2125-description.ab_v2.txt (text/plain), 4.65 KB, created by Karolin Seeger on 2016-12-07 11:42:39 UTC

(hide)

Description:

Filename:

MIME Type:

Creator: Karolin Seeger

Created: 2016-12-07 11:42:39 UTC

Size: 4.65 KB

patch

obsolete

>===============================================================================
>== Subject:     Unconditional privilege delegation to Kerberos servers in trusted realms
>==
>== CVE ID#:     CVE-2016-2125
>==
>== Versions:    Samba 3.0.25 to 4.5.2
>==
>== Summary:     Samba client code always requests a forwardable ticket
>==              when using Kerberos authentication. This means the
>==              target server, which must be in the current or trusted
>==              domain/realm, is given a valid general purpose Kerberos
>==              "Ticket Granting Ticket" (TGT), which can be used to
>==              fully impersonate the authenticated user or service.
>==
>================================================================================
>
>===========
>Description
>===========
>
>The Samba client code always requests a forwardable Kerberos ticket when
>performing Kerberos authentication by passing the GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG to the
>gss_init_sec_context() GSSAPI function.
>
>The use of GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG, if accepted by the Kerberos KDC, results in
>passing the forwardable TGT to the remote target service via Kerberos AP-REQ.
>The target service by design must be part of the same or a trusted Kerberos
>realm (a domain in the same or trusted Active Directory forest).
>
>The service that accepts the AP-REQ from the client can thus do whatever the
>client is also able to achieve with the Kerberos TGT.
>
>The risks of impersonation of the client are similar to the well known risks
>from forwarding of NTLM credentials, with two important differences:
> - NTLM forwarding can and should be mitigated with packet signing
> - Kerberos forwarding can only be attempted after the trusted
>   destination server decrypts the ticket.
>
>Finally, it should be noted that typically the connections involved
>are either explicitly requested, or are between or to Domain
>Controllers already of ultimate privilege.
>
>Controlling Kerberos forwarding
>-------------------------------
>
>In the Active Directory world it's possible for administrators to
>limit the delegation. User and computer objects can both act as
>Kerberos users and also as Kerberos services. Both types of objects have an
>attribute called 'userAccountControl' which is a bitmask that controls the
>behavior of the account. The following three values have impact on possible
>delegation:
>
>0x00100000: UF_NOT_DELEGATED:
>
>The UF_NOT_DELEGATED can be used to disable the ability to get forwardable TGT
>for the account. It means the KDC will respond with an error if the client asks
>for the forwardable ticket.  The client typically gives up and removes the
>GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG flag and continues without passing delegated credentials.
>Administrators can use this to disable possible delegation for the most
>privileged accounts (e.g. administrator accounts).
>
>0x00080000: UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
>
>If the UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION is set on an account a KDC will include the
>OK_AS_DELEGATE flag in a granted service ticket. If the client application
>uses just GSS_C_DELEG_POLICY_FLAG (instead of GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG) gssapi/Kerberos
>libraries typically only include delegated credentials when the service ticket
>includes the OK_AS_DELEGATE flag.  Administrators can use this to control which
>services will get delegated credentials, for example if the service runs in a
>trusted environment and actually requires the presence of delegated
>credentials.
>
>0x01000000: UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION
>
>The UF_TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION is not really relevant for this
>CVE and just listed here for completeness. This flag is relevant for the
>S4U2Proxy feature, where a service can ask the KDC for a proxied service
>ticket which can impersonate users to other services.
>
>The patched Samba version will still use GSS_C_DELEG_POLICY_FLAG and provide
>delegated credentials to services which have the UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
>bitmask set on the user account.
>
>==================
>Patch Availability
>==================
>
>A patch addressing this defect has been posted to
>
>  https://www.samba.org/samba/security/
>
>Additionally, Samba 4.5.3, 4.4.8 and 4.3.13 have been issued as
>security releases to correct the defect. Samba vendors and
>administrators running affected versions are advised to upgrade or
>apply the patch as soon as possible.
>
>==========
>Workaround
>==========
>
>See the description about UF_NOT_DELEGATED above.
>
>The samba-tool command and the AD DC mode honours the undocumented
>"gensec_gssapi:delegation=no" option in the [global] section of the
>smb.conf file.
>
>=======
>Credits
>=======
>
>This vulnerability was discovered by Simo Sorce of Red Hat and
>researched by Stefan Metzmacher of SerNet (https://samba.plus) both
>members of the Samba Team (https://www.samba.org). Stefan Metzmacher
>also provided the fixes.

Actions: View

Attachments on bug 12445: 12707 | 12708 | 12709 | 12710 | 12711 | 12730 | 12732 | 12733 | 12735 | 12736 | 12737 | 12739 | 12766 | 12772