Attachment 10169 Details for Bug 10716 – git-am fix for master, 4.1.next and 4.0.next.

[patch] git-am fix for master, 4.1.next and 4.0.next.

bug-10716-master.patch (text/plain), 4.83 KB, created by Jeremy Allison on 2014-08-02 04:45:13 UTC

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Creator: Jeremy Allison

Created: 2014-08-02 04:45:13 UTC

Size: 4.83 KB

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obsolete

>From 09e739133f460bb64e17deded6ab5f9edfb6db4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
>Date: Fri, 1 Aug 2014 21:29:21 -0700
>Subject: [PATCH 1/2] lib: strings: Fix the behavior of strcasecmp_m_handle()
> in the face of bad conversions.
>MIME-Version: 1.0
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
>
>When either string has a bad conversion, we fall back to
>doing raw ascii byte comparisons using strcasecmp().
>
>The problem is we've already stepped past the character
>that failed the conversion, so we're not re-testing those
>characters for comparison. This can have the effect of
>causing strcasecmp_m_handle() to report that two strings
>are identical when they are not, if the failed conversion
>takes place at the end of the string.
>
>The correct behavior is to step back to the point of
>the string(s) that failed the conversion, and continue
>the test from there.
>
>Found by <lev@zadarastorage.com> when investigating bug
>10716 - smbd constantly crashes when filename contains non-ascii character.
>
>Given the normal character set of utf-8, and an on
>disk filename of ISO-8859-1 of file-Ã© on disk hex
>value: 66 69 6c 65 2d e9, an incoming open given the
>correct utf8 name of file-Ã© will collide when it
>should not.
>
>Fixes:
>
>Bug 10716 - smbd constantly crashes when filename contains non-ascii character
>
>https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10716
>
>Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
>---
> lib/util/charset/util_str.c | 12 +++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
>diff --git a/lib/util/charset/util_str.c b/lib/util/charset/util_str.c
>index 688ab5a..1810e24 100644
>--- a/lib/util/charset/util_str.c
>+++ b/lib/util/charset/util_str.c
>@@ -56,7 +56,17 @@ _PUBLIC_ int strcasecmp_m_handle(struct smb_iconv_handle *iconv_handle,
> 
> 		if (c1 == INVALID_CODEPOINT ||
> 		    c2 == INVALID_CODEPOINT) {
>-			/* what else can we do?? */
>+			/*
>+			 * Fall back to byte
>+			 * comparison. We must
>+			 * step back by the codepoint
>+			 * length we just incremented
>+			 * - otherwise we are not
>+			 * checking the bytes that
>+			 * failed the conversion.
>+			 */
>+			s1 -= size1;
>+			s2 -= size2;
> 			return strcasecmp(s1, s2);
> 		}
> 
>-- 
>1.9.1
>
>
>From a14128e0591e7ab731a89e0bbba9cfa0f15c2ef6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
>From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
>Date: Fri, 1 Aug 2014 21:38:59 -0700
>Subject: [PATCH 2/2] lib: strings: Fix the behavior of strncasecmp_m_handle()
> in the face of bad conversions.
>
>When either string has a bad conversion, we fall back to
>doing raw ascii byte comparisons using strcasecmp(). This
>is wrong - we should fall back to strncasecmp.
>
>The problem is we've already stepped past the character
>that failed the conversion, so we're not re-testing those
>characters for comparison. This can have the effect of
>causing strncasecmp_m_handle() to report that two strings
>are identical when they are not, if the failed conversion
>takes place at the end of the string.
>
>The correct behavior is to step back to the point of
>the string(s) that failed the conversion, and continue
>the test from there.
>
>This is a litle trickier than the previous fix, as
>it requires converting the incoming n variable from
>remaining characters to compare to remaining bytes to
>compare.
>
>As bytes are always the smallest character size
>(1 byte) then it's safe to convert the remaining
>characters to check by decrementing the source string
>by the last character length (in bytes) and incrementing
>the remaining bytes to scan by the same value, then
>calling strncasecmp() with the stepped back strings
>remaining.
>
>Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
>---
> lib/util/charset/util_str.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/lib/util/charset/util_str.c b/lib/util/charset/util_str.c
>index 1810e24..f62c999 100644
>--- a/lib/util/charset/util_str.c
>+++ b/lib/util/charset/util_str.c
>@@ -116,8 +116,33 @@ _PUBLIC_ int strncasecmp_m_handle(struct smb_iconv_handle *iconv_handle,
> 
> 		if (c1 == INVALID_CODEPOINT ||
> 		    c2 == INVALID_CODEPOINT) {
>-			/* what else can we do?? */
>-			return strcasecmp(s1, s2);
>+			/*
>+			 * Fall back to byte
>+			 * comparison. We must
>+			 * step back by the codepoint
>+			 * length we just incremented
>+			 * by - otherwise we are not
>+			 * checking the bytes that
>+			 * failed the conversion.
>+			 */
>+			s1 -= size1;
>+			s2 -= size2;
>+			/*
>+			 * n was specified in characters,
>+			 * now we must convert it to bytes.
>+			 * As bytes are the smallest
>+			 * character unit, the following
>+			 * increment and strncasecmp is always
>+			 * safe.
>+			 *
>+			 * The source string was already known
>+			 * to be n characters long, so we are
>+			 * guaranteed to be able to look at the
>+			 * (n remaining + size1) bytes from the
>+			 * new (s1 - size1) position).
>+			 */
>+			n += size1;
>+			return strncasecmp(s1, s2, n);
> 		}
> 
> 		if (toupper_m(c1) != toupper_m(c2)) {
>-- 
>1.9.1
>

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Attachments on bug 10716: 10109 | 10165 | 10169 | 10175 | 10176